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ABSTRACT 
 
Supply chain integration (SCI) among customers and suppliers is widely touted as 
a panacea that can resolve a variety of supply chain challenges and create new 
opportunities. Yet, there is little understanding about SCI. My first research question 
pertains to identifying the idiosyncratic behavioral nuances associated with SCI. I employ 
Grounded Theory (GT) methodology to analyze data obtained from interviews with 
individuals at seven companies. This work suggests that firms engaging in SCI exhibit a 
set of six behavioral patterns, which vary in degree. I then conjecture that SCI might exist 
at three different levels: coordination, collaboration, and internalization.  
Furthermore, very few studies have examined SCI’s antecedents from the 
supplier’s standpoint. I examine the role of customer leadership behavior which has 
hardly been the subject of empirical inquiry in this domain. I also empirically study the 
operant sequence that relates customer leadership behavior to SCI. I develop a theoretical 
framework and test it using data obtained from 207 firms via survey methodology. My 
results suggest that a customer’s transformational leadership behavior appears to 
positively influence trust which impacts affective commitment. Affective commitment is 
found to engender high levels of SCI.  
Also, the extant empirical research on SCI is examined from an organizational, 
and rather impersonal level, as if an invisible hand calls the shots.  The role of individual 
in decision making in largely ignored. I synthesize the Behavioral Agency Model (BAM) 
and Behavioral Approach and Inhibition Model (BAIM), specify two variables (i.e., 
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Variability in Pay and Socioemotional Wealth) as potential explanatory variables of 
executive decision making. The main findings reported in this study are based on 125 
usable responses obtained by employing a 2x2 experimental design. I find evidence to 
suggest that only the main effect of variability in pay is positive and statistically 
significant. This suggests that individuals experiencing high levels of variability in pay 
are more likely to seek the highest level of SCI A post-hoc analysis, which involved 
splitting the sample by age (i.e., low & high) groups, yielded interesting findings as the 
results varied significantly between the two age groups. 
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1 CHAPTER I 
 INTRODUCTION* 
Firms that poorly manage their supply chain relationships incur significant costs. 
As an example, auto parts suppliers find that supplying to General Motors (GM) costs 
them 8% more than what it costs to supply a similar part to Toyota or Honda (Chappell, 
2004). More often, GM’s suppliers attempt different means to transfer this cost to GM. A 
study by Dyer (2002) also finds that GM’s transaction costs with its suppliers are six to 
eight times higher than what is incurred by Toyota. Recent research reports have 
demonstrated that poor supplier relationships not only translate to high monetary costs, 
but have resulted in fatalities. For instance, thirteen fatal crashes involving GM cars due 
to faulty ignition switches had been reported by December 2013 (Hoffman, 2014). GM 
blamed the faulty ignition switches on its parts supplier, Delphi. Delphi depended on GM 
for more than 90% of its business, and when GM began to squeeze Delphi’s profit margins, 
it resulted in strained relationships between Delphi and GM (Naughton, Welch, Green, & 
Kimes, 2014). GM and Delphi’s strained relationship prevented them from working 
together in designing and developing the ignition switches for their new car models, which 
could have perhaps prevented some tragic events. According to John Henke, president of 
                                                 
* Part of this chapter is reprinted with permission from “The relationships between external integration and 
plant improvement and innovation capabilities: The moderation effect of product clockspeed” by Peng, D. 
X., Verghese, A., Shah, R., & Schroeder, R. G, 2013.  Journal of Supply Chain Management, 49(3): 3-24, 
© 2013 Institute for Supply Management, Inc. 
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Planning Perspectives Inc., a firm that tracks relationships between automakers and its 
suppliers, “the two companies had so much hatred for each other that if one was working 
as a Delphi engineer, he/she didn’t want to get out of bed in the morning” (Hoffman, 
2014).  
On the other hand, effectively managing supply chain relationships can yield 
substantial benefits for companies (e.g., new product development capabilities). As an 
example, in 2007, Research In Motion (RIM) had 10.9% of the worldwide smartphone 
market share while Samsung had 1.8% (Roberta, Nguyen, Gupta, Vergne, & Sato, 2009). 
However, this situation has changed since then, and currently Samsung has acquired 32% 
of the global smartphone market share while RIM has roughly less than 1% of the market 
share (Ganos, 2013). One plausible explanation for this downward spiral of RIM and 
upward spiral of Samsung is their supply chain relationships and how they are managed 
(Greve, Rowley, & Shipilov, 2013). During the time period 2007 to 2011, Samsung 
developed over 25 strategic supply chain relationships while RIM had developed about 
four (Greve et al., 2013). In 2008, during one of the worst economic crises since World 
War I, RIM considered it as an opportunity to increase its profit margins by exercising its 
purchasing power and bargaining for lower costs with its suppliers. Jim Balsillie, Co-Chief 
Executive Officer of RIM Inc., is quoted saying, “Being a strong growth company in a 
challenging environment makes you an important customer” (Miller, 2013). Instead of 
collaborating with suppliers in challenging situations, and finding means to reduce costs 
and increase market share, RIM was keen on bargaining for a lower price by exercising 
its purchasing power (Miller, 2013). Samsung, on the other hand, collaborated with its 
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suppliers and determined ways to reduce its overall costs and gain market share. Samsung 
values long-term strategic relationships and determines ways to expand the scope of its 
business with its supply chain partners (Manna, 2011). Often, this commitment by 
Samsung is reflected in its suppliers’ actions. For example,  Praxair, a supplier of bulk and 
process gasses necessary for the production of liquid crystal displays, purchased an 18,000 
square-foot area close to a Samsung facility to serve it better (Manna, 2011).  
Considering the importance of interfirm relationships (i.e., supply chain 
integration), supply chain scholars have paid increased levels of attention to supply chain 
integration (SCI) over the past two decades (see Figure 1-1). Typically supply chain 
researchers have ascribed SCI with positive attributions. Furthermore, the impact of SCI 
has predominantly been examined in the context of new product development (Koufteros, 
Rawski, & Rupak, 2010; Rai & Bajwa, 1997; Saeed, Malhotra, & Grover, 2005) and 
various operational performance metrics such as delivery, quality, cost, and flexibility 
performance (Paulraj & Chen, 2005; Schoenherr & Swink, 2012; Wagner, Coley, & 
Lindemann, 2011; Watson, 2001). A recent meta-analytic study conducted by Leuschner, 
Rogers, and Charvet (2013) found evidence to suggest that SCI has a positive impact on 
firm performance.  Frohlich and Westbrook (2001) demonstrated that firms with wider 
“arcs of integration” have higher performance improvement. That is, firms with greater 
supplier and customer integration exhibit higher operational performance improvement. 
Overall, consensus exists that SCI is a viable means to compete in today’s highly 
competitive environment (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Leuschner et al., 2013) 
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Figure 1-1 SCI Publication Trend (searched using the keywords supply chain 
integration, collaboration, coordination from EBSCO Business Source Complete) 
  
 
Despite the vast number of studies on SCI, ambiguity still persists regarding the 
theoretical conceptualization and operationalization of the term SCI (Barratt, 2004; Cao 
& Zhang, 2011). The term SCI is often used interchangeably with terms such as 
coordination and collaboration. There is no clear distinction between these three terms in 
the literature, although researchers have argued that coordination, collaboration, and SCI 
represent different levels of interfirm relationships. For example, Cao and Zhang (2011) 
suggest firms that have an integrated relationship have stronger ties with their supply chain 
partners than those firms that collaborate, and Barratt (2004) argued that collaborating 
firms have stronger ties than coordinating firms. Earlier studies suggest that there are 
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inconsistencies in the operationalization of the behavioral characteristics exhibited by 
firms while engaging in SCI (Mackelprang, Robinson, & Webb, 2012).  
Additionally, there is a paucity of studies that examine antecedents of SCI (Goo, 
Huang, & Hart, 2008). This paucity limits our understanding of the factors that can perhaps 
explain failure or success in supply chain relationships. The extant research regarding 
antecedents of SCI has primarily focused on studying the role of power, relationship 
commitment, and supplier attributes such as performance and capabilities (Petersen, 
Handfield, & Ragatz, 2005) while ignoring other critical issues such as leadership 
behavior within a supply chain. Leadership can foster supply chain partner actions and can 
shape supply chain relationships (Defee, 2007; Sharif & Irani, 2012). Furthermore, most 
studies on SCI have looked at it from a customer’s perspective but not from a supplier’s 
perspective. The lack of empirical research and respective evidence regarding the 
antecedents of SCI limits our understanding of how effective SCI can be attained.  
SCI can result in sustained competitive advantage at large (Dyer and Singh, 1998). 
However, SCI requires substantial investment into a relationship in terms of time, effort 
and costs. Failure in SCI can result in substantial costs. Recently, Tiffany & Co. had to 
pay Swiss watchmaker Swatch Group AG the equivalent of $449.5 million in damages 
due to their failed partnership (Linebaugh, 2013). In another instance, Dow Chemical Co., 
the largest U.S. chemical maker by sales, was awarded $2.48 billion from Petrochemical 
Industries Co. of Kuwait for a canceled joint venture (McDonald & Kaskey, 2013). The 
governance mechanisms within organizations are structured in a manner that risks are 
transferred from firms to executives (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). Agency theorists 
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have argued that an executive who bears high risk engages in risk-averse behaviors 
(Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). Thus, if supply chain executives (SCEs) who make 
decisions related to SCI perceive high levels of risk, they might decide not to pursue SCI 
(Villena, Gomez-Mejia, & Revilla, 2009). The decision making behaviors of supply chain 
executives in the realm of SCI decisions have not been a topic of empirical inquiry.  
In addition, much of the extant SCI literature has examined SCI at the firm level 
(Koufteros et al., 2010; Lau, Tang, & Yam, 2010), strategic business unit level (SBU), 
and plant level (Peng, Verghese, Shah, & Schroeder, 2013). The examination of SCI at 
the firm, SBU, and plant level provides valuable insights into the performance 
implications of engaging in SCI. However, our understanding of the phenomenon is 
limited as we fail to consider the role of individuals in SCI (Villena et al., 2009). 
Organizations are a mirror of the respective executives’ strategic choices within them 
(Hambrick & Mason, 1984), and ignoring the role of executives can hamper our 
understanding of the phenomenon of SCI.  
1.1 Research Objectives 
Although a large number of studies have examined SCI, several questions remain 
largely unanswered. First, there is ambiguity pertaining to the theoretical underpinnings 
of the SCI construct. One of the primary objectives of this dissertation is to understand the 
idiosyncratic behavioral nuances of SCI. Furthermore, I seek to develop a theoretical 
framework for SCI serving as the basis upon which future deductive research can be 
conducted. 
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While much of the empirical literature on SCI has focused on examining the 
outcomes of SCI, relatively little research has been conducted to understand the 
antecedents of SCI. The second objective of this dissertation is to examine the impact of 
customer leadership behaviors/styles on the supplier’s willingness to engage in SCI. 
Contingent on the leadership behavior(s) exhibited by a customer, a supplier might 
respond in different ways. Examining whether and how customer leadership behavior 
ultimately heightens the propensity of a supplier to engage in interfirm relationships will 
be fruitful and informative for both academia and practice.  
In addition to the lack of studies examining the antecedents to SCI, hardly any 
attention has been directed towards understanding the individual role of executives within 
organizations in the realm of SCI. Although a firm level perspective provides useful 
insights on how firms engage in SCI, ignoring the role of individuals in SCI research is 
being increasing questioned (Villena et al., 2009). There is no invisible hand that makes 
strategic decisions; rather individuals who carry their own biases, preferences, and 
interests make such decisions.  
1.2 Literature Related to Supply Chain Integration  
This section first elaborates on the two broad perspectives that have been used to 
examine SCI, and subsequently discusses the literature related to the conceptualization 
and antecedents of SCI. This review serves the purpose of more effectively illustrating the 
potential gaps in the literature that are addressed in this dissertation. The two broad 
perspectives used to explain external SCI are customer integration and supplier 
integration. It is not practical to review all the vast SCI literature in this study, and thus 
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only a representative sample of the literature is reviewed here (see van der Vaart & van 
Donk (2010)).    
1.2.1 Supplier Integration  
Increasingly, firms are relying on their suppliers for their valuable inputs while 
developing new products (Petersen, Handfield, Lawson, & Cousins, 2008). In other terms, 
suppliers are treated as strategic collaborators by the focal firm (Koufteros, Vonderembse, 
& Jayaram, 2005). Supplier integration is an important task when it comes to supplier 
management (Wagner, 2003). Das, Narasimhan, and Talluri (2006, p.564) defined 
supplier integration as “a state of syncretism among the supplier, purchasing, and 
manufacturing constituents of the organization.”  A synergetic relationship between the 
supplier and its focal firm allows partnering firms to work closely together in developing 
new products with high quality and at low cost while both companies reap the benefits of 
the emerging product. Supplier integration enables partner firms to combine their efforts 
in meeting customer requirements effectively and efficiently.  
Supplier integration serves as a medium for sharing information and knowledge 
among suppliers and focal firms, and as a means of applying that information and 
knowledge for the joint benefit of the members involved in a relationship (Das et al., 
2006). An integrated supplier relationship is often characterized by high levels of trust and 
commitment among the involved firms. Furthermore, joint problem solving, seamless 
transfer of information, relationship duration, and constant feedback are distinct 
characteristics of an integrated supplier relationship. When integrated with suppliers, 
manufacturers invest time and other resources in developing the capabilities of suppliers. 
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Supplier integration improves a focal firm’s relationship with its integrated suppliers and 
enables a smooth relationship in the future (Petersen, Ragatz, & Monczka, 2005; Ragatz, 
Handfield, & Petersen, 2002). 
Supplier integration has positive benefits for the performance of supply chain. For 
example, it has a positive impact on the reduction of lead time for new product 
development (Primo & Amundson, 2002). Lau et al. (2010) demonstrate that supplier 
integration is a means to improve product innovation and product performance for a focal 
firm. From a supplier perspective, Klioutch and Leker (2011) identify that supplier 
involvement in their customer is new product development activities has a positive impact 
on new product development for the customer. Perols, Zimmermann, and Kortmann 
(2013) maintain that supplier process integration enables the manufacturing firms to 
achieve quicker time-to-market and thereby provides them a competitive advantage. 
1.2.2 Customer Integration  
Relative to supplier integration, customer integration (CI) has not received much 
attention in the SCI literature. Customer inputs can also serve as a valuable source of 
information for continuous improvement and innovation activities (Peng et al., 2013). 
According to Bowersox et al. (1996 ), CI derives from coordination with critical SC 
customers. The few studies pertaining to CI have identified that information sharing, 
coordination, and synchronization of processes are some of the critical activities in CI 
(Zhao, Huo, Flynn, & Yeung, 2008) that help build a long-term relationship with 
customers of choice (Closs & Mollenkopf, 2004). CI involves several activities that 
promote stronger interfirm relationships with customers, such as frequent customer 
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contacts, communication of satisfaction surveys, and formal and informal direct 
employee–customer interactions (Swink, Narasimhan, & Wang, 2007). By engaging in 
CI, focal firms are able to obtain information regarding the required changes to product 
specifications and process design in a timely and accurate manner (Stump, Athaide, & 
Joshi, 2002). Since product modification and improvements are often triggered by changes 
in customer needs, frequent inputs from customers become increasingly important in a 
highly competitive environment. Customers can help improve suppliers’ product design 
processes by providing technical support for and training on product design methodologies 
and tools (Hartley & Choi, 1996). CI not only helps the focal firm obtain additional design 
information but also helps clarify information ambiguity, which frequently arises when a 
product is introduced under significant time pressure. CI has a positive impact on reducing 
glitches in product development and increasing the chances of a product’s market success 
(Koufteros et al., 2010). 
Developing an integrated relationship with customers provides tacit knowledge 
and insights that cannot be achieved without that close relationship. Such knowledge can 
be used to enhance operational effectiveness and cost efficiency (Eckes, 2001). 
Furthermore, developing intimate relationships with customers insulates suppliers from 
market competition, at least to a certain degree (Stank, Keller, & Closs, 2001a).  
Customers are often a source of innovative ideas and can help suppliers improve 
their products and service design (Flint, Larsson, Gammelgaard, & Mentzer, 2005). 
Utilizing customer ideas is a major source of innovation (Ulwick, 2002). Furthermore, CI 
 11 
 
serves as a means to provide individualized products to customers by helping suppliers 
develop key capabilities (Peng et al., 2013).  
1.2.3 Definitions of SCI 
Supply chain scholars often measure interfirm relationships using the construct of 
supply chain integration (SCI) (Frohlich & Westbrook, 2001; Schoenherr & Swink, 2012). 
The term SCI is characterized by inconsistent definitions and dimensions (Tate et al., 
2010). Some scholars treat SCI as a single construct (Cox, 2001), while others focus on 
multiple dimensions of SCI (Leuschner et al., 2013; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Peng et 
al., 2013; Rai & Bajwa, 1997), in particular internal-, customer-, and supplier-integration. 
More recently, Van der Vaart & van Donk (2010) suggest that the term SCI is captured by 
various practices, patterns, and attitudes. They suggest that supply chain practices are 
characterized by tangible activities, or technologies that play a critical role in the 
collaboration of a focal firm with its suppliers and/or customers. Examples include the 
utilization of Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) and Vendor Managed Inventories (VMI). 
Moreover, they suggest that related to supply chain practices are supply chain patterns, or 
interaction patterns, between the focal firm and its suppliers and/or customers. Examples 
of interaction patterns include regular visits to the supplier's facility, and frequent face-to-
face communication. Attitudes, they suggest, measure the feelings of buyers and/or 
suppliers towards each other or towards SCI in general. For instance, one such feeling is 
a customer’s view of their suppliers as an extension of their company. These categories 
help us group pre-existing measures of SCI in an effective fashion. While these 
dimensions and classifications offer significant insights into the research on SCI by 
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examining their role in improving firm performance (Schoenherr & Swink, 2012) and 
innovation capabilities (Peng et al., 2013), the extant literature falls short in explaining the 
term SCI in relation to coordination and collaboration (Barratt, 2004; Cao & Zhang, 2011).  
SCI is confounded with the terms coordination and collaboration. Several studies 
suggest that there is a difference between coordination, collaboration, and integration (Cao 
& Zhang, 2011; Lee, 2000), but the differences between them are still very ambiguous. 
According to a report by Boston Consulting Group & Wharton (2006), having supply 
chain coordination and collaboration amongst two parties alone may not be sufficient to 
address the primary goal of supply chain management: having the right product at the right 
place, at the right time, and at the right price. The report recommends that successful firms 
have now embraced SCI. It is important to note that they suggest that there is a difference 
between supply chain coordination, collaboration, and integration without however really 
delineating the differences between them. In addition, Lee (2000) suggests that there is 
variance between being coordinated and being integrated. According to Lee (2000), 
coordination reflects information sharing, exchanging decision rights, work realignment, 
and resource sharing, while integration encompasses coordination and additional 
organizational linkages which facilitate sharing of risks, costs, and gains. The 
differentiation made by Lee (2000) is significant, however, the term collaboration is lost 
in the expressions of coordination and integration. Also, a number of scholars have 
illustrated that collaboration is different from coordination (Bowersox, Closs, & Stank, 
2003; Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998b). Jap (1999) carried out a seminal study towards 
this account. Jap (1999) suggests that collaboration is the combination of coordination 
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efforts and joint investments in idiosyncratic resources. Although scholars acknowledge 
that there is a difference between the terms of coordination, collaboration, and SCI these 
terms are frequently used interchangeably. This difference promotes confusion, leads to 
inconsistent findings, and hampers meaningful additive research. A plausible reason for 
this confusion is the lack of an unambiguous definition for the constructs of supply chain 
coordination, supply chain collaboration, and SCI. 
1.2.4 Antecedents of SCI 
Although several studies have sought to explain the link between SCI and 
performance, relatively few studies have examined the antecedents of SCI (Zhao et al., 
2008). Bensaou and Anderson (1999) investigated the relationship between different task 
and supplier characteristics on the willingness of a customer to engage in SCI by investing 
in idiosyncratic investments.  Using a sample of 388 complete observations regarding 
matched buyer-supplier relationships, they empirically demonstrate that several factors 
such as, task complexity, interdependency, and supplier trustworthiness serve as enablers 
of SCI from a buyer’s perspective. Supply chain scholars have successfully identified 
generalizable constructs from other disciplines such as sociology and psychology and 
metaphorically examined their impact on SCI. For instance, studies have examined the 
effects of factors such as social embeddedness, i.e. relational linkages or ties among other 
supply chain partners (Koufteros, Edwin Cheng, & Lai, 2007) and reputation (Wagner et 
al., 2011) on SCI.   
Several studies have also sought to explain the role of trust and commitment in 
SCI (Cannon, Doney, Mullen, & Petersen, 2010; Das et al., 2006; Doney & Cannon, 1997; 
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Johnston, McCutcheon, Stuart, & Kerwood, 2004; Zhao et al., 2008). As an example, 
Cannon et al. (2010) study the role of a buyer firm’s trust of its supplier and the supplier 
firm’s operational performance on a buyer’s long-term orientation towards its supplier. 
They further argue that these relationships are contingent upon the culture of the buying 
firm. For the purpose of comparing the differences in relationships across cultures, the 
study was undertaken across three different countries using a total of 561 usable responses. 
In their study, they find that trust and supplier performance positively affect the long-term 
orientation of buyers, thereby inducing them to be more inclined towards SCI. 
Furthermore, in collectivist cultures they find that the effect of trust on long-term 
relationships is greater than the effect of supplier performance.  
More recently, SCI scholars have focused their attention on inciting mechanisms 
that foster trust and commitment among supply chain partners, which can serve as 
effective facilitators of SCI. For instance, studies have examined the role of power in 
achieving SCI and superior performance (Handley & Benton Jr, 2012; Terpend & 
Ashenbaum, 2012; Zhao et al., 2008). Zhao et al. (2008) examined the relationship among 
two different types of power (i.e., mediated and non-mediated sources of power) on CI. 
They generally find that the non-mediated power bases (e.g., expert power, referent power, 
and legitimate power) positively influence SCI using a sample of firms from five major 
cities in China. While extant studies have examined power as an influence mechanism in 
achieving SCI, current research falls short in adequately addressing the role of (customer) 
leadership behavior, another effective rousing mechanism (Avolio, Gardner, Walumbwa, 
Luthans, & May, 2004a; Sharif & Irani, 2012), in enabling SCI.  
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Furthermore, most of the prior work on SCI has examined its antecedents at the 
firm level and ignores the role of executives who have the ability to influence strategic 
decisions pertinent to their organizations. Increasingly researchers question whether this 
is prudent given the level of power executives hold (Villena et al., 2009). 
1.3 Research Questions and Expected Contributions to the SCI Literature 
The review of relevant literature has identified and underlined some of the gaps in 
the current SCI literature, and highlighted some important questions that remain largely 
unanswered.  First, there is a clear need for a theoretical framework of SCI that explains 
what it is and what it entails; there is a need to define SCI and delineate its domain and 
idiosyncratic attributes. Furthermore, the SCI literature has not considered the role of 
customer leadership behavior in achieving SCI. Specifically, there is a need for a 
nomological network that relates customer leadership behaviors to the extent a supplier 
pursues SCI with its customer. Moreover, it is imperative to examine SCI from an 
individual’s perspective to gain a holistic understanding of antecedents of SCI. In essence, 
the interest centers here on the question of whether the personal interests of executives’ 
influence their decisions pertaining to the type of relationship they would seek with supply 
chain partners. I address these questions through three studies in my dissertation, which 
are briefly discussed below. 
1.3.1 Study-1 
Overall, consensus exists that SCI has a positive influence on firm performance. 
However, some recent evidence suggests that SCI might not have the desired impact on 
operational performance (Hong & Hartley, 2011; Schoenherr & Swink, 2012) and new 
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product development capabilities (Wagner, 2012). Such evidence cannot be simply 
dismissed. A plausible explanation for these contradictory findings is that the theoretical 
meaning for SCI is highly inconsistent. Extant literature suggests that there is no 
consistency in the operationalization of SCI (Van der Vaart & van Donk, 2008). To 
adequately capture the term SCI, the nuances in behaviors associated with SCI a 
qualitative approach is employed. 
Several interviews are conducted across several industries. The data were obtained 
through semi-structured interviews and was analyzed using Nvivo10 employing a 
Grounded Theory (GT) methodology. Central themes and their relationships were 
identified using different coding mechanisms (i.e., open, selective, and axial) proposed by 
GT methodology (Birks & Mills, 2011). The results indicate that SCI captures a set of six 
different behaviors namely, monitoring, joint activities, knowledge sharing, relational 
investments, vision sharing, and adaptability in relationships. Furthermore, the results 
suggest, firms can be grouped into three different levels SCI based on the behaviors 
exhibited namely, coordination (i.e., firms are transactional in orientation), collaboration 
(i.e., firms are cooperative in nature), and internalization (i.e., firms exhibit an intrinsic 
desire to be associated in a relationship).  
1.3.2 Study-2 
In this study, two theories are employed (i.e., Transformational Leadership Theory 
(TLT) and Social Exchange Theory (SET)) to develop the hypotheses that link customer 
leadership behaviors and the extent to which a supplier pursues SCI with its customer. 
TLT identifies two distinct leadership behavior styles, transformational (TL) and 
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transactional leadership (TRL). Furthermore, this theory suggests that TL is a second-
order factor comprising of three first-order factors which include charisma/inspirational 
leadership, intellectual stimulation, and individualized consideration. On the other hand, 
TRL can be reflected by two distinct nuances, namely contingent reward and management 
by exception. SET on the other hand provides the theoretical framework to explain how 
these two leadership behavior styles influence SCI as viewed from the supplier 
perspective. Specifically, SET suggests that TL and TRL affect the level of SCI pursued 
through trust and commitment. Based on the extant literature, commitment is 
operationalized using two dimensions, affective and continuance commitment.  
The nomological network is empirically tested using 207 observations obtained 
from different industry sectors. The analysis is carried out using Mplus 6.0. The results 
suggest that TL positively influences trust while both nuances of TRL fail to explain trust. 
Furthermore, my analysis suggests that trust positively influences affective commitment 
but there was no evidence to attest that trust and continuance commitment are related. The 
analysis also revealed affective commitment was a significant predictor of SCI, and 
contrary to the expected relationship, continuance commitment also had a positive and 
significant impact on SCI, after controlling for relationship duration, product type, 
competition, and the location of the customer.   
1.3.3 Study-3 
SCI may fail due to poor executive decision choices regarding the specific type of 
relationship they seek to establish with supply chain partners (Villena et al., 2009). Much 
of the extant research has assumed that firms will engage in integration if an organization’s 
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external (e.g., industry structure in terms of suppliers available for a product) and internal 
(e.g., culture) factors are favorable for integration while largely ignoring the role of 
managerial decision making. The lack of knowledge regarding managerial decision 
making with respect to SCI restricts our ability to devise appropriate incentive schemes to 
align the interests of managers with their respective firm’s interests. A significant 
proportion of the early work on operations and supply chain management (OSCM) has 
been built on certain behavioral assumptions regarding decision makers (e.g., rationality 
of the decision maker and constant risk aversion). However, increasing evidence has 
suggested that accounting for the behaviors of decision makers will help attain better 
solutions for OSCM challenges (Grewal & Slotegraaf, 2007). Understanding and 
incorporating behavioral factors can yield informative findings (Grewal & Slotegraaf, 
2007). Scholars from management and cognitive psychology have found that 
compensation (Jensen & Murphy, 1990) and the cognitions, perceptions and values of 
individuals can influence their behaviors (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006; Carpenter, 
Geletkanycz, & Sanders, 2004).  
In this study, I argue that SCI exists at three different levels: coordination, 
collaboration, and internalization. I further suggest that internalization is the riskiest 
decision for SCEs and coordination is the least risky, while collaboration lies in between 
internalization and coordination.  I employ two behavioral theories in order to frame the 
research questions regarding SCEs decision making behaviors. The Behavioral Agency 
Model (BAM) theory predicts that individuals are in general loss averse and will engage 
in risky behaviors in loss situations to mitigate losses or to totally avoid them. BAM 
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particularly examines the role of variability in pay in decision making and suggests that 
higher levels of variability in pay are associated with increased risk seeking behaviors. On 
the other hand, the Behavioral Approach and Inhibition Model (BAIM) theory posits that 
individuals possessing more power (socioemotional wealth in this context) are more risk 
seeking vis-à-vis individuals with low power. I synthesize the two theories and specify 
two variables (i.e., Variability in Pay and Socioemotional Wealth) as explanatory variables 
for SCE decision making in the context of SCI.  
I postulate that SCEs experiencing high variability in pay and possessing low 
socioemotional wealth will be more likely to seek high levels of supply chain integration.  
Furthermore, I also hypothesize that SCEs experiencing low variability in pay but 
possessing high socioemotional wealth are also likely to opt for high levels of SCI. 
Although these predictions are consistent with the expectations of BAM and BAIM 
respectively, I hypothesize that the interaction between socioemotional wealth and 
variability in pay may generate counterintuitive results. For instance, I predict that the 
interaction between high socioemotional wealth and high variability in pay will result in 
lower risk taking behavior, and hence managers will be less likely to pursue high levels of 
SCI. I test my predictions using a 2x2 between-subjects experimental design where 
socioemotional wealth and variability-in-pay are each varied at two levels (i.e., low & 
high), and I examine the hypotheses in light of multiple studies (i.e., with students and 
practitioners) and several control variables. The study was piloted with roughly 400 
undergraduate students in two different spells. The findings reported in this study are 
based on 125 usable responses obtained from practitioners via Qualtrics. With the overall 
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practitioner sample I find evidence to suggest that only the main effect of variability in 
pay is positive and significant, suggesting that individuals experiencing high levels of 
variability in pay are more likely to seek high levels of SCI. This result did not completely 
support my predictions, and my earlier results obtained by relying on students. Therefore, 
I conducted a post-hoc analysis by grouping the sample into two, based on age (i.e., low 
age & high age), and subsequently found significant differences in the results between the 
two groups.  For instance, in the sample with younger individuals, I find evidence to 
support all of my hypotheses. However, with the high age group sample I find evidence 
to suggest that socioemotional wealth had a significant negative impact on SCI, alluding 
that older individuals with higher levels of socioemotional wealth are less likely to seek 
high levels of SCI.  
1.4 An Overview of the Dissertation 
Chapter II focuses on developing a theoretical framework for SCI.  The first part 
is aimed at motivating the need for a new theoretical framework for SCI.  The second part 
reviews some of the relevant literature on the conceptualizaion of SCI.  In the next few 
sections, I elaborate on the research design for this study, data collection, and illustrate the 
analyses. Subsequently, I summarize the results of the analyses, and provide the discussion 
of the within-firm narratives.  The final sections provide the discussion of the findings and 
develop a proposition.  I conclude the chapter by highlighting the contributions of this 
study along with some directions for future research.  
Chapter III examines the explanatory role of customer leadership behaviors on  
SCI. Chapter III is subdivided into several sections. The first part motivates the research 
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question while the next section provides a brief account of SET and its application in the 
context of customer-supplier relationship. The subsequent part describes the different 
constructs used in this study, such as leadership behavior styles, trust, commitment, and 
SCI. Furthermore,  this part focuses on TLT to identify and discuss the different leadership 
behavior styles examined in this study.  Then I develop the hypotheses to be tested in this 
study. The following few sections postulate the research design and the instrument 
development process. The instrument development process is followed by the testing of 
hypotheses using structural equations modeling (SEM), and  the last part discusses the 
results and suggests directions for future research.  
Chapter IV addresses the role of variability in pay and socioemotional wealth on 
managerial decision making in the realm of SCI. The initial part motivates the research 
question, specifically by considering the role of variability in pay and socioemotional 
wealth. Then, I discuss the primary dependent variable used in this study-SCI, and follow 
it up with the review of some the related literature on SCI (i.e., behavioral agency theory, 
and socioemotional wealth in the context of decision making). Subsequently to this, I 
develop the hypotheses to be tested. In the next few sections, I present the experimental 
design approach for this study, the methodology used, and subsequently present the 
results. Finally, I summarize the results and recommend directions for future research. 
Chapter V provides a general discussion of the results that emerged from chapters 
II, III, and IV. Furthermore, this chapter synthesizes the results and discusses the 
implications of the findings to both theory and practice. The limitations of this dissertation 
and directions for future work are also discussed toward the end of this chapter. 
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2. CHAPTER II 
         A QUALITATIVE PERSPECTIVE OF SUPPLY CHAIN INTEGRATION 
2.1 Introduction  
Supply chain integration (SCI) characterizes the strength of ties among supply 
chain partners (Lee, 2000; Leuschner et al., 2013). Supply chain researchers have argued 
that firms seek to achieve high levels of SCI, recognizing that it helps to improve their 
overall performance (Cooper, Lambert, & Pagh, 1997; Molm, Takahashi, & Peterson, 
2000; Rice & Hoppe, 2001). Several studies have shown that SCI is a critical factor in the 
success of new product development (Rai & Bajwa, 1997; Saeed et al., 2005) and for 
competitive advantage at large (Droge, Jayaram, & Vickery, 2004; Kahn & Mentzer, 
1998; Rosenzweig, Roth, & Dean Jr, 2003; Wong, Boon-itt, & Wong, 2011). Frohlich and 
Westbrook (2001) demonstrated that firms with wider ‘arcs of integration’ have higher 
performance improvement. That is, firms with greater supplier and customer integration 
exhibit higher operational performance improvement when compared to firms that have 
lower integration levels with their supply chain partners. 
In the past two decades, firms have been aggressively engaging in SCI, as is 
apparent from the 57,000 SCI initiatives that were undertaken from 1996-2001 in the 
United States (Anderson & Jap, 2012). While the trend has endured, recent studies indicate 
that nearly 30-50% of the SCI initiatives undertaken by firms end up in failure (Chao, 
2011; Park & Ungson, 2001).  Prior studies indicate that achieving high levels of SCI 
require substantial investments into a relationship in terms of time, commitment, and 
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resources (i.e., both financial and non-financial) (Doz, 1996; Dwyer, Schurr, & Oh, 1987; 
Vanpoucke, Vereecke, & Boyer, 2014). Failure in SCI can significantly impact the 
performance (i.e., both financial and operational performance) of firms involved in a 
relationship (Villena, Revilla, & Choi, 2011). Anderson and Jap (2012) stressed that failed 
relationships have one common factor, “Characteristics that were put in place to enable 
and empower a relationship became the weakest link through which problems began” 
(p.77). While a large number of studies have been published on SCI, there is little 
understanding about the characteristics of SCI, in both academia and practice 
(Mackelprang et al., 2012).  
Although supply chain scholars have typically conceptualized and operationalized 
interfirm relationships through the construct of SCI (Schoenherr & Swink, 2012), there is 
no consistent conceptualization or operationalization of the term SCI across studies (Cao 
& Zhang, 2011; Leuschner et al., 2013; Van der Vaart & van Donk, 2008). This 
inconsistency has often led to confounding results with respect to SCI. For instance, 
several researchers have suggested that SCI has a positive influence on firm performance 
(Cousins & Menguc, 2006; Koufteros et al., 2007; Peng et al., 2013; Rosenzweig et al., 
2003; Stank et al., 2001a) and engenders overall competitive advantage (Dyer, 2002; Dyer 
& Singh, 1998) while others dispute the positive qualities attributed to SCI. For instance, 
Littler, Leverick, and Wilson (1998) find that engaging in SCI with suppliers can increase 
cost and product development lead times while Hong and Hartley (2011) illustrated that 
there is no positive association between supplier integration and new product development 
efficiency. 
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A comprehensive review of the empirical SCI literature by Van der Vaart and 
Donk (2008) indicates that there has been significant differences in constructs that have 
been used to measure SCI. For instance, Carr and Pearson (1999) and Gimenez and 
Ventura (2005) both study the impact of SCI on performance. However, Carr and Person 
(1999) measured SCI using a six item measure that captures behaviors such as loyalty, 
face-to-face interactions, and establishing direct computer links with exchange partners. 
On the other hand, Gimenez and Ventura (2005) operationalized SCI using items that 
measured behaviors such as informal teamwork, shared information, and joint logistical 
processes. Such differences in behaviors are pervasive in the extant SCI literature, which 
thwarts meaningful additive research.  
Mohr (1982) suggested that the lack of consistent theoretical meanings across 
studies poses a major problem when building and testing theories. It causes inconsistency 
of focus regarding the theoretical question being addressed. Furthermore, Kaplan and 
Norton (2008) noted that what cannot be measured adequately cannot be managed and 
improved. Kaplan (1973) argued that a construct’s systemic meaning depends upon the 
underlying theory. SCI appears to lack consistency in its systemic meaning across studies. 
SCI is often confused with terms such as coordination and collaboration (Mackelprang et 
al., 2012). Although several studies have suggested that there are differences between 
coordination, collaboration, and SCI (Barratt, 2004; Cao & Zhang, 2011; Lee, 2000), these 
differences remain ambiguous. A plausible reason for this confusion is the lack of 
adequate understanding of the term SCI. 
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Typically, SCI studies have examined it employing cross-sectional survey research 
while several scholars have called for an examination of SCI employing a qualitative 
approach (Vanpoucke et al., 2014). Lewicki, Tomlinson, and Gillespie (2006) also 
indicate that little attention has been given to understanding the behavioral characteristics 
exhibited by firms engaging in SCI.  
In this research, I address the primary research question that needs attention in the 
SCI literature: What are the idiosyncratic behavioral nuances exhibited by firms engaging 
in SCI? I attempt to respond to this question using a qualitative approach. Edmondson and 
McManus (2007) suggest that when the goal of data analyses is pattern identification, 
qualitative research is well suited. In addition, if the constructs of interest (i.e., SCI in my 
study) are not adequately developed in the prior literature, the use of qualitative research 
is recommended.  The lack of clear understanding of the theoretical underpinnings of the 
term SCI in the literature prompts the use of qualitative research in this study. My research 
question is primarily directed toward addressing the “what” questions in theory-building 
related to SCI, which again leads me to employ qualitative research (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
Qualitative data for this research is obtained by interviewing several individuals 
across seven companies affiliated with four different industries. Companies from multiple 
industries were targeted to improve the generalizability of my findings.  My qualitative 
research involved interviewing subject experts via a semi-structured interview protocol 
(see Table A-1 in Appendix-A). I focus on SCI across supply chain partners, which may 
include customers as well as suppliers. I do not necessarily distinguish between customer 
and supplier perspectives as it relates to SCI.  
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Furthermore, the qualitative data obtained via interviews were transcribed and 
coded in NVivo10, and subsequently addressed based on Grounded Theory (GT) 
methodology. Data analysis was performed by continually comparing the 
themes/categories identified in one interview with those from other interviews. Constant 
comparison is a fundamental technique of the GT methodology (Strauss & Corbin, 1994; 
Strauss & Corbin, 1990).  
In Section 2, I present a brief review of the relevant literature on the 
conceptualization of the term SCI. Then in section 3, I discuss the research design, 
research methods, and analysis used in the study and Section 4 presents the data collection 
process. Section 5 illustrates the data analysis and section 6 will provide the summary of 
the results. Section 7 produces the within-firm narratives while section 8 and 9 offer the 
discussion of the findings and develop a proposition. Finally, section 10 provides the 
conclusion for the chapter.  
2.2 Related Literature  
2.2.1 Conceptualization of SCI  
There is consensus in the extant literature that the term SCI is not adequately 
understood or operationalized (Fawcett & Magnan, 2002; Mackelprang et al., 2012). 
Croom, Romano, and Giannakis (2000) examined the SCI definitions and 
operationalizations prior to the year 2000 and concluded that the term is inconsistently 
defined and operationalized. Chen and Paulraj (2004) also reached a similar conclusion as 
Croom et al. (2000). Recent studies have also indicated that SCI is not defined and 
operationalized effectively (Mackelprang et al., 2012; Van der Vaart & van Donk, 2008). 
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For instance, Frohlich and Westbrook (2000) operationalize SCI using measures 
encompassing access to information systems and sharing of logistical capabilities while 
Vickery, Jayaram, Droge, and Calantone (2003) address SCI using indicators reflecting 
supplier partnering, closer customer relationships, and cross-functional teams. There is no 
consistency in the behavioral patterns that are used to capture SCI. 
Lee (2000) recommended that SCI can exist at two different levels: coordination, 
and integration, where integration involves coordination and organizational linkages. Lee 
(2000), asserts that coordination entails information sharing, exchanging decision rights, 
work realignment, and resource sharing, while integration encompasses coordination and 
organizational linkages which facilitate sharing of risks, costs, and gains. However, Lee 
(2000) does not address collaboration explicitly. Leuschner et al. (2013) advocate that 
collaboration exists at a different level than integration. Also, a number of scholars have 
illustrated that collaboration is different from coordination (Bowersox et al., 2003; Zaheer 
et al., 1998b). A seminal manuscript from Jap (1999) suggests that collaboration is 
coordination combined with idiosyncratic investments into a relationship.  Mackelprang 
et al. (2012) argue that SCI might encompass constructs such as coordination and 
collaboration.  Clearly, there is no clarity and consensus regarding the term SCI. 
Furthermore, van der Vaart & van Donk (2010) also indicate that the term SCI has 
been operationalized inadequately in the extant literature. They articulate that SCI has 
been captured using a different set of practices, attitudes, and patterns across the literature. 
They demonstrate that supply chain practices are characterized by tangible activities, or 
technologies that play a critical role in the collaboration of a focal firm with its suppliers 
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and/or customers. Examples include the utilization of Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) 
and Vendor Managed Inventories (VMI). Moreover, they highlight that related to supply 
chain practices are supply chain patterns, or interaction patterns, between the focal firm 
and its suppliers and/or customers. Examples of interaction patterns include regular visits 
to the supplier's facility, and frequent face-to-face communication. Attitudes, they report, 
measure the feelings of buyers and/or suppliers towards each other or towards SCI in 
general. For instance, one such feeling is a customer’s view of their suppliers as an 
extension of their company. These categories help us group pre-existing measures of SCI 
in an effective fashion. The classification advanced by Van der Vaart & van Donk (2010) 
affords a useful classification of SCI measures, yet it does not adequately resolve the 
ambiguity of the term SCI relative to coordination and collaboration.  
Ho et al. (2002) survey the empirical literature on SCI, and report that there is 
discrepancy in the conceptualization and operationalization of the term SCI among earlier 
studies. This discrepancy has often led to mixed findings related to SCI (Van der Vaart & 
van Dunk, 2008). Recent studies call for a closer examination of the construct of SCI to 
identify the behavioral patterns that are exhibited by firms that engage in SCI (Leuschner 
et al., 2013; Mackelprang et al., 2012).   
In summary, earlier studies have suggested that SCI can exist at different levels 
without clearly delineating the behavioral patterns and their nuances. I attempt to 
understand the behavioral patterns of firms by employing a qualitative approach. Once the 
nuances of these behavior patterns are understand and structure, I propose to explore 
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whether the notion of different levels of SCI as provided in the literature is accurate and 
useful. 
2.3 Research Design 
I use a qualitative approach using interviews to respond to the research question 
due to its inductive theory building nature. Qualitative research methods are useful in 
inductive research where the constructs or theories used to explain a phenomenon are not 
adequately developed (Edmondson & McManus, 2007; Eisenhardt, 1989a; Eisenhardt, 
1989b). Qualitative research helps answer questions of “what,” “why,” and “how” 
(Barratt, Choi, & Li, 2011). Unlike most cross-sectional survey studies on SCI that fail to 
adequately capture the characteristics of SCI, I employ a qualitative methodology. 
The data obtained via interviews are analyzed using the Grounded Theory (GT) 
methodology proposed by Strauss and Corbin (1990).  Theoretical sampling technique is 
employed in selecting firms for this research. A theoretical sampling involved selecting 
firms according to their perceived level of relationships with their supply chain partners.  
Initial data analysis also guided firms’ selection, as theoretical sampling is used to 
“illuminate and extend relationships and logic among constructs” (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 
2007, p. 27). As Birks and Mills (2011) also noted, theoretical sampling focuses on finding 
new data sources (persons or things) that can best explicitly address specific theoretically 
interesting facets of the emergent analysis.   
On the basis of industry affiliation, product type, firm size, and subsequently 
relying on telephonic interviews and e-mail responses, I assessed whether a firm would be 
a candidate for participation for my study. Within each selected firm, I identified 
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participants by contacting a sponsor who assumed the responsibility of providing me with 
the appropriate contacts. Such participants included individuals at the level of vice 
president, director, or senior manager working in the functional area of operations and 
supply chain management at large. I then obtained some elemental information regarding 
the types of interfirm relationships each firm maintains with its supply chain partners. 
Furthermore, it was critical for the participants in my study to have adequate knowledge 
regarding interfirm relationships. I verified this during my correspondence with the 
participants over the phone or via e-mail. Once I identified a potential candidate in a firm, 
I briefed the participant in detail regarding my study, and obtained consent for a face-to 
face interview. I collected data from individuals using a semi-structured interview 
technique (see Appendix A). The interviews were semi-structured to guide participants in 
the necessary direction, but at the same time to allow for free flow of information from 
the participants. The questions for the interview were designed to elicit responses vis-à-
vis my primary research question. Digression from the interview questions was 
purposefully permitted in situations where it helped to clarify the questions of interest and 
discuss concepts that emerged during the course of the interview. Qualitative data was 
obtained in a retrospective manner regarding the questions of interest. This approach to 
qualitative data provides in-depth understanding of a specific phenomenon as it accrues 
retrospective data by reflecting upon events that have occurred in the past. Notes were 
taken during the interviews to capture the emotions of the participants, and the broad ideas 
emerging during the interviews. The interview was also recorded using a digital voice 
recorder for subsequent data analysis. Another expert in the domain of interfirm 
 31 
 
relationships assisted me with the data collection process. This assistance proved to be 
very effective, as one researcher asked the questions, and the other ensured substantive 
notes were taken, which were later used for illuminating the recorded data. In addition, 
memos (i.e., notes to myself on ideas and concepts emerging from data) were taken after 
each interview to assure key details from the interviews were not lost.  
Based on GT methodology, the qualitative data obtained through interviews are 
analyzed using open (i.e., breaking down qualitative data into smaller thought units), axial 
(i.e., relating the small thought units based on their properties), and selective coding (i.e., 
identifying the overarching categories and their relationships) (Birks & Mills, 2011; 
Strauss & Corbin, 1990). A constant comparison is ensued among different interviews to 
ascertain the relationships among the concepts uncovered during the open, axial, and 
selective coding procedure. 
2.4 Data Collection 
I obtained Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval prior to the data collection 
process. Data were collected through semi-structured interviews using an instrument that 
was developed and approved by the IRB for this specific study (see Table A-1 in 
Appendix-A). A question and probe approach ensued using a protocol which enabled me 
to ask questions of primary interest and at the same time permit new ideas and thoughts to 
flow from the participants (Krueger & Casey, 2000). I conducted individual face-to-face 
and focus-group type interviews. The participants for the interviews ranged from senior 
managers to vice presidents of operations and supply chain management. In total, I 
interviewed 13 individuals across seven firms (see Table 2-1). The participants’ work 
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experience ranged from 5 to 28 years within a particular organization. Profiles of the 
companies and the respondents’ job titles are provided in Table 2-1. The questions were 
asked in a retrospective manner allowing for a focused data gathering process (Vanpoucke 
et al. 2014). The questions were asked based on the “interview tool” that was developed 
to specifically identify the behavioral patterns of SCI.  
Ascertaining theoretical saturation is an effective guideline to stop the data 
collection process when employing GT methodology (Birks & Mills, 2011). Theoretical 
saturation occurs when no addition insights are obtained by increasing the sample size. I 
concluded that theoretical saturation had been achieved in this study after several 
interviews with seven companies, since examining all seven firms did not reveal a single 
instance of more than three levels for interfirm relationships and recurring themes were 
emerging during data analysis.   
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Table 2-1: Overview of Companies and Individuals for Interviews 
Firm  Focal Company 
Description 
Ownership 
Type 
Annual 
Revenue 
Ownership Interviewees 
Oil_One Major producer of 
oil and gas 
Public >$20 
billion 
Domestic Vice President 
of Supply Chain 
Management 
(1) 
Electronics_One Major electronics 
contract 
manufacturer 
Public >$20 
billion 
International 
 
Material 
Planning & 
Purchasing 
Managers (3) 
Net_One Major electronics 
component provider 
Public >$30 
billion 
International Vice President 
of Operations 
(1) 
Ret_One A large supermarket 
chain 
Private >$15 
billion 
Domestic Director of 
Global Sourcing 
(1), 
Director of 
Logistics (1)  
Purchasing 
Manager (1) 
Comp_One Leading computer 
manufacturer 
Private >$10 
billion 
Domestic Vice President 
of Supply Chain 
Management 
(1) 
Ser_One Leading service 
provider for oil and 
gas companies 
Public >$20 
billion 
Domestic Director of 
Supply Chain 
Management 
(1) 
Oil_Two 
Major drilling 
contractor 
Public >$3 
billion 
International Purchasing 
Managers (2), 
Director of 
Sourcing (1) 
2.5 Data Analysis 
The qualitative data obtained were first transcribed, which resulted in 
approximately 250 pages of text. Data analyses employing the GT technique followed 
three distinct steps: open coding, axial coding, and selective coding. These three steps 
provided by Birks and Mills (2011) are comparable to the GT technique suggested by 
Corbin and Strauss (1990). 
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Using the GT technique (Birks & Mills, 2011), the analyst initially codes the data 
by a process labeled as open coding. Open coding is performed word-by-word, or 
segment-by-segment, or thought-unit-by-thought-unit. In this study, open coding was 
performed thought-unit-by-thought-unit as it results in more meaningful codes (Birks & 
Mills, 2011). However, these codes are not interpreted during the open coding phase. 
Collectively, this process resulted in 1,082 open codes generated from interviews from 
seven companies. In the axial coding process, I determined whether the codes generated 
from one data source (i.e., interview) also appeared in other sources, and then aggregated 
related codes by ascertaining their relationships. Strauss and Corbin (1990) define axial 
coding as “a set of procedures whereby data are put back together in new ways after open 
coding, by making connections between categories. This axial coding is done by using a 
coding paradigm involving conditions, context, action/interactional strategies, and 
consequences” (p. 96). The coding framework provides the means to relate the open codes. 
The axial coding process was carried out iteratively as I obtained more data through 
additional interviews. Through the axial coding process, the 1,082 open nodes were 
reduced to several axial codes, which were then further reduced to overarching categories 
that were explicitly integrated to form a theoretical framework of SCI using selective 
coding. During the axial and selective coding procedure, I performed constant comparison. 
Taylor and Bogdan (1984) suggest that “in the constant comparative method the researcher 
simultaneously codes and analyses data in order to develop concepts; by continually 
comparing specific incidents in the data, the researcher refines these concepts, identifies 
their properties, explores their relationships to one another, and integrates them into a 
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coherent explanatory model” (p. 126). The data analyses resulted in the identification of 
six different behavioral patterns namely, monitoring, relational investments, knowledge 
sharing, joint activities, vision sharing, and adaptability in relationships. An overview of 
the major characteristics of SCI exhibited by firms is presented below. 
2.5.1 Monitoring 
Firms engage in monitoring activities to ensure that they have sufficient control 
over the activities of their exchange partners. Exchange partners “tend to be more 
confident about their partners’ cooperation when they feel that they have adequate control 
over them” (Das and Teng, 1998, p. 493).   In line with the extant literature, I define 
monitoring to represent those activities carried out by supply chain partners to ensure that 
they are not subject to the opportunistic behaviors of other supply chain members. Table 
2-2 illustrates that the construct of monitoring is comprised of six different axial codes. 
The axial codes that represent monitoring are: constantly checking for deviations, 
enforcing contracts, setting a framework for operation, estimating cost structure, hard 
bargaining, and seeking control. 
Firms employ contracts to develop a framework for operation, which is 
subsequently used to closely monitor the activities of exchange partners. Firms hold their 
partners accountable to any deviations from the set rules and standards. For example, the 
Director of Sourcing at Oil_Two mentioned that “We do have several key contracts in 
place. We try to set some framework agreement based on pricing with some baseline 
options,” while the Vice President of Supply Chain Management at Oil_One noted that 
“all contracts have performance expectations for providers by which they are assessed.”   
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Firms also exhibit monitoring behavior in an attempt to gain control over pricing 
by acquiring the cost structure for products obtained from exchange partners, and 
subsequently use this information to engage in hard bargaining. The Vice President of 
Supply Chain at Comp_One stated “We go through all the designs and come up with their 
bill of materials. Subsequently, we start doing all our cost stuff on that, and estimate what 
it should cost us.  They [suppliers] are saying this is what it costs us, we go ‘oh wait a 
second’, we agree on this or we do not agree on this. If they are not meeting the cost, we 
are going to talk to the component supplier and see if we can get a better price. If we can 
find a better price, we are going to buy this part, and you [suppliers] are going to buy it 
from us. We then buy and sell it.” The logic of engaging in control is to ensure that the 
desired goal can be achieved in a predictable manner.  
2.5.2 Relational Investments 
Jap (1999) suggests that firms involved in a relationship can improve their 
combined benefits by making relational investments. Dyer and Singh (1998) also suggest 
that making asset specific investments in a relationship is likely to reduce transaction costs 
in relationships. I define relational investments as those that are made to specifically 
enhance the value of a particular relationship. Williamson (1985) notes that there are three 
types of investments that can be made specific to a relationship. The investments are 
dedicated assets, physical asset specific investments, and human asset specific 
investments. The qualitative data obtained from this study also suggests that firms engage 
in three types of relational investments, as proposed by Williamson (1985) (see Table 2-
2).   Dedicated assets are typically huge discrete investments made by a supplier to meet 
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the specific requirements of a buyer. There will be substantial costs if the buyer decides 
not to purchase from the specific supplier as there will be substantial excess capacity. For 
instance, the Director of Global Sourcing at Ret_One noted that one of their strategic 
suppliers “is building its factory nearby to serve us better. They are that committed.”  On 
the other hand, physical asset specificity refers to the equipment and machinery that are 
designed to produce inputs specific to a particular customer. As an example, one of the 
Material Planning Managers at Electronics_One provided an analogy for their investment 
in equipment and machinery, “When you get awarded a part for a car, that is a platform 
that is going to last for about 5 years, you are going to make multimillion dollar 
investments to produce it.  Let’s say you are going to award me the car body, I have to go 
out and build all the tooling for it, I have to make a huge investment… it’s not a 
transactional cost.” Human asset specificity represents the skill sets that are particularly 
developed to work with a specific exchange partners. The Vice President of Supply Chain 
at Comp_One commented that “We have a ‘Technology Division’ where individuals with 
specific skills focus on the technology advanced by specific suppliers.” Collectively, I find 
that firms tend to make different types of relational investments in their relationships.  
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Table 2-2: Behaviors Exhibited by Firms Engaging in SCI 
Construct Definition  Axial Codes Derived from Data  Frequency Frequency 
Percentage 
Monitoring Monitoring represents those activities 
carried out by supply chain partners to 
ensure that they are not subject to the 
opportunistic behaviors of others.  
 Constantly monitoring for 
deviations 
7 100% 
  Enforcing contracts   
  Set frameworks for operation   
  Estimate cost structure   
  Hard bargaining   
  Seeking control   
Knowledge Sharing Knowledge sharing refers to the transfer 
of know-hows and data among supply 
chain partners in a relevant, accurate, 
complete, and confidential manner. 
 Frequency of reporting 7 100% 
  Multiple input sources   
  Codified information sharing   
  Tacit information sharing   
Relational Investments Relational investments are those that 
are made to specifically enhance the 
value of a particular relationship.   
 Site specific investments 6 87% 
  Human asset specific investments   
  Physical asset specificity   
Joint Activities Joint activities represent the combined 
efforts of supply chain partners in 
performing various tasks such as 
forecasting, new product development, 
and problem solving.  
 Engage in joint new activities 7 100% 
  Human resource sharing   
  Capital equipment sharing   
  Collaborative forecasting   
  Jointly explore new markets   
  Joint problem solving   
Vision Sharing Vision sharing by firms involves 
sharing their long-term plans with 
supply chain partners and ensuring the 
alignment of their goals, priorities and 
values.  
 Common goals 6 87% 
  Providing direction   
  Stating priorities   
  Merging values   
Adaptability in Relationships Adaptability represents the ability of 
firms to sustain long-term relationships 
by adjusting to circumstances.  
 Demonstrating commitment 
during crises  
7 100% 
  Flexibility to changes in the 
environment 
  
  Risk sharing   
  Profit sharing   
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2.5.3 Knowledge Sharing 
I define knowledge sharing as the transfer of know-hows and data among supply 
chain partners in a relevant, accurate, complete, and confidential manner. Several scholars 
have acclaimed the importance of sharing knowledge for successful interfirm 
relationships. For example, Min et al. (2005) reckon that knowledge sharing is an essential 
ingredient for effective interfirm relationships.  Knowledge sharing represents the transfer 
of codified information and tacit know-hows among exchange partners. Furthermore, the 
knowledge sharing construct in this study also captures the frequency and the sources of 
knowledge input (see Table 2-2). Transfer of codified information refers to the exchange 
of “tactical data such as inventory levels, forecast information, sales promotion, strategies, 
and marketing strategies” (Cao & Zhang, 2011, p.166). In this research, I find that firms 
transfer codified information to their exchange partners to enable to synchronization of 
the flow of goods between them. For instance, the Vice President of Operations at 
Net_One suggested that with one of their major customers, “It used to be that our 
(Net_One) customer would have just have some matrix that we would report on to 
coordinate.” Besides transferring codified information, firms also transfer tacit 
information with their exchange partners. As an example, the Director of Supply Chain 
Management at Ser_One noted that “We [Ser_One] use some of the things we learned and 
share it with our suppliers.”  The frequency and the sources from where knowledge is 
obtained to share with exchange partners also play a significant role in the exchange of 
information among firms. The Vice President of Operations at Net_One noted that “Our 
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customer was seeing the benefit of having communication with our company at different 
levels on a frequent basis.” 
2.5.4 Joint Activities 
Table 2-2 suggests that joint activities, in this study, represent tasks such as 
forecasting, new product development, problem solving, exploring new markets, human 
resource and capital equipment sharing.  Several studies have cited the benefits of working 
closely together with supply chain partners. For instance, working closely with a supplier 
has a positive impact on the reduction of lead time for new product development (Primo 
& Amundson, 2002), and provides a means to improve product innovation and product 
performance for firms (Lau et al., 2010).  
Firms work collaboratively to help improve the scope of their business. The Vice 
President at Ret_One commented “This supplier was innovative, cutting edge, very 
creative, and very flexible… as both [Ret_One and Supplier] were looking for a long-term 
relationship, we began to extend to cookies, pastries, and now they also do other products.” 
Firms work jointly on forecasting by exchanging information, and correcting forecasts 
based on the inputs of exchange partners after deliberation.  For instance, the Director of 
Supply Chain Management at Ser_One mentioned that “Forecasts are bad  the minute they 
are printed, we can be of assistance to our suppliers, and they can respond back to us and 
provide valuable information based on what they see going on in the market.” I also find 
that firms engage in new product development by sharing designs and innovative ideas. 
The Vice President of Supply Chain Management at Oil_One noted that with one of their 
providers in the development of a new product “We will work with them on the lab and 
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their technology, we will also do pilots and testing, and so forth with them.” At times, 
firms share human resources and technological capabilities to assist their exchange 
partners in developing new products. The Vice President of Supply Chain Management at 
Comp_One commented “Like if our [Comp_One] suppliers don’t have the human 
resources, say we [Comp_One] are going to go and design a product with them.”  Finally, 
I notice that as firms recognize their bounded rationality, they engage other firms in the 
hopes of gaining their insights towards a particular problem.  Supply chain partners are 
often a source of innovative ideas that can help firms overcome their challenges (Flint et 
al., 2005).  The Vice President of Operations at Net_One suggested that “Our customers 
understand that our problem is their problem, so they work with us on resolving it.” 
2.5.5 Vision Sharing 
Supply chain scholars suggest that there needs to be an agreement on the strategic 
vision for supply chain partners to proceed in their relationships (Lambert, Stock, & 
Ellram, 1998).  Furthermore, Ross (1998) argues that the creation and communication of 
vision among exchange partners is necessary before any project begins. Creating a vision 
and sharing it among firms involved in a relationship provides them with “specific goals 
and strategies on how they plan to identify and realize the opportunities they expect” 
(Lambert, 2002, p. 13). In line with the extant literature, I suggest that vision sharing 
involves firms sharing their long-term plans with supply chain partners and ensuring the 
alignment of their goals, priorities and values. Goals provide a sense of objectivity in 
relationships, and are necessary to ensure the success of firms involved.  For instance, the 
Vice President of Supply Chain Management at Oil_One suggested that “Looking at our 
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goals and their goals, one thing I can say is our relationship has been extremely accruable.” 
Goals help firms create a strategic plan to achieve it. Providing direction ensures that firms 
involved are aware of appropriate steps necessary to move ahead and achieve their goals.  
Also, stating priorities clearly enables firms to focus on specific tasks and ensures that 
firms involved are working towards a common vision coherently. For example, the Vice 
President of Supply Chain Management at Oil_One noted that “Our job is to figure out 
what is right for the business and push the agenda for it.” Finally, aligning the values of 
the firms involved is necessary to ensure that they are focused on the same goals and have 
a similar vision of the future of their relationship. As an example, the Director of Supply 
Chain Management at Ser_One noted that “We need to ensure that our values are 
compatible with our exchange partners to ensure success,” by working towards similar 
goals.   
2.5.6 Adaptability in Relationships 
Lee (2004) refers to adaptability as the willingness of firms to reshape supply 
chains based on the changes in the environment. In this study, I define adaptability in 
relationships as the ability of firms to sustain long-term relationships by adjusting to 
circumstances. Dwyer et al. (1987) suggest that firms which adapt to changes in 
circumstances are likely to engender durable relationships. In this study, I find that a firm’s 
adaptability in a relationship is characterized by its commitment to work with exchange 
partners during challenges, willingness to adapt to changes in the environment, and 
exhibiting risk and profit sharing behaviors. To demonstrate their commitment during 
challenges, firms are willing to work with their partners by providing additional resources 
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and sharing relevant know-hows. As an example, the Director of Supply Chain 
Management at Ser_One noted that “If we see our supplier struggling with scheduling or 
any other industrial processes, we will take an expert in there to assist them with 
scheduling or any other industrial process that they are doing, be it welding or machining.” 
With respect to shaping relationships based on changes to the environment, I find 
that firms are more flexible to the initial terms and conditions that were laid out as they 
comprehend the environmental changes better. For instance, the Vice President of Supply 
Chain at Oil_One suggested that “We generally look at situations…, so contracts become 
more of guidelines as opposed to hard and fast rules.” During adverse times, I find firms 
that try to preserve a relationship engage in activities to ensure the profitability of their 
supply chain partners (e.g., sharing profits and risks). Again, the Vice President of Supply 
Chain Management at Oil_One provided an excellent example of sharing one of its 
suppliers’ risks in which it was stated “The knee-jerk reaction would have been to throw 
most of that relationship away because other guys would do the work for 30% less, we 
(Oil_One) did not do that.” 
2.6 Summary of Behavioral Patterns Exhibited by Firms Engaging in SCI 
 In summary, I find when firms engage in SCI they exhibit a set of six behaviors 
namely, monitoring, relational investments, knowledge sharing, joint activities, vision 
sharing, and adaptability in relationships. From Table 2-2, it is evident that several of the 
behaviors were repeated across most of the firms interviewed, rendering reliability. 
Relational investments and vision sharing had roughly 87% representation among all firms 
interviewed while the other behavioral constructs had a 100% representation across firms. 
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Although firms exhibit different behavioral characteristic for SCI, the exact manner in 
which they are exhibited by firms might vary. In order to better comprehend the behavioral 
nuances, within-firm narratives are employed. 
2.7 Within-Firm Narratives 
The within-firm narrative of each firm is employed to gain insights about the 
behaviors exhibited by firms in their relationships with exchange partners. The narrative 
for each firm is presented below.  
2.7.1 Oil_One 
Oil_One is one of the largest oil and natural gas producers in the United States. 
Oil_One partners with several firms to produce oil and natural gas. The participant for this 
interview was the Vice President of Supply Chain Management. Most of Oil_One’s 
relationships with its supply chain partners evolve over time. Relationships generally 
evolve from being transactional to a more integrated relationship. For example, the 
participant noted that “The duration of the contract, the type of commitment, and the 
degree of integration and so forth, yes, it does evolve over time.” The participant provided 
an example of Oil_One’s service providers for rigs. The participant suggested that the 
market for providing service for rigs is highly competitive with a large number of 
providers. However, Oil_One tends to develop close relationships with a few providers 
over a period of time due to the perceived positive value proposition.  
 Early on in Oil_One’s relationship with its providers, very limited commitment 
and investments are made. Furthermore, providers are continually assessed against certain 
performance metrics. At the beginning of their relationship, Oil_One provides all the 
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necessary information for its service providers, but does not engage in knowledge sharing 
activities with the service provider. Similarly, at this level, service providers are tightly 
bound to contractual obligations, and failing to adhere to specifications in their contract 
might cause Oil_One to exit their relationship.  
Contingent upon their performance and value proposition, as the number of 
positive interactions between the service provider and Oil_One increased, the scope of its 
business gradually increased. Even at this level, Oil_One is willing to exit a relationship 
if its partners’ performance does not meet expectations. On the other hand, as service 
providers sustain their performance over time and both firms see the value proposition of 
doing business together, they develop a close relationship which is characterized by high 
levels of commitment and investment. The participant also added that besides what they 
do with their transactional and next level service providers, they were willing to take short-
term losses for sustaining their relationship with their strategic partners, with whom they 
have developed a close relationship. For instance, when Oil_One’s profitability waned due 
to inefficiencies with its close strategic supply chain partner, Oil_One stuck with its 
partner to help the partner improve its efficiency and develop a strong relationship, which 
both parties benefited from later.  The participant noted the following: 
“People were willing to pay us as opposed to us paying them, but we had a long-
term relationship with this company that has provided us with both operational and 
commercial hedging against, you know, the other side of the market. We 
eventually worked with this company with job efficiency expectations and caps on 
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the hours per job that resulted in a significant reduction in costs and preserved the 
elements of a long term relationship.” 
Oil_One shares its long term vision with its close strategic partners and does not 
do so with other service providers. As an example, the participant commented “We will 
give them [our strategic providers] insight into where we are going in the next 3 to 5 
years.” Furthermore, with respect to joint activities the participant stated “We will conduct 
joint efforts.”  Moreover, when Oil_One and one of its service providers develops a close 
relationship, contracts are still in place, but hardly ever used. Conflicts are resolved 
amicably over a conversation. For instance, the participant commented, “I will be honest, 
the reality where we litigate the contracts and enforcements is usually in my office.” 
 With respect to the factors that helped shape their relationships with service 
providers, the respondent noted that the type of relationships developed depends upon 
several factors such as industry structure, product type, value proposition, cost, reliability, 
culture, and management acumen. Industry structure and product type (i.e., strategic or 
commodity) also suggest whether a possibility for close strategic relationships exists. 
Industry structure here refers to the number of providers in the market. Once firms decide 
to engage in a relationship, the participant added, cost structure always plays an important 
role in the evolution of a relationship, but as firms try to improve the scope of business 
with their partners their value proposition and performance become as critical as cost. 
Furthermore, the importance of the compatibility of management acumen and culture were 
highlighted as important factors engendering close strategic relationships. With respect to 
management acumen and culture for a close strategic relationship, the participant stressed 
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that “Their [Service provider’s] advantage is driven by management acumen and culture 
is also very important.” Oil_One expected their culture and management acumen to be 
compatible with their strategic providers prior to engaging in close relationships. 
2.7.2 Electronics_One 
Electronics_One is one of the largest electronics contract manufacturers in the 
world. It offers design, manufacturing, and distribution services to several original 
equipment manufacturers in the United States. This facility caters to a small number of 
fairly large customers in the electronics industry. A significant proportion of its sales 
revenue is generated by working with one major customer, however it is currently in the 
process of diversifying its customer base. The participants for this study were three 
Material Planning and Purchasing Managers. Electronics_One’s relationship with this 
major customer has evolved over the past several years. Early on, the relationship could 
be described as being transactional in nature. A participant being interviewed commented 
“I feel like there is a maturity level cycle that goes through for all the customers.” 
Electronics_One believes that new customers should be constantly monitored. However, 
as the business evolves they feel that it becomes self-sustaining and not much monitoring 
is required. The participant stressed “You can really leave it [matured relationship] on its 
own to grow, like seeing a couple of e-mails here and there from them.” They believe that 
relationships transition to a more trusting relationship. The participant added “I think they 
[major customer] understand what we can do, and we appreciate their work as a customer, 
so we are working together to grow some more business.” 
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 In what the company termed as a “matured” relationship with its major customer, 
they do some joint activities in terms of working on forecasts, but there is very limited 
vision sharing by their customer with them or vice-versa. With regards to sharing a vision, 
the participant noted “To a lesser degree, kind of, here is where we want to be. We don’t 
get a lot of, like, directional type communication from them.” Also, Electronics_One does 
not voluntarily assume temporary losses for its major customer but occasionally exceeds 
contractual obligations in order to maintain their business value proposition with their 
customer. The participants also noted that there is not a great level of knowledge sharing, 
however, some cross training takes place with their major customer. Electronics_One and 
its major customer are constantly trying to grow their business. 
The participants further suggested that sales volume, relationship duration, and 
product type are the three primary factors that drive business relationships from a 
transactional level to one of more substance. The level of sales revenue between the 
companies provides a proxy for the interdependence or rather the value proposition that 
firms offer to each other. 
 A participant suggested that product type determines whether firms need to evolve 
to the next level and provided an analogy of Toyota: 
“When you get awarded a part for a car, that is a platform that is going to last for 
about five years, you are going to make multimillion dollar investments to produce 
it. Let’s say you are going to award me the car body, I have to go out and build all 
the tooling for it, I have to make a huge investment, you are going to be working 
with me on the design the whole time. We are then going to produce this together 
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for five years and then after that you hope that I am going to do the next one, it’s 
not a transactional cost.”  
Thus, product type can influence the transition of a relationship between firms beyond a 
mere transactional relationship. 
2.7.3 Net_One 
Net_One provides electronics components to several large telecommunication 
companies in the United States. It is a mature firm with over 70 years of experience serving 
the industry. The participant for this interview was Net_One’s Vice President for 
Operations. Net_One maintains a unique relationship style with each of its customers. 
These relationships varied from being highly transactional to being very cooperative. The 
participant provided an example with two of its major customers with whom it started 
doing business at the same time. It was noted that the two major customers had different 
ways of interacting with Net_One. One of the customers was very difficult to deal with 
while the other was very cooperative. The participant added that the collaborative 
relationship began as a transactional relationship, however this customer saw the value in 
collaborating and working together and this helped their relationship evolve. The other 
customer did not really see the value of working closely together, and thus the relationship 
has remained transactional. For example, the participant mentioned that with respect to its 
cooperative customer, “they have progressively added more resources and progressively 
increased the interface that they have with us.” At the same time, the transactional 
customer “does not feel it is necessary to put resources toward doing that [solving 
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problems], it is our problem we need to go take care of it, and we can end up not supplying 
to them as well because they are not as collaborative with us.”  
The participant then provided details about the distinctive aspects of the two 
relationships in terms of their contracts, commitments, and joint activities. With respect 
to the contracts, the participant noted “There is definitely an arrogance with one and more 
flexibility with the other organization.” The difference in commitment of Net_One 
towards the cooperative and transactional customers is very subtle: “We may give the 
cooperative customer some advantage in terms of attention but not a whole lot.” The data 
from the interview also suggested that they work jointly together in product development 
but not to the extent that they lose their competitive advantage, as the participant stressed 
“You can come up with collaborative ways to develop products, but you cannot lose your 
competitive advantage as a result of doing that.” 
Net_One’s relationships with its transactional and cooperative customer are to a 
great extent driven by profitability. Although relationships are important, profitability 
determines the outcome of relationships. When I questioned whether Net_One had made 
any sacrifices in their relationship with their cooperative customers, the participant 
responded, “If you find a customer who you are more profitable with, you should do it 
based on profitability more than based on whom you would like to do business with.” 
Net_One was willing to switch customers based on profitability.   
2.7.4 Ret_One 
Ret_One is one of the largest family-owned supermarket chains in the United 
States. The company was started several decades ago and has grown gradually over the 
 51 
 
years. It has many tens of thousands of employees working in hundreds of stores. It sells 
over 100,000 SKUs across a variety of store formats. The participants for this study 
included the Director of Global Sourcing, the Director of Logistics, and a Purchasing 
Manager. Ret_One purchases products from over 6,000 foreign suppliers and 27,000 
domestic suppliers. Ret_One prides itself on developing unique products for its customers 
that are not typically available through other supermarket chains. The company’s primary 
goal is to serve its “boss,” which Ret_One says is its customers. To achieve this goal, 
Ret_One works with its suppliers. Ret_One does not share the same type of relationship 
with all of its suppliers. Although the company is very transactional with some suppliers, 
it is very strategic with others. On further investigation, it was revealed that its strategic 
relationships started at a transactional level by sharing only transactional information 
necessary to run the operations; however, the relationships tended to evolve over time. For 
instance, one of the participants in the interview suggested that with a close supplier, “We 
started with cookies, but again as we are cutting purchase order after purchase order for 
this type of product it was really changing the relationship to the next level.”  Ret_One 
and its supplier (which was international) jointly determined ways to increase the scope 
of business to other products as it found value in doing business together. A participant I 
interviewed noted that as the relationship was evolving into a more mature one, they were 
making investments into the relationship in terms of human resources. However, after 
repeated interactions, Ret_One liked working with this supplier as their cultures were 
compatible and the management acumen of both companies was quite compatible – they 
were thinking and acting similarly. This compatibility led to further evolution of their 
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relationship and prompted significant idiosyncratic investments and a great deal of vision 
sharing by the companies. As an example, the strategic supplier recently made an 
idiosyncratic investment in the relationship by opening a new facility in the United States 
to serve Ret_One more effectively and more efficiently. Furthermore, the overall 
evolution of this relationship occurred in a span of approximately two years. Ret_One was 
their only customer in the United States. Furthermore, Ret_One does not engage in close 
strategic relationships with firms that have a short-term organizational vision. In addition 
to sharing their strategic vision, the exchange partners started jointly working on 
developing new products. Ret_One has also established a “university” for its strategic 
suppliers where Ret_One’s knowledge is transferred to them besides constant transfer of 
knowledge that takes place during business interactions. This knowledge transfer 
illustrates Ret_One’s commitment developed towards its close suppliers.  
Initially, Ret_One was merely coordinating activities with its international 
supplier; however, driven by increased product sales (and respective profits) and 
relationship duration, the company decided to expand its scope of business. The increased 
level of interactions over a period of time and compatibility of cultures between the 
companies helped the development of trust between them. This trust resulted in a close 
strategic relationship between Ret_One and its international supplier.   
Ret_One also sought cost and quality products from all of its suppliers. As an 
example, one of the participants said about choosing suppliers, “We cannot compromise 
on quality as that is non-negotiable.” Profitability is also an important consideration for 
Ret_One; however, the company wants its suppliers also to be profitable. To ensure 
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competitive pricing, Ret_One assessed the cost structure of the company’s suppliers on 
the basis of global pricing information for raw materials. However, with more strategic 
suppliers they looked for flexibility and responsiveness. As a participant stressed “Our 
strategic supplier is very responsive.” 
2.7.5 Comp_One 
Comp_One revolutionized the computer industry through its supply chains. The 
company is one of the leading producers of personal computers in the world. It currently 
has more than 10% of the worldwide market share for personal computers. The participant 
for this study was the Vice President of Supply Chain Management. My interviewee 
suggested that the relationships with suppliers evolve through three distinct levels. For 
instance, the company initially begins its relationship with its suppliers at a transactional 
level. The participant noted that such relationships are very discrete at this point.  At this 
level, suppliers are provided with specific instructions on how the product needed to be 
manufactured, and the product design is done in-house. However, as the firms’ 
relationships evolved over time, they appear to transition into a more collaborative 
relationship in which they design and develop products jointly, and begin investing in their 
relationship. However, after doing business with a particular supplier for 12 to 13 years, 
Comp_One and some of the suppliers developed a very good understanding of each other, 
culminating in handing over product development completely to the supplier. A significant 
amount of knowledge is transferred from Comp_One to suppliers before handing over the 
development of the product. Trust is built between Comp_One and its suppliers before 
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they enable their suppliers to produce their products. Trust played a major role in interfirm 
relationships, especially at the highest levels. As an example, the participant mentioned, 
“Joint development does take place in a way, and then the relationship tends to 
evolve even further where you get to use the term the true marriage stage. There 
are some products that you just say you are doing this and you know how, you 
know what we want, so that is kind of the last evolution, I would say.” 
 As the relationship matures, the suppliers provide visibility to their supply base 
and to the cost structure of their products. Furthermore, as the relationship between 
Comp_One and its suppliers matures, the company is more willing to share its knowledge 
and strategic vision with them. In addition, at this level Comp_One exhibits flexibility in 
its relationships with exchange partners contingent upon circumstances. Also, Comp_One 
trust’s its suppliers, which reduces the enforcement of contracts.  As the participant 
commented “We don’t use penalty laden contracts.” 
 Although Comp_One finds that their culture percolates into the way they manage 
their suppliers, several external factors also play a critical role in the development of its 
relationship with its suppliers. For instance, the participant added the following:  
“The industry is a major determinant in our relationship with our suppliers. As an 
example, whether you end up in a transactional or strategic relationship depends a 
lot on the industry that you are dealing with, and when I say industry, I mean are 
you dealing with, in our case, a PC or systems manufacturer, or are you dealing 
with memory industry, or are you dealing with the hard drive industry, or are you 
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dealing with a structural commodity type industry, an engineered commodity 
industry. That begins to dictate.”  
The participant was referring to the number of suppliers in the market for specific products 
when discussing industry structure. 
2.7.6 Ser_One 
  Ser_One is one of the largest players in the oil and gas service industry. It is a 
global company with over 1,000 locations in 50 countries. It provides most of the 
necessary equipment and components the oil and gas industry uses, and it prides itself on 
delivering its products across the globe on time. My participant for this interview was the 
Director of Supply Chain Management. Many of its products are engineered-to-order, 
which requires close relationships with its suppliers. Although Ser_One has several close 
relationships with its suppliers, it perceives that these relationships were built over a period 
of time through three distinct phases. The participant in the study stated that the company’s 
relationships with selected suppliers begin via discrete transactions, during which it 
continuously measures the relationship against specific performance metrics such as 
delivery, responsiveness, and cost. The scope of the business increases according to the 
relationship performance over time, providing the suppliers with additional work while 
developing trust between them. The level of trust developed enables them to work jointly 
on new product development and confidently invest in their relationships. At this level, 
Ser_One is willing to work collaboratively on forecasts with their suppliers.  After 
collaborating with a given supplier for several years, which might vary from supplier to 
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supplier, Ser_One might decide to engage with their suppliers to a greater extent. For 
example, the participant noted,  
“So when we do start with the vendor, there is a lot of capitalization they have to 
do to be able to do business with, so we want that initial phase to be 2 [or] 3 years, 
and then we want 10 [to] 15 years of good solid business with them to go ahead 
and absorb the capital expenses and be able to go ahead and increase their 
capability and capacity so that we can capitalize on them.” 
 Once Ser_One develops close strategic relationships, the participant indicated that 
Ser_One might assume short-term losses to sustain their long-term relationship with a few 
of its strategic suppliers, which subsequently improves the commitment of those suppliers. 
The participant stressed that the improved relationship enables Ser_One to “place a call in 
the middle of the night and say, ‘I have got a problem,’ and know that they will respond 
in a positive manner.” Moreover, the trust developed with among exchange partners over 
the years ensured lower monitoring behavior and enhanced communication of their 
strategic goals. Also, at this level, Ser_One was willing to share their knowledge with their 
exchange partners to overcome their problems, as the participant noted “We [Ser_One] 
use some of the things we learned and share it with our suppliers.” 
2.7.7 Oil_Two 
Oil_Two is a very large oil and natural gas drilling contractor in the United States, 
which also has global presence. It has hundreds of rigs being operated in the United States 
and Canada. Oil_Two also has operations in several other countries around the globe. The 
capital-equipment sourcing at Oil_Two is primarily carried out with a few major suppliers 
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because its customers want to use these name-brand products in their operations. Oil_Two 
has worked with several of these customers for many years but often changes suppliers 
depending upon the requirements. The company’s relationships with its suppliers are very 
transactional in nature. It does not appear that Oil_Two engages in any kind of significant 
collaborative activities with its suppliers. Its relationships with suppliers tend to depend 
on its suppliers’ capacity availability, and pricing at a given point in time. The 
requirements, especially during the early phase of drilling a rig, are very uncertain, and 
hence forecasting requirements is a challenge. In the early phase of developing the rig, the 
company is looking for suppliers that can provide it with the product in the shortest lead 
times possible. When the company has some certainty in demand, it seeks to go to its large 
suppliers. Again, there is no long-term relationship orientation with these suppliers as they 
can be governed by the customer’s directed requirements of suppliers to be selected, which 
can vary from rig to rig. Even then, conducting business with any large supplier is 
contingent on the capacity availability of its suppliers along with pricing. Having a 
transactional orientation with its suppliers, Oil_Two enforces contracts to the maximum 
extent. As an example, one of the participants noted, “We do have several key contracts 
in place with our big suppliers… we have had to use it at times to get things done.”  
Based on the interviews with several individuals from diverse purchasing 
departments, it did not appear that Oil_Two engages in joint product development with 
any of their suppliers. As a participant stated “We don’t do a lot of joint activities.” They 
essentially send the requirements to a supplier who then designs and develops a product 
 58 
 
for them. For instance, as the participant noted, “Traditionally, we would say, ‘I want 
something that would do this, build this for me.” We have done that a lot.” 
2.8 Discussion of Within-Firm Narratives  
Based on the within-firm narratives, it appears that the behaviors exhibited during 
SCI vary. Table 2-3 lists the extent to which firms exhibit specific behavioral patterns 
associated with SCI. From inspection of Table 2-3, it is evident that firms share some 
combinations of behavior patterns. For instance, firms such as Oil_One, Ret_One, 
Comp_One, and Ser_One appear to share a very trusting relationship with their close 
strategic supply chain partners. They exhibit low levels of monitoring, and high levels of 
relational investments, knowledge sharing, joint activities, vision sharing, and adaptability 
in relationships; whereas Oil_Two engages in high levels of monitoring, and hardly 
exhibits other behavioral patterns associated with SCI. On the other hand, 
Electronics_One and Net_One tend to exhibit most of the behavioral patterns associated 
with SCI at a moderate level expect adaptability in relationships, which is hardly 
exhibited. These recurring behavior combinations map into what the literature refers to 
levels of SCI. In the last column of Table 2-3, I categorize the behavioral intensity 
associated with SCI into coordination, collaboration and internalization. Collectively, the 
firms in this study, give the impression that SCI is pursued at three different levels (i.e., 
coordination, collaboration, and internalization) based on the behavioral nuances 
exhibited. Table 2-4 provides a summary of the different behaviors across the three levels 
of SCI. For instance, at the coordination level, firms behave in a transactional manner.  
There is low trust among exchange partners at the coordination level, and they exhibit a 
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high degree of monitoring. At the collaboration level, they assume a cooperative posture. 
They exhibit moderate levels on most behaviors exhibited by firms engaging in SCI (e.g., 
relational investments), but are not willing to compromise on profitability. They exhibit 
low adaptability in relationships. At the internalization level, firms go beyond mere 
cooperation and engage in activities such as risk sharing and shaping their strategic vision 
collectively to a great extent. The firms that were involved in internalized relationships 
had an intrinsic desire/liking to pursue the long-term relationship with their respective 
supply chain partners. 
I speculate that firms progress to the highest intensity of SCI through three levels, 
which I term as coordination, collaboration and internalization (see Figure 2-1). However, 
not all firms in this study pursued an internalized relationship. Specifically, I find that 
Electronics_One and Net_One had their relationships evolve to collaboration while 
Oil_Two never evolved from being transactional in its relationship orientation. All the 
other firms had evolved to internalization with their close strategic supply chain partners 
(see Figure 2-2). In summary, I conjecture that SCI might involve three levels of interfirm 
relationships: coordination, collaboration, and internalization. Furthermore, based on the 
within-firm narratives, it appears that the behaviors exhibited by the firms vary in degree 
depending upon the intensity of SCI the firms are pursuing, which are briefly discussed 
below. 
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Table 2-3: SCI Behavioral Patterns and Level of SCI Pursued by Firms 
 
 
Table 2-4: Nuances in Behavioral Patterns across SCI Levels 
Firms Monitoring Relational 
Investments 
Knowledge 
Sharing 
 Joint 
Activities 
Vision 
Sharing 
Adaptability in 
Relationships 
Level of SCI 
Oil_One Low High High  High High High Internalization 
Electronics_One Moderate Moderate Moderate  Moderate Moderate Low Collaboration 
Net_One Moderate Moderate Moderate  Moderate Moderate Low Collaboration 
Ret_One Low High High  High High High Internalization 
Comp_One Low High High  High High High Internalization 
Ser_One Low High High  High High High Internalization 
Oil_Two High Low Low  Low Low Low Coordination 
Behavioral Patterns of SCI Coordination Collaboration Internalization 
Monitoring High Moderate Low 
Relational Investments None Moderate High 
Knowledge Sharing Low Moderate High 
Joint activities Low Moderate High 
Vision Sharing Low Moderate High 
Adaptability in Relationships Low Low High 
 61 
 
Figure 2-1: Levels of Interfirm Relationships 
 
Figure 2-2: Level of SCI Pursued by Firms 
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2.8.1 Monitoring 
Table 2-5 produces a sample of representative quotations regarding monitoring 
across the three different levels of SCI. The coordination level is characterized by low 
levels of trust where there is constant monitoring by the members involved in the 
relationship. For instance, a materials planning manager in Electronics_One suggested that 
early on in a relationship, firms need to be continuously monitored. The primary activity 
that takes place during this phase is the synchronization of the flow of goods between 
firms. This level of SCI is also described by very rigid relationships and firms are more 
than willing to switch partners on the basis of cost. On the other hand, collaborative 
relationships are considered to possess a certain amount of trust because firms at this level 
of SCI have worked constructively together for a period of time. This level entails a lesser 
degree of monitoring as firms do not survey their supply chain partners as closely as they 
do during the coordination level. Finally, internalization is typified by high levels of trust. 
Trust in itself acts as a control mechanism and the fear of opportunistic behavior does not 
arise. Prior work on trust has also indicated that it can serve as an effective control 
mechanism in buyer-supplier relationships (Das & Teng, 1998). Sometimes firms do not 
employ formal contracts, and even if they do, they are never utilized. As a participant from 
Ret_One noted, “For the vast majority of our strategic relationships we don’t have to 
enforce contracts.” 
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Table 2-5: Quotes Representing Monitoring at Different Levels of SCI 
SCI Level Representative Quotations 
Coordination “The new customer is where we (Electronics_One) have to have all our 
attention.” 
“We (Oil_Two) have several key contracts in place with our big suppliers.”   
Collaboration “Once in a while, we (Ser_One) do send people to visit our customers and 
ensure they are okay.” 
Internalization “Contracts! We (Ser_One) don’t use them.”  
“The vast majority of our (Ret_One) strategic relationship we don’t have to 
enforce contracts.” 
“We (Com_One) don’t have penalty laden contract.” 
 
2.8.2 Relational Investments 
Table 2-6 presents a sample of representative quotations to depict the extent to 
which relational investments are made across different levels of SCI. As firms enter into 
a relationship through coordination, they refrain from making relational investments as 
these investments are likely to bind firms to a particular relationship. Such firms perceive 
their relationships to be transactional in nature and are ready to switch customers based 
on cost and quality. As an example, the VP of Oil_One suggested that they refrain from 
making significant investments with transactional suppliers. However, when firms start 
collaborating in a relationship, they see the value proposition in the relationship, and make 
relational investments. Firms understand that making relational investments deepen their 
inter-dependence and so their relationship will be sustained for longer time periods. They 
also believe that the benefits of making such relational investments can be recovered over 
the course of their relationship. Jap (1999) also proposes that the primary difference 
between coordinative and collaborative efforts is the investment in relational investments. 
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Relationships at the internalization level are characterized by high levels of trust 
and commitment, and hence firms are willing to make substantial investments into their 
relationship. Firms at this level of relationship do not fear that opportunistic behavior will 
emerge by their partners as at this level their relationship is characterized by high levels 
of trust. I also find that firms make larger investments as opposed to in a collaborative 
relationship.  
Table 2-6: Quotes Representing Relational Investments at Different Levels of SCI 
SCI Level Representative Quotations 
Coordination “Our (Net_One) customer does not feel it is necessary to put resources in our 
relationship.”  
“Our (Oil_One) supplier was not making investments in technology.” 
“With short term suppliers our (Oil_One) investment and commitment is 
much more reduced.” 
Collaboration “I (Electronics_One) have to go out and build tooling for it, I have to make a 
huge investment…it is not a transactional cost.” 
Internalization “Our (Ret_One) supplier made their decision that they want to build a factory 
in the United States to serve us better.”  
2.8.3 Knowledge Sharing 
Table 2-7 illustrates the differences in knowledge sharing behavior across the three 
levels of SCI. Firms that are merely coordinating activities do not typically share their 
knowledge, but rather share only codified information that is necessary to conduct 
business. This level is characterized by low levels of trust, and firms fear opportunistic 
behavior, which restricts the sharing of knowledge among firms.  However, as firms 
evolve into the collaboration level, there is some degree of trust that develops due to 
repeated interactions, which promotes knowledge sharing. At the collaboration level, 
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knowledge sharing occurs through increases in telephonic and internet-enabled 
conversations, or face-to-face interactions fostered through trust.  
Internalized relationships involve high levels of trust, and firms readily gain access 
to some of the know-hows of their partnering firms. Tacit knowledge is willingly shared 
between the partners. Dwyer et al. (1987) also propose that firms in relationships 
characterized by high levels of commitment provide meaningful inputs into their 
relationship.   
Table 2-7: Quotes Representing Knowledge Sharing at Different Levels of SCI 
SCI Level Representative Quotations 
Coordination “Before it used to be that our (Net_One) customer would have just have 
some matrix that we would report on.” 
“Traditionally we (Oil_Two) would say, we want this and they would go 
build it for me. There is hardly any knowledge sharing.” 
Collaboration “Our (Electronics_One) customer is entrenched in a lot of our data.” 
“Our (Net_One) customer now wants to have a bi-weekly calls or once a 
month calls where we go through, we talk in detail about the matrix.” 
Internalization “Because we (Oil_One) have a good relationship with them and this was 
something they shared with us.” 
“We have a university for suppliers, and we (Ret_One) teach them good 
supplier practices and we (Ret_One) teach them global food safety 
initiatives.”  
“We (Ser_One) use some of the things we learned and share it with them.” 
 
2.8.4 Joint Activities 
Table 2-8 provides some of representative the quotes regarding joint activities 
during each level of SCI. At the coordination level, firms do not necessarily engage in 
joint activities with their supply chain partners as they do not envision having a long-term 
relationship with their supply chain partners. However, as firms observe the value 
proposition of working together, as opposed to working independently, they begin 
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collaborating. Firms engage in activities such as collaborative planning and forecasting. 
As an example, Ser_One engages in collaborative planning and forecasting with its 
collaborative suppliers (see Table 2-8).  
The joint initiatives truly bloom at the internalization level as exchange partners 
trust each other even further. At this level of SCI, firms willingly share tacit information 
with their exchange partners that helps in jointly developing new products. The extent and 
scope of joint activities is higher in an internalized relationship when compared to a 
collaborative relationship. As an example, the VP of Supply Chain Management at 
Comp_One suggested that in an internalized relationship they work together with their 
suppliers to test and design new products, and provide them with necessary resources to 
develop new products, while in transactional relationships they do not engage in such 
activities.   
Table 2-8: Quotes Representing Joint Activities at Different Levels of SCI 
SCI Level Representative Quotation 
Coordination “Our (Net_One) transactional customer believes that it is our problem, and 
we need to go work it out.”  
Collaboration “The forecast is bad the minute after we (Ser_One) printed it, we can be of 
assistance to our suppliers, and they can respond back to us and provide 
valuable information based on what they see going on in the market.”  
Internalization “We (Oil_One) do pilots and testing and so forth with them.” 
“Like if our (Comp_One) suppliers don’t have the resources, Say we 
(Comp_One) are going to go and design a product with them.”  
“I (Ser_One) will take an expert there to assist our supplier with scheduling, 
and with actual industrial processes they are doing.” 
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2.8.5 Vision Sharing 
Table 2-9 provides some representative quotations from participants indicating the 
extent to which firms share their vision during different levels of SCI. I find that during 
the coordination level firms are very myopic in their focus and thus do not necessarily 
share their vision with their supply chain partners as they are not committed to a long-term 
relationship with their exchange partners. However, as the degree of trust and inter-
dependence among supply chain partners increase over repeated interactions, firms begin 
developing a long-term orientation with their exchange partners. The long-term 
orientation with the exchange partners motivates firms to provide some visibility into their 
planning with their exchange partners. Long-term strategic planning and shaping of goals 
and vision together only occurs when firms are highly committed towards each other and 
share a high degree of trust. Firms that have an internalized relationship implicitly and 
explicitly pledge towards relationship continuity, thus sharing long-term plans becomes 
critical to the sustenance of their relationship. I find that firms involved in an internalized 
relationship have a better understanding of their supply chain partners’ long term 
objectives. 
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Table 2-9: Quotes Representing Vision Sharing at Different Levels of SCI 
SCI Level Representative Quotation 
Coordination “Even though I (Oil_Two) manage them, they are not in my radar. I don’t 
pay much attention to them.”  
“Some of our (Ret_One) suppliers don’t share their vision” 
Collaboration “Our (Net_One) customers have a vision of what they want and how they 
want…they say to us, ‘this is the plan, we will want a product to go do this,’ 
and we  come up with products to be able to go and match those desires.” 
Internalization “We (Oil_One) sit down with our strategic partners, we lay out what we are 
trying to do on a business plan, we generally share what our plan looks like 
this year, and we will give them insight into where we are going in three to 
five years.” 
 
2.8.6 Adaptability in Relationships 
Table 2-10 presents a sample of representative quotations depicting the 
adaptability in relationships firms assume at different levels of SCI. Firms at the 
coordination level try to maximize their own profits and have little or no consideration for 
what happens to their partners. Due to the discrete nature of these relationships, firms 
attempt to maximize their profit at every given opportunity with their supply chain 
partners. Even during collaboration, firms are concerned about their relationship’s 
profitability and might be willing to exit a relationship in case performance expectations 
within relationships are not met and their profitability is adversely affected. They are 
unwilling to adapt in order to sustain the relationship at the collaboration level. However, 
when relationships are internalized firms are willing to endure short-term losses to 
preserve their long-term relationships. Furthermore, these firms are not only willing to 
take losses, but they work with the supply chain partners to improve their current 
predicament. For instance, the VP of operations and supply chain management at Ser_One 
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suggested that they try to maintain their relationships even during a crisis and help their 
suppliers to overcome challenges.  
Table 2-10: Quotes Representing Adaptability in Relationship at Different Levels of 
SCI 
SCI Level Representative Quotation 
Coordination “Competition is the name of our (Net_One) game, and so everybody has to 
remain competitive.”  
“We  (Oil_Two) select vendors based on pricing.” 
Collaboration “Relationships are very important for us (Net_One), but profitability also has 
a part to play in the competition.” 
Internalization “The knee-jerk reaction would have been to throw most of that relationship 
away because these other guys would do the work for 30% less, we 
(Oil_One) did not do that.” 
“We (Ret_One) have introduced our suppliers to other regional supermarket 
chains.”  
2.9 Discussion 
In summary, I find that firms exhibit a set of behaviors when engaged in SCI, and 
conjecture that there are some behavioral nuances based on the extent to which firms are 
engaged in SCI.  
2.9.1 Theoretical Framework for the Behavioral Patterns of SCI  
Based on the data analyses and within-firm narratives, I conjecture a theoretical 
framework for SCI as presented in Figure 2-3. It depicts that as firms begin to interact 
with each other at the coordination level, they share basic information necessary to 
synchronize the flow of goods. The within-firm narratives reveal that firms at the 
coordination level are more likely to enforce contracts and hold their partners strictly 
accountable to them. Coordination is characterized by rigid relationships with minimal 
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commitment and trust describing such relationships. At the coordination level, firms are 
less likely to engage in activities such as knowledge sharing, relational investments, joint 
activities, and vision sharing as it is described by low levels of trust. Firms fear that 
exchange partners might engage in opportunistic behavior during coordination.  
However, repeated positive interactions at the coordination level might engender 
trust, which enables the evolvement of relationships from coordination to collaboration. 
The collaboration level of SCI is characterized by some degree of trust. Exchange partners 
at this level trust but try to also verify each other through some measures of surveillance. 
However, monitoring occurs to a lesser degree in collaboration as compared to 
coordination. At the collaboration level, firms also recognize the benefits of working 
together, and engage in relational investments, knowledge sharing and collaborative 
activities, and share their short term vision with their exchange partners. These activities 
in turn increase the inter-dependency among firms, and also enable the development of 
trust among exchange partners.  
The increase in trust due to the activities at the collaboration level creates a desire 
to develop a closer relationship (i.e., internalization) among firms. Internalization is 
characterized by high levels of trust and commitment among exchange partners.  As 
relationships evolve into the internalization level, contracts are hardly used, and disputes 
are settled amicably over conversations. At the internalization level, exchange partners are 
more willing to make relational investments, because they tend to believe that their 
partners would not engage in opportunistic behavior. Furthermore, exchange partners at 
this level engage in a high degree of knowledge transfer, joint activities, and share their 
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strategic vision as they believe in the continuity of their relationships and do not fear 
opportunistic behavior. In addition, firms that are involved in an internalized relationship 
 
 
 
Figure 2-3: SCI Theoretical Framework 
 
                         
appear to stick with their supply chain partners in times of crises and are willing to work 
with them to overcome their challenges. The behaviors of firms exhibited during 
internalization are found to be self-reinforcing. It should be also noted that firms can 
terminate their relationship at any of the levels of SCI.  Based on my findings, I propose 
the following: 
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Proposition 1. As firms evolve from coordination to internalization via collaboration, they 
increasingly engage in relational investments, knowledge sharing, joint initiatives, vision 
sharing, and exhibit adaptability while engaging to a lesser degree in formal monitoring.  
2.10 Conclusion 
This study contributes to academic research and practice alike. Several studies 
have examined SCI using cross-sectional surveys (Flynn, Huo, & Zhao, 2010; Koufteros 
et al., 2007; Leuschner et al., 2013) but SCI has had relatively no theoretical 
underpinnings. The supply chain literature is fraught with ambiguous conceptualizations 
of SCI (Van der Vaart & van Donk, 2008), preventing any meaningful additive research 
from being conducted on SCI. In this study, I have proposed a theoretical model for the 
behavioral patterns exhibited by firms while engaging in SCI via qualitative research, and 
thus ground my framework on data unlike earlier studies of Dwyer et al. (1987).  
I have provided a framework for the development of SCI measures by listing the 
behavioral nuances exhibited by firms during SCI, while Mackelprang (2012) argues that 
the behaviors exhibited by firms engaging in SCI are not clearly understood. The 
behavioral patterns of SCI identified through this study should also serve as guidelines for 
practitioners to engage in SCI. Furthermore, the study provides a foundation to develop a 
consistent measure for the behaviors exhibited by firms during SCI, which is currently 
lacking in the extant literature (Van der Vaart & van Donk, 2008), 
Like any study, this one also has limitations. I have provided an inkling in this 
research that SCI can evolve through three levels. Additional research is required to 
examine the levels through which SCI evolves, and the specific characteristics exhibited 
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at those levels. Furthermore, I speculate that several factors such as relationship duration, 
product type, supplier concentration, cost, quality, value proposition, and culture and 
management acumen can influence the evolution of SCI. However, the exact role of these 
triggers in the evolution of SCI is unclear. Future studies should explore the role of these 
triggers in the evolution of SCI.  
I concluded that firms can engage in relationship termination at any level of SCI. 
However, how firms terminate relationships is still unclear. Future research should seek 
to examine the decline of relationships across different levels of SCI. In other words, how 
does the relationship regress from one level to a lower level? Or, is it possible that the 
relationship regresses across multiple levels simultaneously? These areas of inquiry will 
be particularly useful to provide insights about mitigating the negative impacts of failure 
in SCI.  
Furthermore, I have not explicitly addressed trust in relationships but I have rather 
suggested that trust develops over time through repeated positive interactions. Sako and 
Helper (1998) suggest that interfirm trust exists at three different levels—contractual, 
competence, and goodwill trust. Future research should seek to deepen our understanding 
of the nature of trust developed while engaging in increasing extent of SCI. 
In this study, I considered the relationships of large firms while ignoring how small 
firms build relationships. Koufteros et al. (2007), employing a cross-sectional survey 
study, demonstrate that firm size can influence SCI. Small firms might not have the 
resources and abilities of large firms to enable the achievement of high levels of SCI. 
Hence, it will be interesting to ascertain how my findings might differ based on firm size.   
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My research indicates that SCI is a very complex phenomenon, which is very 
dynamic in nature. A system dynamics perspective can provide valuable insights by 
simultaneously examining the interplay of factors involved in the evolution of SCI. As 
another limitation, this study is still restrictive in its understanding of the role of 
individuals within organizations. Executives within organizations can influence strategic 
decisions, and organizations can be seen as reflections of their top executives (Carpenter 
et al., 2004; Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Examining the role of individuals within 
organizations on SCI may therefore be a fruitful research direction. Finally, a single 
individual coded and analyzed the data. To lend the findings more credibility, however, it 
is imperative that more researchers code and analyze the data. Moreover, despite my 
rigorous methodological approach to data collection and analysis—that is, using multiple 
informants and theoretical sampling and writing memos—it is still possible that, because 
of the study’s retrospective nature, it did not capture certain aspects of SCI. 
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CHAPTER III 
SUPPLY CHAIN LEADERSHIP 
3.1 Introduction 
Despite the perceived benefits of working closely together (i.e., supply chain 
integration (SCI)), some firms tend to exhibit adversarial behaviors with their supply chain 
partners (Swinney & Netessine, 2009). For instance, in the 1990’s, Ford, under pressure 
to reduce its costs imposed a 5% price reduction on all its suppliers (Swinney & Netessine, 
2009). This led to its suppliers complaining and reducing their commitment towards Ford. 
On the other hand, during the same time period, Toyota and Honda worked with their 
suppliers and reduced their manufacturing costs for the Toyota Camry and Honda Accord 
models by over 25% respectively (Choi, 2005). Subsequently, learning the importance and 
benefits of working constructively with suppliers, Ford has made the transition from 
working with several hundred suppliers to a few select suppliers over the last few years.  
Birgt Behrendt, vice president of global programs and purchasing operations at Ford, 
reports that Ford now spends a significant proportion of its purchasing budget on 104 
preferred suppliers, a far smaller number than the 3,000 suppliers it boasted in 2005, and 
recently has moved to the top three auto manufacturers with respect to supplier 
relationships (Bunkley, 2013). According to the 2010 Working Relations Index (WRI), 
Ford has improved 24% in supplier relationships since 2009 (www.ppi1.com). Ford’s 
suppliers attribute the improvement in relationships to Ford’s new style of leadership in 
its supply chain (Burder, 2014). Ford’s improved relationships with its suppliers have 
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made its suppliers more willing to work with them collaboratively on several new product 
development initiatives (Bunkley, 2013).  
Firms increasingly view supply chains as conduits for innovation (Shipilov, 2013). 
Several scholars have also touted the benefits of working together with supply chain 
partners (Carr & Pearson, 1999; Droge, Jayaram, & Vickery, 2004; Koufteros, Rawski, & 
Rupak, 2010; Koufteros, Cheng, & Lai, 2007). For instance, Petersen, Handfield, and 
Ragatz (2005) find that working closely with suppliers can help in making significant 
improvements in product design performance. Parker, Zsidisin, and Ragatz (2008) find 
that early supplier involvement significantly enhances the chances of success for new 
product development. However, there is increasing evidence to suggest that firms often 
do not achieve the desired benefits of working together. The failure rates of SCI initiatives 
are as high as 70% (Anderson & Jap, 2012).  
SCI initiatives that are poorly led are more likely to fail (Defee, 2007; Hult, Ferrell, 
Hurley, & Giunipero, 2000). Members of an integrated supply chain also need to be led in 
the same manner as organizations that operate as independent firms (Cooper, Lambert, & 
Pagh, 1997). An effective leadership style plays an important role in successfully 
managing and guiding an integrated supply chain. Mentzer et al. (2001) suggest that there 
needs to be a firm that assumes the leader role in a supply chain. Furthermore, Bowersox 
and Closs (1996) suggest that supply chains need leaders as much as individual 
organizations do. Effective leadership is required to lift barriers between supply chain 
members, to orchestrate the use of resources, and to allow seamless transfer of information 
(Avolio, Bass, & Jung, 1999; Hult, Ketchen, & Chabowski, 2007). Effective leaders in a 
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supply chain can develop a relationship which is built on shared goals and high 
commitment (Defee, Stank, & Esper, 2010). Effective leaders are those who adopt and 
practice the right leadership style to achieve desired outcomes. 
Leadership style defines the manner in which power is exercised by an individual 
or an organization. The right leadership style needs to be exhibited in order to drive a 
change in supply chain relationships (Defee, 2007). Leadership can be an organizational 
quality (Ogawa & Bossert, 1995) as much as it is an individual quality. The leadership 
style exhibited by top management gradually becomes institutionalized throughout the 
entire organization (Ogawa & Bossert, 1995). Organizations are a reflection of their 
leaders (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Ford’s turn-around in its relationships with its 
suppliers in the last decade can be attributed to the leadership style it exhibits towards its 
suppliers (Burder, 2014).  
Despite growing calls for rigorous empirical examination of the concept of supply 
chain leadership (SCL), only a small number of studies cover this topic. For instance, 
supply chain scholars have sought to examine SCL’s role on performance and relationship 
commitment (Defee, 2007; Hult et al., 2000). However, the role of SCL in achieving high 
levels of SCI remains largely unexplored.  
In order to understand the operant processes through which customers’ leadership 
styles influence SCI behaviors exhibited by suppliers, Transformational Leadership 
Theory (TLT) and Social Exchange Theory (SET) are employed. TLT is used to inform 
us about specific leadership styles, and SET is utilized to explain the mechanism by which 
customer leadership influences and supplier behaviors. TLT proposes two broad 
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leadership styles namely, transformational leadership and transactional leadership (see 
Appendix-B for definitions). 
Transformational and transactional leadership styles exhibited by customers 
transcend organizational boundaries and impact suppliers (Bass, 1997; Defee et al., 2010). 
TLT is robust across different levels of analysis, and this has made it a preferred choice 
amongst leadership theories for supply chain scholars (Hult et al., 2000). Transformational 
leaders in supply chains are shown to improve performance by enhancing information 
availability and relationship commitment (Defee, 2007; Hult et al., 2007). Additionally, 
some scholars argue that the transformational and transactional leadership styles exhibited 
by customers impact relationship outcomes differently (Zhu, Chew, & Spangler, 2005). 
There is, however, scant empirical evidence examining the mechanism through which 
transformational and transactional leadership styles affect SCI. 
Towards this account, social exchange theory (SET) provides a useful theoretical 
framework to examine suppliers’ responses to different customer leadership styles. The 
origins of SET can be traced back at least to the early 1920’s (Molm, 2006) and SET still 
remains one of the most useful frameworks to explain inter-organizational behavior.  
Social exchanges comprise a number of interactions that generate obligations (Cropanzano 
& Mitchell, 2005). Firms engage in social exchanges to gain specific rewards and avoid 
certain punishments (Griffith, Harvey, & Lusch, 2006). SET suggests that the action of 
member ‘A’ towards member ‘B’ is contingent upon the action of B on A. Furthermore, 
one of the basic tenets of SET is that trust and commitment evolve over a period of time 
in social exchanges. This tenet is consistent with some of the explanations for the 
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evolution of inter-firm relationships (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). According to SET, in 
the context of a customer-supplier relationship, the leadership styles of customers might 
evoke certain behavioral responses from suppliers which are mediated by the trust and 
commitment that is engendered during repeated interactions.  The commitment-trust 
theory by Morgan and Hunt (1994) proposes that trust precedes commitment in a 
relationship.  
Although leadership seems to be an important factor to be considered while 
examining SCI, supply chain scholars have largely ignored it.  This study aims to do the 
following: (1) identify the most effective leadership style to achieve SCI, (2) examine the 
mechanisms by which leadership styles influence SCI, and (3) provide managerial insights 
on improving supply chain relationships through leadership. 
This examines the explanatory role of customer leadership behaviors on  SCI.  via 
several parts. The first part motivates the research question while the next section provides 
a brief account of SET and its application in the context of customer-supplier relationship. 
The subsequent part describes the different constructs used in this study, such as leadership 
behavior styles, trust, commitment, and SCI. Furthermore,  this part focuses on TLT to 
identify and discuss the different leadership behavior styles examined in this study.  Then 
I develop the hypotheses to be tested in this study. The following few sections postulate 
the research design and the instrument development process. The instrument development 
process is followed by the testing of hypotheses using structural equations modeling 
(SEM), and  the last part discusses the results and suggests directions for future research.   
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3.2 Theoretical Development 
SET provides a useful theoretical lens to study the interplay between leadership 
style, trust, relationship commitment, and SCI (See Figure 3-1). The roots of SET can be 
dated back to the early 1920s (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005), bridging disciplines such 
as anthropology, social psychology, and sociology (Molm, 2006). SET has been applied 
to diverse areas of research including leadership (Liden, Sparrowe, & Wayne, 1997) and 
social interactions. The use of SET in the context of supply chains is also steadily 
increasing (Griffith et al., 2006; Nyaga, Whipple, & Lynch, 2010; Zhao et al., 2008). This 
study utilizes SET to develop theoretical arguments suggesting that leadership style 
impacts integration with customers through trust and relationship commitment, while 
acknowledging that a direct link between customer leadership style and SCI may exist as 
well. 
While classical theories of economic exchanges typically assumed that exchanges 
were independent, one-shot transactions between actors, social exchange theorists are 
primarily interested in relations of some length and endurance (Molm, 2006). Social 
exchanges involve a series of interactions that generate obligations (Emerson, 1976). 
These interactions are perceived to be interdependent and contingent on the actions of 
another entity (Blau, 1964). SET also emphasizes that these interactions are capable of 
high quality relationships between the interacting members (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 
2005). Though primarily developed to study individuals, sociology researchers have 
recognized that the behavioral principles of individuals in a social group have strong
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Figure 3-1: Hypothesized Structural Model 
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generalizability (Emerson, 1976) and can be applied to study inter-organizational 
behaviors (Choi & Wu, 2009). 
The basic elements of social exchanges are the actors who engage in exchanges, 
the resources they exchange, the structures within which the exchange relations develop, 
and the dynamic process in exchange (Molm, 2006). The actors involved in an exchange 
can be an individual or an organization (Cook & Rice, 2006). It is not difficult to perceive 
firms as social actors embedded in a social network (Rai & Bajwa, 1997). The basic 
assumption about the actors is that they are self-interested, seeking to maximize outcomes 
that they positively value and to minimize outcomes that they negatively regard (Molm, 
1990). Actors involved in social exchanges reciprocate resources (tangible or intangible) 
that are of value to others (Molm, 2006). Moreover, the process of exchange explains the 
mechanics of interaction within an exchange structure. The core assumption with respect 
to exchanges is that the benefits derived from exchanges are contingent upon the benefits 
provided in the exchanges (Molm, 2006).  
SET is used to explain the followers’ behaviors in response to leadership styles 
exhibited by the leader, though this phenomenon mainly has been examined at the 
individual level. Liden et al. (1997) examine the leader-member exchange within the 
purview of SET. They argue that social exchanges exist between leaders and members of 
an organization that result in reciprocal exchanges of resources (i.e., both tangible and 
intangible) amongst them.  Several other scholars also consider the leader-member 
exchange to be governed by social exchange theory (Liden et al., 1997; Wang, He, & 
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Mahoney, 2009). The generalizability of SET across different units of analysis will help 
us examine the role of customers’ leadership styles on suppliers’ reciprocal behaviors.  
Supply chain interactions are not only governed by economic elements stated in a 
contract, but also through social elements that are not explicitly specified in the contract 
(Shin, Collier, & Wilson, 2000). The social exchanges in supply chains often create future 
obligations (Masterson, Lewis, Goldman, & Taylor, 2000) that help develop relationships 
among firms involved. Several supply chain scholars have used SET to explain different 
phenomena in supply chains. For instance, Griffith et al. (2006) examine the role of 
procedural justice and distributive justice of suppliers in fostering a long term orientation 
and relational behaviors with distributors, which then reduces conflict and enhances 
satisfaction, leading to improved overall performance. They use SET to argue that the 
procedural and distributive justice exhibited by suppliers creates a sense of obligation with 
distributors which they then reciprocate by enhancing their commitment towards 
suppliers. In another study, Zhao et al. (2008) use SET to examine the role of different 
customer power bases on customer integration. They argue that suppliers exhibit their 
reciprocity in response to different customers’ power bases through their relationship 
commitment. 
Wang et al. (2009) argue that the nature of social exchanges governs the quality of 
relationship that is developed between the leader and the follower. Based on SET, the 
follower’s reciprocity depends upon the action of the leader. Thus, the trust and 
relationship commitment developed by a supplier (follower) will be contingent on the 
leadership style of the customer (leader). The type and extent of trust and relationship 
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commitment developed by the supplier will then influence the relationship it is willing to 
engage in with the customer.  
3.3 Variables of Interest 
3.3.1 Supply Chain Leadership 
Within the realm of inter-personal influence literature, leadership style is 
considered to be an important influence mechanism (Allred, Fawcett, Wallin, & Magnan, 
2011). Effective leadership style has been shown to invoke high levels of trust and 
commitment by the follower (Defee, 2007). Supply chains are comprised of several firms 
acting interdependently. The supply chain management literature has repeatedly cited the 
importance of leadership in supply chains. Effective supply chain management requires a 
leader who has a strong sense of purpose and direction (Cooper et al., 1997). For example, 
an exploratory study of Chinese firms by Lockström, Schadel, Harrison, Moser, and 
Malhotra (2010) suggests that customer-side leadership impacts motivation, trust, and 
commitment among suppliers. The commitment developed by suppliers is then shown to 
be a key enabler of successful customer-supplier integration. Additionally, Defee (2007) 
finds empirical evidence to suggest transformational leaders in supply chains positively 
influence followers. Thus, leadership may be an influential factor to consider for achieving 
successful integration between a customer and a supplier.  
Bass’s (1985) Transformational Leadership Theory (TLT) is the most widely used 
and accepted leadership theory. Miner (2005) states, “TLT has remained remarkably 
stable over time” (p.366), which implies that the constructs of TLT are well established. 
Besides, TLT encompasses the virtues of most prior leadership styles such as the 
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“charismatic leadership style” (Miner, 2005). TLT encapsulates two broad leadership 
styles, i.e., transformational leadership and transactional leadership styles.  
Within the context of an organization, transformational leaders create strategic 
goals, which they communicate effectively throughout the entire organization to build 
organizational commitment towards their vision (Defee, 2007). Moreover, 
transformational leaders are found to communicate strategic goals better than leaders who 
do not exhibit transformational leadership qualities (Kearns & Lederer, 2003). As a result, 
this enhanced communication ability allows them to achieve higher cohesion, trust, 
commitment and performance in new organizational settings (Kearns & Lederer, 2003).  
Although TLT is primarily deployed at the individual level, Ogawa and Bossert 
(2010) have argued that leadership also is an organizational quality. More recently, 
scholars have used transformational leadership style to study inter-organizational 
relationships. For example, Hult et al. (2007) have demonstrated that transformational 
leadership positively moderates the relationship between the value of a corporate buying 
center and supply chain performance. Avolio et al. (1999) agree that leadership can be an 
organizational-level quality that is diffused into an organization’s culture. They further 
contend that leadership can be extended beyond an organization’s boundaries to influence 
external members in a supply chain.  
The robustness of TLT across different organizational levels of analysis has made 
it an obvious choice among other leadership theories for supply chain scholars (Avolio & 
Bass, 1995; Bass, 1997; Defee, 2007; Hult, Ferrell, Hurley, & Giunipero, 2000). A 
transformational leader is characterized by (i) charismatic/inspirational leadership, (ii) 
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intellectual stimulation, and (iii) individualized consideration (Allred et al., 2011; Avolio, 
Waldman, & Yammarino, 1991). Studies have also shown that transformational leadership 
can be conceptualized as a higher-order factor (Ganesan, 1994; Zaheer, McEvily, & 
Perrone, 1998a) that captures the attributes of charismatic/inspirational leadership, 
intellectual stimulation, and individualized consideration.  
Furthermore, transformational leadership style is often contrasted against 
transactional leadership style. Transactional leadership style is operationalized by the two 
primary dimensions of (i) contingent rewards, and (ii) management by exception. The use 
of contingent rewards involves a leader governing the actions of followers by articulating 
rewards, and recognizing the work accomplished and penalizing for failure. On the other 
hand, management by exception implies that a leader tends to micro-manage followers 
based on a set of rules and standards. Corrective actions are taken immediately if 
transactional leaders managing by exception find any deviation from their governing set 
of rules and standards. 
3.3.2 Trust 
Trust is a key element in cooperative relationships (Monczka, Petersen, Handfield, 
& Ragatz, 1998). Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995) define trust as “the willingness of 
a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the 
other party will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the 
ability to monitor or control the other party” (p. 712).  
Trust is present at the inter-personal level and at the inter-organizational level. 
(Zaheer et al., 1998b) find that inter-organizational trust reduces the cost of negotiations 
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and conflict. The role of inter-organizational trust in soliciting desired outcomes out of 
inter-firm relationships is widely examined. For example, a study by Johnston et al. (2004) 
highlights the importance of suppliers’ trust for effectively engaging in joint activities with 
customers. Specifically, they find that a supplier’s willingness to be vulnerable to a 
customer’s actions promotes shared planning and coordinating activities with its customer. 
Along similar lines, Corsten, Gruen, and Peyinghaus (2011) empirically examine the 
buyer-supplier relationships in the automotive industry.  They find that trust is important 
to achieve the desired benefits out of inter-firm relationships. Specifically, they find that 
trust fully mediates the relationship between a supplier’s sense of belonging with its 
customers, and the supplier’s contributions in relationship specific investments and 
exchanging information with the customers.  
Although several studies have sought to explain the benefits of inter-organizational 
trust, relatively fewer studies have sought to explain the antecedents of inter-
organizational trust. The debate still continues regarding the antecedents of inter-
organizational trust, since our knowledge about the emergence of trust in a relationship is 
very limited (Gulati & Nickerson, 2008; Gulati & Sytch, 2008). Currently, two broad 
perspectives for the origins of trust are identified in the extant literature (Poppo, Zhou, & 
Ryu, 2008). The first perspective proposed by Gulati (1995) argued that familiarity breeds 
trust, as firms interact with each other several times, trust develops between them. The 
second perspective is an economic explanation for the emergence of trust. The economic 
perspective suggests that trust originates from rational deliberation and that it is beneficial 
to act in a manner such that the other party in the relationship can be trusted, even when 
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exposed to vulnerabilities (Poppo et al., 2008). These perspectives provide useful insights 
into the origins of trust. However, they fail to delineate the specific organizational traits 
(e.g., leadership style) that can engender inter-organizational trust.  
A supply chain necessarily involves interdependence where firms need to work 
together to achieve organizational goals. Building trust between partnering firms is vital 
for achieving alignment of interests between the buyer and the supplier (Blomqvist, 2002). 
Effective leadership styles are shown to invoke follower trust in the leader (Podsakoff, 
MacKenzie, Moorman, & Fetter, 1990) at the individual level; however, this phenomenon 
is yet to be empirically examined at the organizational level. 
3.3.3 Relationship Commitment 
The Organizational Behavior (OB) literature has widely examined the concept of 
organizational commitment.  OB scholars recognize that organizational commitment is a 
multi-dimensional construct. However, debate continues regarding the dimensionality of 
the construct. Two widely used paradigms proposed by Meyer and Allen (1991) and 
O'Reilly and Chatman (1986) dominate the relationship commitment literature. Meyer and 
Allen (1991) develop their model based on the observation that the existing 
conceptualization of organizational commitment at that time did not adequately capture 
differences in the state of mind of individuals who remained with the organization.  Meyer 
and Allen conceptualized organizational commitment as a three dimensional construct 
which they labeled as affective commitment, continuance commitment, and normative 
commitment. Affective commitment manifests the desire of an organization to stay in a 
relationship and the intrinsic desire to be associated in the relationship. Continuance 
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commitment suggests a lack of options where the relationship is driven by necessity, while 
normative commitment captures the obligated state of mind to remain within an 
organization.  Several independent factor analytic studies support the three factor model 
(Meyer & Herscovitch, 2001). However, a very high correlation was reported between 
normative commitment and affective commitment causing some concern regarding the 
dimensionality of the construct (Meyer & Herscovitch, 2001).   
Similar to the model advanced by Meyer and Allen (1991), O’Reilly and Chatman 
(1986) proposed a three factor model for organizational commitment. They developed 
their model based on Kelman’s (1958) model regarding attitude and behavior change and 
labeled the three dimensions of organizational commitment as compliance, identification, 
and internalization. Compliance is the change in attitude and behavior in response to 
specific rewards or avoidance of certain punishments. Identification occurs when an 
individual accepts influence to maintain a satisfying relationship. On the other hand, 
internalization occurs because an individual’s values are in line with that of the 
organization. Factor analytic approaches applied on this model failed to discriminate 
between the commitment due to internalization and identification. In a later model 
proposed by O’Reilly and Chatman, they combined the internalization and identification 
dimensions and created a new dimension which they labeled as normative commitment 
(Meyer & Herscovitch, 2001). This type of commitment is similar to the affective 
commitment proposed by (Allen & Meyer, 1990). They also termed compliance 
commitment as instrumental commitment. This commitment is similar to the continuance 
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commitment described by Allen and Meyer (1990). Ultimately, O’Reilly and Chatman 
specified a two-factor model.  
Building on the work in OB, marketing and supply chain scholars have readily 
adapted the two-factor model of organizational commitment in order to examine the 
relationship commitment between supply chain members. Relationship commitment can 
be described as the desire to maintain relationships. More formally, (Morgan & Hunt, 
1994) define relationship commitment as the willingness of a party to invest in financial, 
physical, or relationship-based resources.   
In the context of buyer-supplier relationships, Gustafsson, Johnson, and Roos 
(2005) examine the role of affective commitment and calculative (i.e., continuance) 
commitment on customer retention.  Within the realm of inter-firm relationships, affective 
commitment refers to the willingness to retain cohesive relationships based on emotions 
and values of the parties involved, while continuance commitment is strictly based on 
economic benefits. Zhao et al. (2008) also examine the impact of affective commitment 
and instrumental (i.e., continuance) commitment on customer integration. They find that 
affective commitment has a positive impact on customer integration, while continuance 
commitment has a negative impact on customer integration.  
The trust-commitment theory proposed by Morgan and Hunt (1994) serves as a 
precursor to examining the relationship between trust and relationship commitment, but 
latter studies have failed to examine the link between trust, affective commitment and 
continuance commitment. Furthermore, the role of trust and relationship commitment as 
mediators in the context of inter-firm relationships development is yet to be examined.  
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3.3.4 Supply Chain Integration 
Stevens (1989) suggested that “the main objective of managing the supply chain 
is to synchronize the requirements of the customer with the flow of materials from the 
supplier in order to maintain a balance between what are often seen as conflicting goals of 
high customer service, low inventory investment and low unit cost” (p.3). To achieve these 
goals one recognizes the necessity for buyers and suppliers to cooperate across various 
processes ranging from product design, market launch, promotions, and order-fulfillment 
and recycling (Kopczak & Johnson, 2003). Frohlich and Westbrook (2001) suggest that 
companies need to integrate activities across partners and supply chains to effectively 
deliver products to the market. The establishment and maintenance of such a relationship 
is a socialization process that facilitates a two-way process of information sharing, joint 
problem solving, and knowledge transfer between the buyer and supplier (Cousins & 
Menguc, 2006), the management process of which has been identified as  SCI. In this 
study, SCI is captured from the perspective of a supplier towards its customer.  
3.4 Hypotheses Development 
3.4.1 Transformational Leadership and Trust- Transformational Leadership as 
an Enabler of Trust 
Social exchanges do entail future obligations that serve as means to develop trust 
and commitment towards relationships with members involved. Unlike economic 
exchanges where the exact nature of returns is specified and there is limited potential for 
the development of trust, social exchanges result in the development of trust. Social 
exchanges offer a potential for the development of trust since exchanges are handled with 
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the assumption that exchange parties will fairly exercise their obligations in the future 
(Molm, 2005).  Trust is absolutely necessary to sustain social exchanges (Konovsky & 
Pugh, 1994). The relational view of supply chains (Dyer & Singh, 1998) suggests that 
supply chains can increase their benefits by engaging in social exchanges instead of purely 
economic exchanges. Griffith et al. (2006) employ the theoretical lenses of social 
exchange theory to explain how the enacted procedural and distributive justice of a firm 
influences its partner’s attitudes and behaviors. Contingent upon the behavior exhibited 
by a member in a supply chain, the behavior can either have a positive or negative impact 
on the social exchanges by engendering trust or endangering trust between the exchange 
members. SET suggests that trust is contingent upon the leadership style exhibited by a 
member in a relationship (Wang et al., 2005). 
SET suggests that leadership styles exhibited by customers can influence 
suppliers’ trust towards them. Burke, Sims, Lazzara, and Salas (2007) suggest that “the 
idea of trust is strengthened or weakened due to the experiences, interactions, and context 
within which the relationship exists…” (p.610). The leadership styles exhibited by 
customers towards their suppliers can influence the perceptions of suppliers. Followers’ 
trust in leaders is one of the most important factors that determine the outcome of 
leadership styles.  Yukl (2010) suggests that transformational leadership fosters trust in a 
relationship, which then creates high levels of commitment in a relationship.  Pillai and 
Williams (2004) find evidence to suggest that trust mediates the relationship between 
transformational leadership styles and the follower’s commitment.   
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Transformational customers try to induce their suppliers to look beyond their own 
needs and make them focus on broader goals and needs that will benefit the relationship 
(Defee et al., 2009; Yukl, 2010). In this process, transformational leaders take into account 
the individual follower’s needs, goals, and interests (Bass, 1991). Transformational 
leaders do this through charisma/inspiration, intellectual stimulation, and individualized 
consideration. This, in turn, makes a supplier more willing to trust customers who exhibit 
transformational leadership. 
Transformational customers exhibiting charisma/inspirational leadership, 
individualized consideration, and intellectual stimulation are likely to win the trust of their 
suppliers. Mayer et al. (1995) proposed one of the most influential models on trust. They 
argue that the antecedents of trust generally appeal to at least one of the three broad 
categories of trust; namely ability, benevolence, and integrity. The actions of leaders that 
appeal to these categories are likely to earn the trust of followers (Burke et al., 2007). 
Transformational leaders communicate and role-model their values and a shared sense of 
purpose (i.e., charisma/inspiration), and thereby demonstrate their ability and integrity to 
their followers. In a similar fashion, they inspire followers to achieve attainable goals (i.e., 
inspiration), and in this fashion exhibit their competence, which in turn facilitates trust 
(Bass, 1991).  Likewise, through individualized consideration, transformational leaders 
understand the strength and weakness of followers and respect and demonstrate concern 
for them (Burke et al., 2007). Such individualized consideration is generally perceived as 
benevolence by followers, and this benevolence is empirically shown to develop trust in 
followers (Burke et al., 2007). Furthermore through intellectual stimulation, 
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transformational customers motivate their supplier to think of problems facing them from 
many different angles and support them throughout this endeavor. These actions reinforce 
the suppliers’ perception regarding their customers’ integrity and competence, which in 
turn enables the development of trust in suppliers. Therefore I hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 1. High transformational leadership style exhibited by the customer engenders 
high levels of trust in the supplier. 
3.4.2 Transactional Leadership and Trust- Transactional Leadership as a 
Deterrent of Trust 
Shamir (1995) suggests that leaders honoring their transactional commitments 
over a period of time tend to win the trust of their followers.  In their meta-analytic study, 
Dirks and Ferrin (2002) also find support to suggest that transactional leadership, through 
contingent reward and management by exception, has a positive influence on followers’ 
trust of their leaders.  
Unlike transformational customers, transactional customers are concerned only 
about short term outcomes (Avolio et al., 2004a; Avolio, Waldman, & Yammarino, 1991). 
Transactional customers exist within a series of give-and-take exchanges between the 
leader and the follower (Bass, 1997; Hult et al., 2007).  In other words, transactional 
customers are only concerned about accomplishing tasks. Simply put, transactional 
customers expect work to be done and are willing to reward and recognize their suppliers 
for getting the work done while failure to get the work done results in punitive actions. 
Transactional customers also work within a set of rules and standards and take corrective 
actions if they find any deviations.  
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Contrary to Shamir (1995), Jung and Avolio (2000) argue that transactional leaders 
administering contingent rewards will not engender trust among followers. Furthermore,  
empirically (Pillai, Schriesheim, & Williams, 1999) demonstrate that transactional 
leadership through contingent reward can endanger trust among followers. The customer’s 
transactional leadership style based on the usage of rewards and management by exception 
can negatively influence the suppliers’ trust in customers. Therefore, I propose: 
Hypothesis 2a. High levels of contingent reward leadership style exhibited by customers 
will diminish the level of trust developed by their suppliers. 
Hypothesis 2b. High levels of management by exception leadership style exhibited by 
customers will diminish the level of trust developed by their suppliers. 
3.4.3 Trust and Commitment- Trust as a Source of Relationship Commitment 
SET suggests that firms are more likely to commit to a particular relationship if 
they trust that their exchange partner will reciprocate (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005). 
Trust in a relationship is highly valued because partners are willing to commit to a specific 
relationship when there is a high level of trust (Morgan & Hunt, 1994). Spekman (1988) 
regarded trust to be the “cornerstone of strategic relationships.” However, Kwon and Suh 
(2004) argue that trust without actual commitment will not translate into actual gains for 
an organization. Prior studies also suggest that trust between organizations is a pre-
requisite for relationship commitment (Ganesan, 1994; Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Zhao, Huo, 
Flynn, & Yeung, 2008). Ganesan and Hess (1997) suggest that trust enhances relationship 
commitment by reducing the risk of opportunistic behaviors, by enhancing confidence that 
short term profit asymmetries will be resolved in the long run, and reducing the transaction 
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costs in a relationship.  While trust is necessary to achieve commitment, the type of 
commitment developed depends upon the level of trust that one has developed towards 
the other.  
3.4.4 Trust and Affective Commitment- Trust as a Source of Affective 
Commitment 
Affective commitment is based on emotions and values (Anand & Ward, 2004). 
In essence, firms that have affective commitment towards each other are tied to them based 
on emotions and values (Allen & Meyer, 1990) and are willing to make themselves 
vulnerable towards the actions of the other in a relationship (Morgan & Hunt, 1994). Since 
affective commitment exposes a firm to high vulnerability, a firm will develop affective 
commitment only if they trust its partner and recognize that its partner will be willing to 
go beyond contractual obligations for the sake of their relationship (Geyskens, Steenkamp, 
Scheer, & Kumar, 1996).  
Furthermore as firms develop high levels of trust, the threat of opportunistic 
behaviors by their partners is decreased dramatically (Ganesan, 1994). Firms with high 
levels of trust are more inclined to make asset specific investments into a relationship 
because they do not perceive any opportunistic behavior exhibited by their partners. Trust 
fosters a long-term orientation in a relationship and induces firms to focus on long-term 
relationship continuance instead of short term benefits (Cannon, Doney, Mullen, & 
Petersen, 2010).  In addition, the SET perspective argues that trust built through positive 
interactions develops a social bonding between the exchange partners (Cropanzano & 
Mitchell, 2005). The social bonding between firms is based on the emotional attachment 
 97 
 
that one develops towards the other. The emotional ties developed between firms motivate 
them to enhance their relationship by investing even further into their relationship 
(Babakus, Yavas, Karatepe, & Avci, 2003; Zhao et al., 2008).  
Hypothesis 3a. Trust is positively associated with affective commitment. 
3.4.5 Trust and Continuance Commitment- Trust as a Deterrent of Continuance 
Commitment 
Continuance commitment is based on rational and economic dependence towards 
a partner in a relationship (Anand et al., 2009). Firms exhibiting continuance commitment 
are primarily involved in a relationship purely for economic reasons (Iverson & Buttigieg, 
1999). Relationships for economic reasons can arise because a firm believes that its partner 
is the only firm that has the competence to carry out a particular task, or due to contractual 
obligations and high switching costs. There is no social or emotional bonding between 
firms. Firms try to protect themselves from vulnerabilities by strictly adhering to contracts. 
Such relationships are characterized by their low levels of trust (Das & Teng, 1998). Such 
firms do not typically wish to pursue long-term relationships. 
Firms exhibiting continuance commitment realize that their partners can exhibit 
self-serving behaviors (Zhao et al., 2008). Firms exhibiting continuance commitment may 
attempt to switch partners but find themselves in situations where there are no other viable 
partners. In such cases, firms are forced to stay with their existing partners as a part of 
their survival process until they find other suitable alternatives. Similarly, firms retain 
their partners despite the threat of opportunistic behavior due to their high asset specific 
investments, the costs of which have not yet been recovered. Firms exhibiting continuance 
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commitment are less likely to make any significant investments into a particular 
relationship as they recognize that they are not seeking to have a long term relationship 
with their partners. Taken together, I propose the following hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 3b. Trust is negatively associated with continuance commitment. 
3.4.6 Commitment and SCI- Commitment as a Source of SCI 
Supply chain relationships are built on effective partnerships that require high 
levels of relationship commitment (Zhao et al., 2008). Very few studies have examined 
the role of relationship commitment on integration. Morgan and Hunt (1994) found that 
relationship commitment positively influences cooperation and acquiescence in 
relationships. In a similar fashion, Chen, Paulraj, and Lado (2004) also argue that 
relationship commitment is necessary for firms to integrate. Although these studies have 
sought to examine the role of relationship commitment on integration, they have failed to 
distinguish between affective and continuance commitment, because they measure 
commitment as a one-dimensional construct. To the best of our knowledge there are no 
studies that examine the role of different dimensions of commitment on customer 
integration from a supplier’s perspective. Firms with the right type of commitment can 
enable integration by being willing to readily exchange knowledge and invest into a 
particular relationship going forward (Zhao et al., 2008). 
3.4.7 Affective Commitment and SCI- Affective commitment as an Enabler of 
SCI 
Affective commitment is built on emotional ties and common values. Suppliers 
that have affective commitment internalize the values of their customers and want to hang 
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on with their customers (Zhao et al., 2008).  Shared values that motivate repeated 
interactions drive these long-term relationships. Suppliers that have affective commitment 
are willing to make themselves vulnerable towards the action of their partners in a 
relationship. These firms that have affective commitment are not only willing to do things 
required by their partners, but also go beyond contractual obligations and make sacrifices, 
if needed, for the sake of their relationship. Affective commitment reduces opportunistic 
behaviors (Williamson, 1975) and enhances cooperative, collaborative, and internalized 
behaviors in supply chain partners. Suppliers with affective commitment perform tasks 
since they appeal to their values and not necessarily because they are coerced into a 
relationship. Suppliers with affective commitment are more willing to share their 
knowledge, and work closely with their customers by investing into their relationships. 
Furthermore, since suppliers intrinsically favor working with their customers they are 
more likely to withstand short term losses to sustain their relationship.  Thus, taken all 
together, I propose the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 4a. Affective commitment is positively related to SCI.  
3.4.8 Continuance Commitment and SCI- Continuance Commitment as a 
Deterrent of SCI 
Continuance commitment is developed purely for economic reasons. Continuance 
commitment is not built on shared values or norms. Suppliers with continuance 
commitment are skeptical about their customers (Gruen, Summers, & Acito, 2000; Zhao 
et al., 2008). Such suppliers perceive their customers to be self-serving and opportunistic. 
Firms that have continuance commitment are not willing to make sacrifices for their 
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relationship, or make significant investments. A plausible explanation might be that they 
are ready to switch customers if they find suitable alternatives for their existing customers. 
Making significant investments might hold them hostage to a particular customer. 
Furthermore, since suppliers with continuance commitment are working with their 
customers due to necessity rather than desire, they are more likely to refrain from sharing 
their knowledge, and investing into their relationship. In general, suppliers with 
continuance commitment are less likely to achieve high levels of integration. Thus, I 
propose the following: 
 Hypothesis 4b. Continuance commitment is negatively related to SCI. 
3.5 Research Design  
This study examines the relationship between leadership styles exhibited by the 
customer on suppliers’ trust and commitment. Furthermore, I examine whether 
commitment translates to varying levels of integration. The nomological network rests on 
the basic tenets of SET. This study tests a variance theory model based on a mature theory 
(i.e., SET) and the data collected are necessarily quantitative in nature (Edmondson & 
McManus, 2007). A suitably designed survey instrument is utilized for data collection 
purposes. Prior to finalizing the survey instrument, several procedures were undertaken to 
ensure the construct validity and reliability of the measures.  
The research design, methodology, and implementation for this study is in line 
with Flynn, Sakakibara, Schroeder, Bates, and Flynn (1990), Edmondson and McManus 
(2007), and Koufteros, Droge, Heim, Massad, and Vickery (2014). The instrument was 
first developed based on a thorough literature review and an examination of pertinent 
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empirical studies. The instrument was then reviewed via 11 interviews with practitioners 
and two academics in order to assure its content validity. In other words, the research 
interest was to establish that the domain of each construct was properly defined and to 
assure that the content domain was adequately covered. Furthermore, the interviews were 
useful to differentiate between the numerous definitions of popular concepts (such as 
supply chain integration vis-à-vis supply chain collaboration) and to determine when such 
categories coincide with concepts utilized in the hypotheses (Flynn et al., 1990). 
Academics and practitioners were asked to review the survey items for ambiguity and 
clarity, and to evaluate whether individual items appear to be appropriate measures of their 
respective constructs (DeVellis, 1991) 
Once the survey instrument was improved by modifying and dropping some items 
based on the initial set of interviews, the total number of items in the instrument was 
reduced from 83 to 52. The instrument was then piloted with a 34 of practitioners and 
preliminary data analysis, such as corrected item total correlations (CITCs) and 
Cronbach’s alpha, was undertaken to ensure the validity and the reliability of the survey 
instrument. Survey questions are anchored on a seven point Likert type scale to obtain 
necessary variance. The unit of analysis for this research is the relationship between a 
supplier and its major customer. Based on this preliminary analysis and examining the 
CITCs and Cronbach’s alpha several items were labeled as suspicious if they had a CITC 
less than 0.35 and if the overall Cronbach’s alpha for each construct was lower than 0.70.  
The low value of 0.35 for CITC was selected considering the low sample size (i.e., 34 
observations) based on which the preliminary data analysis was conducted. The items that 
 102 
 
were labeled suspicious were then closely examined during the confirmatory factor 
analysis (CFA) with the final data set obtained through the large data collection process. 
The large scale data collection methodology targeted participants from SIC codes 20-39 
which represents the manufacturing sector at a large as it better suits the context of this 
study.  The usage of these SIC codes is consistent with the extant literature that have 
examined SCI in terms of their composition. The survey for the large scale study was 
administered online using a list of contacts obtained through an alumni database and 
employing Qualtrics panel services. Previous studies have used such panel services to 
obtain data for research (Hagtvedt, 2011). Furthermore, reminders were sent to about 600 
participants based on a ‘wave analysis’ of the responses over a specific time period 
(Dillman, Smyth, & Christian, 2009). 
Before the substantive hypotheses were tested, the data was subject to several tests. 
These tests include checks for normality, non-respondent bias, common-method bias, 
convergent validity, and discriminant validity. The normality assumption can be examined 
via P-P plots, Q-Q plots, and also through the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test. In this 
study, the KS test is used due to its objective nature.  Another potential source of bias in 
survey research is common method bias. One of the procedures commonly utilized to test 
for evidence suggesting the presence or absence of common method bias in a data set is 
Harman’s one-factor test (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Jeong-Yeon, & Podsakoff, 2003). An 
exploratory factor analysis can be performed on the variables of interest. If a single factor 
is obtained or if one factor accounts for the majority of the covariance in the independent 
and criterion variables, then the threat of common method bias is high. Another more 
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robust approach to check for common method bias is by using a correlation-based marker 
variable technique. With this technique, a marker variable which is supposedly unrelated 
with the substantive variables of interest is used (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, & Podsakoff, 
2012). Podsakoff et al. (2003) also provide a variety of ways by which common method 
bias can be avoided. These include structural mechanisms utilized while administering the 
survey, which were employed as part of my survey design. For instance, care was taken 
to space the measurement of the predictor and the criterion variables as much as possible, 
and the items in the instrument were carefully chosen.  The measurement model was 
examined for the model fit, convergent validity, and the efficacy of a second-order factor. 
The discriminant validity of the constructs in this study was examined by comparing the 
average variance extracted (AVE) with the squared correlations among the factors used in 
this study (Koufteros & Marcoulides, 2006).  
The structural or substantive model is tested using structural equations modeling 
(SEM) in Mplus 6.0. Specifically, the standardized beta coefficients that measure the 
association among the constructs, and the model fit indices such as comparative fit index 
(CFI), Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI), and standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) 
are used to examine the model fit.  
3.6 Instrument Development 
To test the theoretical model presented in Figure 3-1, reliable and valid measures 
need to be developed for each construct (see Appendix-B for tables for the definitions of 
constructs used in this study). This study develops and tests the measures for transactional 
and transformational leadership styles, trust, commitment, and SCI. The instrument 
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development is categorized into three distinct phases: first, item generation; second, 
structured-interviews and pre-test; and third, a pilot test (Churchill, 1979; Koufteros, 
Vonderembse, & Doll, 1998).                                                   
3.6.1  Item Generation 
Content validity is an important criterion for developing good measures as it 
reflects whether the items for a construct capture its content domain (Churchill, 1979). 
Content validity is enhanced by undertaking a comprehensive review of the literature, and 
by interviewing practitioners and academic scholars. The list of items for each construct 
was identified through a comprehensive review of the literature and the measures were 
categorized into different groups based on the particular content domain. The literature 
reviewed for developing the constructs in the theoretical model is discussed below. 
To develop the measures for transformational and transactional leadership styles, 
the literature on Transformational Leadership Theory (TLT) was reviewed (Avolio et al., 
1999; Avolio et al., 1991; Avolio, Zhu, Koh, & Bhatia, 2004b; Bass, 1998; Jung & Avolio, 
1999). Transformational leadership style is characterized by three different correlated 
factors: (a) charismatic/inspirational leadership, (b) intellectual stimulation, and (c) 
individualized consideration (Avolio et al., 1999). Similarly, transactional leadership style 
has two distinct factors: (a) contingent rewards, and (b) management by exception (Avolio 
et al., 2004a; Judge & Piccolo, 2004). An initial set of questions was generated by 
reviewing the relevant literature for transformational and transactional leadership styles 
(see Tables 3-1 & 3-2).   
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Table 3-1: Items List for Transformational Leadership 
Item Description Construct 
II1 Our major customer acts in ways that builds 
our respect. 
 
II2 Our major customer displays a sense of 
confidence. 
 
II3 Our major customer has admirable practices 
which it shares with us. 
Charismatic/Inspirational 
II4 Our major customer challenges us to do better 
in our processes. 
 
II5 Our major customer challenges us to push our 
technology frontier. 
 
II6 Our major customer articulates a compelling 
vision. 
 
IS1 Our major customer challenges us to improve 
our current practices. 
 
IS2 Our major customer talks optimistically about 
the future. 
Intellectual Stimulation 
IS3 Our major customer expresses confidence that 
our collective goals will be achieved. 
 
IS4 Our major customer talks enthusiastically 
about our relationship. 
 
IC1 Our major customer treats us as an individual 
firm rather than just another member of the 
group. 
 
IC2 Our major customer is ready to provide 
individual attention when needed. 
Individualized Consideration 
IC3 Our major customer helps us with our 
challenges. 
 
Table 3-2: Item List for Transactional Leadership 
Item Description Construct 
LCR1 Our major customer tells us what to do if we 
want to be rewarded for our efforts. 
 
LCR2 Our major customer rewards our achievements. Contingent Reward 
LCR3 Our major customer rewards us based on the 
effort that we put in. 
 
LME1 Our major customer manages our relationship 
only when failures are uncovered. 
 
LME2 Our major customer pays attention to us only 
when a crisis emerges. 
Management By Exception 
LME3 Our major customer only gives attention to us 
when mistakes are uncovered. 
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To develop the measures for trust, the literature on inter-organizational trust was 
examined (Doney & Cannon, 1997; Ganesan, 1994; Geyskens et al., 1996; Sako & Helper, 
1998; Zaheer et al., 1998a). The measures of trust developed through a comprehensive 
review of the literature is presented in Table 3-3. The measures of trust capture the 
willingness of suppliers to be vulnerable to the actions of the customer (Mayer et al., 
1995).  
Table 3-3: Items List for Trust 
Item Description Construct 
T1 This customer has always been evenhanded in 
its negotiations with us. 
 
T2 This customer uses opportunities that arise to 
profit at our expense (R). 
 
T3 Based on past experience, we cannot rely with 
complete confidence on this customer to keep 
its promises made to us (R). 
 
T4 We are hesitant to transact with this customer 
when the specifications are vague (R). 
 
T5 This customer is trustworthy. Trust 
T6 This customer is genuinely concerned that our 
business succeeds. 
 
T7 We are confident that this customer will look 
out for us even when it is costly to do so. 
 
T8 If a situation arises, this customer will stand by 
our side. 
 
T9 This customer will make sacrifices for us if 
needed. 
 
T10 This customer has superb processes.  
T11 This customer has superb capabilities.  
T12 This customer has great competencies across a 
variety of dimensions. 
 
   
Notes: (R) indicates the item has been reverse coded. 
 
To develop the measures for commitment, the literature on relationship 
commitment (Allen & Meyer, 1990; Geyskens et al., 1996; Gruen et al., 2000; Zhao et al., 
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2008) was examined. Relationship commitment is characterized by two distinct factors: 
(a) affective commitment and (b) continuance commitment (Zhao et al., 2008). An initial 
set of questions for commitment was developed and provided in Table 3-4.   
Table 3-4: Items List for Relationship Commitment 
Item Description Construct 
AC1 We have a strong sense of loyalty towards this 
customer. 
 
AC2 We like working with this customer.  
AC3 We are eager to continue working with this 
customer, even if we find other promising 
customers. 
Affective Commitment 
AC4 We are proud to tell others about this customer.  
AC5 We have little, if any, emotional attachment to 
this customer (R). 
 
CC1 We are working with this customer because too 
much of our business will be disrupted if we 
decide to leave this customer now. 
 
CC2 It will be very difficult for us to leave this 
customer right now, even if we wanted to. 
Continuance Commitment 
CC3 Right now we do business with this customer 
because we have no other viable or suitable 
option. 
 
CC4 We do business with this customer only 
because of the high costs to switch. 
 
Notes: (R) indicates the item has been reverse coded. 
 
To develop the measures for SCI, the literature on inter-firm relations (Cao & 
Zhang, 2011; Das et al., 2006; Lado, Dant, & Tekleab, 2008; Lee & Whang, 2000; 
Leuschner et al., 2013; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994) was critically assessed.  The measures 
of integration captured the different nuances of integration such as the willingness to 
sacrifice for the customer and work jointly, the manner of dispute settlement, the extent 
of information and knowledge sharing, and the degree of internalization of values. The 
generated items are presented in Table 3-5.  
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Table 3-5: Items List for the Supply Chain Integration 
Item Description Construct  
I1 
We overlook our firm's profit from individual transactions 
with this customer in the interest of our relationship. 
 
I2 
We set aside contractual terms in order to work with this 
customer when it faces serious challenges. 
 
I3 We develop an exclusive relationship with this customer 
at the expense of doing business with other potential 
customers. 
 
I4 We assume significant risk to maintain a long term 
relationship with this customer. 
 
I5 
We share all relevant know-hows with this customer.  
I6 
We sometimes bear the costs of this customer even if we 
are not contractually obliged to do so. 
Supply Chain Integration 
I7 We make strategic changes to satisfy this customer’s 
requirements. 
 
I8 We internalize this customer’s values.  
I9 
We have a unique or rare relationship with this customer.  
I10 We share only basic operational/transactional information 
with this customer (R). 
 
I11 
We constantly monitor this customer's activities to ensure 
that they don't take advantage of us (R). 
 
I12 We drive our relationship with this customer primarily 
through contracts (R). 
 
I13 We have developed a mutually valuable relationship with 
this customer. 
 
I14 We invest significantly in our relationship with this 
customer (such as in product development, or technology, 
or manufacturing processes). 
 
I15 We shape our vision based on our relationship with this 
customer. 
 
I16 
We plan our future together with this customer.  
I17 We settle disputes via non-contractual and amicable 
means. 
 
I18 We have compatible goals with this customer.  
Notes: (R) indicates the item has been reverse coded. 
 
3.6.2 Structured Interviews and Pretest 
It is critical to ensure the content validity of the measures used in this study before 
the large scale administration of the survey. To assure the content validity of the items 
 109 
 
generated through the literature review, a structured interview and pre-test was conducted. 
In the structured interview process, 11 practitioners at the level of vice-presidents and 
directors were asked about the relevance and clarity of each construct definition. The 
interview participants were also asked to comment whether the proposed measures 
comprehensively covered the domain of each construct and whether the proposed 
constructs in fact measure what was intended based on the definitions I provided.  
Benefitting from the results of the interview process, certain items were revised. 
The revised items were later presented to two faculty members and three doctoral students 
in operations and supply chain management for another round of review. The faculty 
members have extensive experience in developing measurement instruments in the 
respective domains. The primary objective of the second round of the review was to further 
refine the measures in the survey instrument. The participants of the second round were 
asked to review and make recommendations to modify or add new measures for each 
construct. After a few minor modifications to the survey items, a list of 52 items emerged 
and was utilized for pilot study purposes. The next few sections discuss the procedures 
and the results obtained from the pilot test. 
3.6.3 Pilot Study 
A pilot study serves its purpose by providing valuable information regarding the 
validity and reliability of the measurement items before the large-scale administration of 
the survey. A typical pilot study is conducted with a small sample (preferably larger than 
30 participants) from a population similar to that of the large scale survey administration. 
Observations for the pilot study were chosen by randomly selecting a small group of 
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observations (i.e., slightly greater than 30) from the large data sample. Qualtrics was used 
to design and administer surveys to participants. Participants can be limited to a user’s 
own database or one can make use of the panel service feature provided by Qualtrics. 
Through the Qualtrics panel feature, a user can specify and obtain a customized sample 
population that is well fitting for the purpose of the study. Similar Internet survey tools 
have been used previously in the literature (e.g., Hagtvedt, 2011). Participants for the 
survey were screened using several screening questions. Please see Appendix-B for the 
full set of screener questions. Individuals with three or more years of work experience 
were targeted for completing the survey. Furthermore, this study required individuals 
responding to the survey to have closely worked with customers and have a great deal of 
knowledge regarding their customer. The study targeted respondents to this survey from 
supply chain management, purchasing, sales, and operations departments. In addition to 
this, the respondents were targeted from small and large organizations. Furthermore, the 
survey was primarily targeted for the manufacturing industries with SIC codes 20-39. 
Firms that participated in this study belonged to manufacturing industries such as 
automotive or parts, fabricated metal products, electronics, electrical equipment, and 
others.  
The analysis of the pilot test was conducted based on the results of 34 complete 
responses. The primary objective of this pilot study was to purify the items before the 
large scale survey administration, assess unidimensionality, and examine the reliability of 
the items.  To achieve the objectives of the pilot study, using SPSS 21, the items were 
subjected to exploratory factor analysis (EFA) (Churchill, 1979) within block. Item 
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purification is carried out by examining the corrected item total correlation (CITC) for 
each measurement item (Koufteros et al., 1998) and the overall Cronbach’s alpha. Items 
for which the CITC are lower than 0.35 are considered to be candidates for elimination, 
and subsequently the revised CITC and Cronbach’s alpha are obtained after deleting 
poorly performing items in each scale. A minimum cut-off value of 0.70 (Nullally & 
Bernstein, 1978) for Cronbach’s alpha is considered to be acceptable. Eliminating an 
indicator based on a high CITC cut-off value will be considered premature as the sample 
size used for the pilot was relatively small (i.e., 34).  An exploratory factor analysis (EFA) 
with the initial set of items for each construct is conducted to assess the internal rule of 
unidimensionality of constructs used in this study. EFA within block provide a means to 
examine if items are loading on a single specified factor and to check whether unintended 
multiple dimensions exist within a hypothesized single factor. Items that are loading on 
multiple sub-dimensions within a factor were then closely examined. The subsequent 
sections present the pilot test results for the constructs in this study. 
3.7 Pilot Test Results 
3.7.1 Leadership Styles- Transformational Leadership Style 
TLT suggests that Transformational Leadership style is represented by multiple 
dimensions namely charismatic/inspirational influence, intellectual stimulation, and 
individualized consideration (Avolio et al., 1999). Charismatic/inspirational influence was 
originally represented by six items, intellectual stimulation by four items, and 
individualized consideration by three items.  
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Table 3-6: Transformational Leadership: Charismatic/Inspirational - Item 
Purification Results 
Items Initial 
CITC 
Final 
CITC 
Alpha if 
Deleted 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
II1. Our major customer acts in ways that builds our 
respect.  
0.685 0.685 0.851 0.874 
II2. Our major customer displays a sense of 
confidence.  
0.651 0.651 0.857 
LII3. Our major customer has admirable practices 
which it shares with us. 
0.644 0.644 0.860 
II4. Our major customer challenges us to do better in 
our processes.  
0.684 0.684 0.851 
 
II5. Our major customer challenges us to push our 
technology frontier. 
0.689 0.699 0.848 
 
II6. Our major customer articulates a compelling 
vision.  
0.717 0.717 0.845 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Table 3-7: Transformational Leadership: Intellectual Stimulation- Item 
Purification Results 
Items Initial 
CITC 
Final 
CITC 
Alpha if 
Deleted 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
IS1. Our major customer challenges us to improve our 
current practices. 
0.858 0.858 0.842 0.900 
IS2. Our major customer talks optimistically about the 
future.  
0.789 0.789 0.867 
IS3. Our major customer expresses confidence that 
our collective goals will be achieved. 
0.720 0.720 0.893 
IS4. Our major customer talks enthusiastically about 
our relationship.  
0.751 0.751 0.881 
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Table 3-8: Transformational Leadership: Individualized Consideration- Item 
Purification Results 
Items Initial 
CITC 
Final 
CITC 
Alpha if 
Deleted 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
IC1. Our major customer treats us as an individual firm 
rather than just another member of the group.  
0.789 0.789 0.868 0.900 
IC2. Our major customer is ready to provide individual 
attention when needed. 
0.828 0.828 0.834 
IC3. Our major customer helps us with our challenges.  0.790 0.790 0.868 
 
The initial purification of the items was undertaken by using SPSS 21. In SPSS 21, 
the scale reliability analysis routine was employed to compute the CTIC and Cronbach’s 
alpha analysis.  The CITCs and the Cronbach’s alpha for charismatic/inspirational 
influence are reported in Table 3-6. The CITCs of all items were greater than 0.35 and the 
initial Cronbach’s alpha is greater than 0.70, and hence none of the items were candidates 
for deletion. The lowest CITC was 0.74. The CITCs and Cronbach’s alpha for intellectual 
stimulation are reported in Table 3-7. The CITCs of all items were greater than 0.35 and 
the initial Cronbach’s alpha is greater than 0.70, and thus none of the items were 
considered candidates for deletion.  The lowest CITC was 0.72. The CITCs and the 
Cronbach’s alpha for individualized consideration are reported in Table 3-8. The CITCs 
of all items are greater than the threshold and the initial Cronbach’s alpha is greater than 
0.70, and similarly none of the items were eliminated from further investigation. 
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Table 3-9: Transformational Leadership: Charismatic/Inspirational- Exploratory 
Factor Analysis 
Items Factor 1 Loadings 
II1 0.746 
II2 0.700 
II3 0.696 
II4 0.740 
II5 0.757 
II6 0.777 
Notes: Factor loadings below 0.4 are suppressed. Principal axis factoring, and direct oblimin rotation 
was performed 
 
Table 3-10: Transformational Leadership: Intellectual Stimulation- Exploratory 
Factor Analysis 
             Items Factor 1 Loadings 
IS1 0.935 
IS2 0.855 
IS3 0.758 
IS4 0.789 
Notes: Factor loadings below 0.4 are suppressed. Principal axis factoring, and direct oblimin rotation 
was performed 
Table 3-11: Transformational Leadership: Individualized Consideration- 
Exploratory Factor Analysis 
                                   Items Factor 1 Loadings 
 
                                    IC1           0.847 
                                    IC2           0.904 
                                    IC3           0.848 
Notes: Factor loadings below 0.4 are suppressed. Principal axis factoring, and direct oblimin rotation 
was performed 
 
Subsequently an EFA was performed with the items for each construct using the 
dimension reduction routine in SPSS 21. In SPSS, EFA is carried out using principal axis 
factoring as an extraction method along with direct oblimin rotations.  To ensure easy 
interpretation of the factor structure, factor loadings less than 0.40 were suppressed from 
presentation. The six items of charismatic/ inspirational influence all loaded onto one 
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factor respectively and had fairly high loadings (greater than 0.70), with the lowest factor 
loading being 0.79 (see Table 3-9). Similarly, items for intellectual stimulation and 
individualized consideration loaded onto their respective factors (see Tables 3-10 & 3-11) 
with the lowest factor loadings being 0.76 and 0.85 respectively. Hence the measures for 
the constructs of Transformational Leadership style are reliable (since there was no 
change, Cronbach’s alpha measures remain the same as my prior analysis suggested) and 
valid.  
3.7.2 Transactional Leadership Style 
TLT suggests that transactional leadership style is represented by two distinct 
factors namely contingent reward and management by exception. Contingent reward is 
originally represented by three items, and management by exception is also measured by 
three items.  
Table 3-12: Transactional Leadership: Contingent Reward - Item Purification 
Results 
Items Initial 
CITC 
Final 
CITC 
Alpha if 
Deleted 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
CR1. Our major customer tells us what to do if we 
want to be rewarded for our efforts.  
0.545 0.545 0.826 0.778 
CR2. Our major customer rewards our 
achievements.  
0.708 0.708 0.609 
CR3. Our major customer rewards us based on the 
effort that we put in.  
0.646 0.646 0.686 
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Table 3-13: Transactional Leadership: Contingent Reward- Exploratory Factor 
Analysis 
Items Factor 1 Loadings 
CR1 0.596 
CR2 0.905 
CR3 0.780 
Notes: Factor loadings below 0.4 are suppressed. Principal axis factoring, and direct oblimin rotation 
was performed 
 
The initial CITCs for Contingent Reward are reported in Table 3-12. Since all the 
CITC’s are above the threshold (0.35) and the Cronbach’s alpha is greater than 0.70, none 
of the items were candidates for elimination. The lowest estimated CITC was 0.55 (CR1).  
Table 3-13 represents the factor loadings for the Contingent Reward items. 
Table 3-14: Transactional Leadership: Management by Exception- Item 
Purification Results 
Items Initial 
CITC 
Final 
CITC 
Alpha if 
Deleted 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
ME1. Our major customer manages our 
relationship only when failures are uncovered.  
0.683 0.683 0.787 0.836 
ME2. Our major customer pays attention to us only 
when a crisis emerges.  
0.753 0.753 0.721 
ME3. Our major customer only gives attention to 
us when mistakes are uncovered.  
0.661 0.661 0.810 
 
Table 3-15: Transactional Leadership: Management by Exception- Exploratory 
Factor Analysis 
Items Factor 1 Loadings 
ME1 0.769 
ME2 0.885 
ME3 0.734 
Notes: Factor loadings below 0.4 are suppressed. Principal axis factoring, and direct oblimin rotation 
was performed 
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Similar to the Contingent Reward construct, the purification results for the items 
of Management by Exception construct yielded high initial CITCs and a Cronbach’s alpha 
value greater than 0.70 (see Table 3-14). The lowest CITC was 0.68, hence no items were 
considered for elimination. An EFA suggested that all the items loaded significantly on to 
a single factor with the lowest factor loading being 0.73 (see Table 3-15). Based on the 
analysis and results of the pilot test, the measures for transactional leadership appear to be 
reliable and valid.  
3.7.3 Trust 
The construct of trust was represented by twelve items as shown in Table 3-16. 
The CITCs and Cronbach’s alpha are reported in Table 3-16. Three items of trust T2, T3, 
and T4 had negative CITC scores, and hence were potential candidates for deletion.  If the 
items were dropped and the revised CITCs and Cronbach’s alpha are computed, the lowest 
CITC was 0.62 and the revised Cronbach’s alpha is 0.91 which are reported in Table 3-
16. 
Furthermore, an EFA was performed with all the items. The EFA yielded two 
factors (see Table 3-17). Indicators T2, T3, and T4 had negative loadings on factor 1 along 
with other items that had positive loadings on factor 1. In addition, indicators T1, T8, and 
T12 cross-loaded on factor 2.  These items were not deleted but labeled as “suspicious” 
and will revisited more closely during the CFA with the larger data set. 
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Table 3-16: Trust- Item Purification Results 
Items Initial 
CITC 
Final 
CITC 
Alpha if 
Deleted 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
T1. This customer has always been evenhanded in its 
negotiations with us.  
0.727 0.656 0.906 0.913 
T2. This customer uses opportunities that arise to profit at 
our expense. 
-0.760 If Del. NA 
T3. Based on past experience, we cannot rely with 
complete confidence on this customer to keep its 
promises made to us.  
-0.700 If Del. NA 
T4. We are hesitant to transact with this customer when 
the specifications are vague.  
-0.718 If Del. NA 
T5. This customer is trustworthy.  0.564 0.783 0.897 
T6. This customer is genuinely concerned that our 
business succeeds.  
0.553 0.798 0.896 
T7. We are confident that this customer will look out for 
us even when it is costly to do so.  
0.716 0.731 0.901 
T8. If a situation arises, this customer will stand by our 
side.  
0.381 0.653 0.907 
T9. This customer will make sacrifices for us if needed.   0.639 0.796 0.897 
T10. This customer has superb processes.  0.844 0.816 0.896 
T11. This customer has superb capabilities.  0.568 0.622 0.908 
T12. This customer has great competencies across a 
variety of dimensions.  
0.459 0.473 0.916 
 
Table 3-17: Trust - Exploratory Factor Analysis 
Items Factor 1 Loadings Factor 2 Loadings 
T1 0.650 0.485 
T2 -0.842  
T3 -0.792  
T4 -0.769  
T5 0.854  
T6 0.874  
T7 0.745  
T8 0.760 -0.435 
T9 0.835  
T10 0.807  
T11 0.693  
T12 0.497 0.512 
Notes: Factor loadings below 0.4 are suppressed. Principal axis factoring, and direct oblimin rotation 
was performed 
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3.7.4 Commitment 
In this study two types of commitment are examined and include affective 
commitment and normative commitment. Affective commitment is represented by five 
items while continuance commitment is operationalized by four items. The list of items 
for affective commitment is presented in Table 3-18. The initial CITCs are presented in 
Table 3-18 suggest that the CITC for AC5 is low and negative (-0.29), and was below 
threshold of 0.35. This indicates that AC5 can be a poorly performing item. If AC5 was 
dropped the lowest CITC was 0.75 and Cronbach’s alpha was 0.91 (see Table 3-18).  
Table 3-18: Affective Commitment- Item Purification Results 
Items Initial 
CITC 
Final 
CITC 
Alpha if 
Deleted 
Cronbach’
s Alpha 
AC1. We have a strong sense of loyalty towards this 
customer. 
0.627 0.775 0.892 0.910 
AC2. We like working with this customer.  0.573 0.752 0.900 
AC3. We are eager to continue working with this 
customer, even if we find other promising customers.  
0.662 0.806 0.881 
AC4. We are proud to tell others about this customer.  0.742 0.869 0.857 
AC5. We have little, if any, emotional attachment to 
this customer.  
-0.294 If Del. NA 
Notes: Items were dropped iteratively and NA stands for Not Applicable 
Table 3-19: Affective Commitment- Exploratory Factor Analysis 
Items Factor 1 Loadings 
AC1 0.818 
AC2 0.806 
AC3 0.850 
AC4 0.924 
AC5  
Notes: Factor loadings below 0.4 are suppressed. Principal axis factoring, and direct oblimin rotation 
was performed. 
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An EFA was performed including all of the items for affective commitment. To 
ensure easy interpretation of the factor structure, the factor loadings of less than 0.40 were 
suppressed from presentation. EFA generated only one factor as expected but indicator 
AC5 did not load heavily on that factor (see Table 3-19). The loading of AC5 was less 
than 0.40.  Apart from AC5, all of the other items for affective commitment loaded heavily 
on the extracted factor with the lowest loading being 0.81. Thus, the preliminary analysis 
suggests that AC5 can potentially be a problematic measure.  
The list of indicators reflecting continuance commitment is presented in Table 3-
20. The initial CITCs are presented in Table 3-20 and the reliability analysis suggests that 
the CITCs for all the items are above our threshold (0.35) while Cronbach’s alpha is also 
greater than 0.70. The worst performing item on this scale had a CITC of 0.72.  
Table 3-20: Continuance Commitment- Item Purification Results 
Items Initial 
CITC 
Final 
CITC 
Alpha if 
Deleted 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
CC1. We are working with this customer because too 
much of our business will be disrupted if we decide to 
leave this customer now.  
0.810 0.810 0.827 0.882 
CC2. It will be very difficult for us to leave this 
customer right now, even if we wanted to.  
0.682 0.682 0.876 
CC3. Right now we do business with this customer 
because we have no other viable or suitable option.  
0.807 0.807 0.825 
CC4. We do business with this customer only because 
of the high costs to switch.  
0.722 0.722 0.862 
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Table 3-21: Continuance Commitment- Exploratory Factor Analysis 
Items Factor 1 Loadings 
CC1 0.886 
CC2 0.737 
CC3 0.873 
CC4 0.767 
Notes: Factor loadings below 0.4 are suppressed. Principal axis factoring, and direct oblimin rotation 
was performed. 
An EFA was performed with the all the items for continuance commitment. EFA 
generated only one factor and all the items loaded significantly onto the single factor (see 
Table 3-21).   
3.7.5 Supply Chain Integration  
The construct of integration was captured using an 18-item scale. The initial CITCs 
are reported in Table 3-22. The CITCs on most of the items other than I10, I11, and I12 
were greater than our threshold of 0.35. Items I10, I11, and I12 had negative CITCs and 
thus were classified as suspicious items. If I10, I11, I12 are dropped the revised CITCs 
and Cronbach’s alpha are reported in Table 3-22. The lowest CITC was 0.35 and Cronbach 
alpha is 0.95. An EFA of all the items for integration produced two distinct factors (see 
Table 3-23). Consistent to the results obtained from the initial CITCs, items I10, I11, and 
I12 had a negative loading on factor 1 on which a majority of the measures for integration 
had fairly high positive loadings. In addition to the items I10, I11, and I12 which were 
negatively loaded on factor 1, items I2 and I8 loaded heavily on a second factor. These 
items were closely examined by considering the content of these items. After the initial 
analysis, items I2, I8, I10, I11 and I12 were labeled suspicious and required a more 
comprehensive examination of the items with the larger data set.  
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Table 3-22: Integration- Item Purification Results 
Items Initial 
CITC 
Final 
CITC 
Alpha if 
Deleted 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
I1. We overlook our firm's profit from 
individual transactions with this customer in the 
interest of our relationship. 
0.730 0.747 0.955 0.957 
I2. We set aside contractual terms in order to 
work with this customer when it faces serious 
challenges.  
0.448 0.493 0.959 
I3. We develop an exclusive relationship with 
this customer at the expense of doing business 
with other potential customers.  
0.819 0.827 0.953 
I4. We assume significant risk to maintain a 
long term relationship with this customer.  
0.876 0.886 0.952 
I5. We share all relevant know-hows with this 
customer.  
0.853 0.873 0.952 
I6. We sometimes bear the costs of this 
customer even if we are not contractually 
obliged to do so.  
0.759 0.783 0.954 
I7. We make strategic changes to satisfy this 
customer’s requirements.  
0.701 0.746 0.955 
I8. We internalize this customer’s values.  0.353 0.398 0.960 
I9. We have a unique or rare relationship with 
this customer.  
0.781 0.814 0.959 
I10. We share only basic 
operational/transactional information with this 
customer.  
-0.786 If Del. NA 
I11. We constantly monitor this customer's 
activities to ensure that they don't take 
advantage of us.  
-0.753 If Del. NA 
I12. We drive our relationship with this 
customer primarily through contracts 
-0.747 If Del. NA 
I13. We have developed a mutually valuable 
relationship with this customer.  
0.835 0.834 0.953 
I14. We invest significantly in our relationship 
with this customer (such as in product 
development, or technology, or manufacturing 
processes).  
0.799 0.771 0.954 
I15. We shape our vision based on our 
relationship with this customer.  
0.710 0.726 0.955 
I16. We plan our future together with this 
customer.  
0.774 0.808 0.953 
I17. We settle disputes via non-contractual and 
amicable means.  
0.842 0.860 0.952 
I18. We have compatible goals with this 
customer.  
0.749 0.757 0.955 
Notes: Items were dropped iteratively and NA stands for Not Applicable 
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Table 3-23: Integration - Exploratory Factor Analysis 
Items Factor 1  Loadings Factor 2  Loadings  
I1 0.721  
I2  0.724 
I3 0.916  
I4 0.878  
I5 0.762  
I6 0.910  
I7 0.867  
I8  0.802 
I9 0.778  
I10 -0.724  
I11 -0.478 -0.504 
I12 -0.836  
I13 0.801  
I14 0.657  
I15 0.588  
I16 0.957  
I17 0.806  
I18 0.777  
Notes: Factor loadings below 0.4 are suppressed. Principal axis factoring, and direct oblimin rotation 
was performed. 
3.8 Large Scale Survey Administration and Instrument Validation 
A large scale data collection was undertaken after the preliminary instrument 
development phase. Data collected are used for validating the instrument and testing the 
hypothesized structural relationships among constructs. This section presents the 
procedures used for collecting data, confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) and results for the 
measurement model, and subsequently the structural model analysis and results.  
3.8.1 Large Scale Data Collection: Research Design 
The data for this study were collected using a survey-based approach. A survey-
based approach offers an attractive option for collecting a large volume of data that can 
be used to analyze the relationships among variables of interest (Miller & Roth, 1994). A 
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survey-based approach offers a means to collect information from a large number of 
participants, which provides an opportunity to validate and test the psychometric 
properties of the measurement scales. This approach has the potential for greater 
generalizability vis-a-vis other data collection processes e.g., case studies (Dillman et al., 
2009), since it represents data collected from several firms across industries. Surveys are 
typically completed using face-to-face interviews or by telephone or mail-in surveys.  
However, with the advancement in Internet technology and the proliferation of Internet 
use across firms, on-line surveys have gained popularity (Dillman et al., 2009). 
Although on-line surveys have gained popularity over the years, there is still one 
major drawback which is related to relatively lower response rates. Response rates to on-
line surveys have been lower than using other survey data collection approaches. Klassen 
and Jacobs (2001) attribute the low response rates of on-line surveys to personal reluctance 
to use the Internet, controlled usage within the confines of the firm, and difficulty in 
obtaining valid email addresses for qualified respondents. 
To overcome these challenges, several remedial measures were taken. Typically, 
survey participants are time constrained and generally tend to skip questions that are 
ambiguous and difficult to read. If they encounter several such questions they may quit 
responding to the survey, never completing it. To improve response rates, it is necessary 
to make sure that the questions are easy to read and comprehend by the survey participants 
(Blankenship & Breen, 1992) and this is achieved here through several iterations of 
scrutiny during the instrument development process.     
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Another method to improve the response rates is to provide participants with 
relevant incentives (Erdos & Morgan, 1970). Dillman et al. (2009) advices to provide 
individual incentives as opposed to providing one big incentive to a randomly chosen 
survey participant. Dillman also suggests that it is necessary to provide the incentives to 
individuals before they participate in the survey as it develops a sense of goodwill towards 
the researcher, and hence they are more likely to complete the survey. Adhering to this 
recommendation, each individual participating in this study was provided a small 
incentive (i.e., a $5 Starbucks Gift Card) prior to survey completion.  
Dillman et al. (2009) also argues for social bonding with the participants of the 
survey in order to improve response rates. Dillman suggests that this bonding can be 
achieved by writing personalized emails to the participants (i.e., addressing them by their 
first/last name). Previous studies have shown that personalized emails improve the 
response rate in surveys (Joinson & Reips, 2007).  Furthermore, targeting the right group 
of respondents is more likely to increase the response rate. Through email correspondence 
and several screening questions I ensured that the right participants for the survey were 
contacted. See Appendix-B for the screening criteria.  The pre-qualification of the 
participants also ensures that the individuals who are supposed to be taking the survey 
actually received it. 
3.8.2 Large Scale Data Collection: Procedures 
The data was collected from two different sources. The first source of data was a 
large American University’s (>50,000 enrolled students) alumni network (AUAN), which 
provided a list of potential candidates who matched the screening criteria. The other source 
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of data was the panel service offered via Qualtrics. Previous studies have also used the 
Qualtrics panel service for their research (Hagtvedt, 2011). The procedures used to obtain 
the data from the AUAN and Qualtrics are discussed in the subsequent paragraphs of this 
section. 
In this paragraph, the procedure used to select the sample for the survey from the 
AUAN is discussed. AUAN provides the contact information of executives from different 
industries and different functional departments. A customized sample can be obtained 
from the website by specifying the requirements for this study. Based on the screening of 
participants, a total of 170 individuals were identified. An email was sent soliciting their 
participation (See Appendix-B for the correspondence email) of which 55 individuals 
responded indicating their interest in participation. Next, emails with a link to the survey 
and a $5 Starbucks gift card were sent out to 55 individuals who indicated their interest to 
participate in the study. Among the 55 emails sent out, 40 individuals responded by 
completing the survey which resulted in a 72.73% response considering only the emails 
that were sent out with the survey link. The overall response rate considering the total 
number of individuals contacted is 23.52%. 
In this paragraph, the procedure used to obtain the data from the Qualtrics panel is 
provided. The Qualtrics panel approach is a paid service in which a customized sample 
can be obtained. The quality of the data was ensured by adhering to the screening criteria 
imposed earlier. Furthermore, attention filters were put in place to eliminate respondents 
who were not paying attention while completing the survey. The quality of data was 
further ensured by triangulating the personal information provided by the respondent and 
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cross-verifying that information with online sources (e.g., www.linkedin.com). The 
survey data was collected in two rounds. A total of 1847 emails were sent out soliciting 
responses from a targeted group. A total of 136 responses were obtained from the first 
round. In the follow up round, a total of 83 responses were obtained.  This process resulted 
in a total of 219 observations, yielding a response rate of 11.85%. Collectively, a total of 
2017 emails were sent out soliciting responses from participants across both methods of 
data collection and a total of 259 observations were obtained resulting in an overall 
response rate of 12.84%. 
 Further, 17 observations were omitted from the overall sample of 259 
observations due to inappropriate job title/functional role resulting in 242 useful 
observations. Of the 242 observations obtained, a randomly selected set of 34 observations 
were used for the pilot test, since pilot tests can be effectively used with about 30 
responses. The remaining 207 observations were used for the large scale data analysis.  
3.8.3 Demographics 
Tables 3-24 and 3-25 depict the profiles of respondents and companies used for 
this study. In relevance to the respondent profile, Table 3-24 provides information about 
the gender, age, experience, title, and the functional departments of the respondents. In 
terms of the company profile, information regarding whether a firm is private or public, 
and the number of employees is presented in Table 3-25. The respondents were primarily 
affiliated with SIC codes 20-39.  More than 70% of the firms used in this study were 
private firms (70.2%) and several large corporations participated in our study. 
Approximately 41% of the firms that participated in this study had over 5000 employees.  
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Around 50% of respondents had more than three years of work experience and around 9% 
of the individuals had work experience of more than 5 years with the specific corporation 
on behalf of which they were responding. The respondents came from different functional 
groups within an organization with 29.5% of the individuals working in sales or sales 
operations group, 22.7% of the respondents belonging to the operations department, and 
22.2% of the respondents were affiliated with the supply chain management functional 
division. Also, a sizable portion (33.8%) of the individuals belonged to the 35-44 age 
group. Furthermore, based on available data, roughly 23% of the respondents were at the 
managerial level while about 16% of the respondents were at the level of a director or 
above. 
Table 3-24: Individual Demographics 
 N Percentage 
Gender   
Female 41 25.5 
Male 126 74.5 
Missing 46 22.2 
Total 207 100 
Age   
18-24 2 1.0 
25-34 27 13.0 
35-44 70 33.8 
45-54 41 19.8 
55-64 20 9.7 
>65 1 0.5 
Missing 46 22.2 
Total 207 100 
Functional Department   
Supply chain management 46 22.2 
Marketing or marketing sales 13 6.3 
Sales or sales operations 61 29.5 
Operations 47 22.7 
Missing/Other 40 19.3 
Total 207 100 
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Table 3-24: Continued 
 N Percentage 
Experience in the Firm   
3-4 years 83 40.3 
4-5 years 105 50.7 
>5 years 19 9 
Total 207 100 
Job Title   
Buyer/Procurement Specialist  20 9.5 
Manager 48 23.2 
Business Analyst 17 8.3 
Director 14 6.8 
VP 14 6.8 
C-Level 4 1.9 
Other/Missing  90 43.5 
Total 207 100 
   
 
Table 3-25: Organizational Demographics 
 N Percentage 
Organization Type   
Private 144 70.2 
Public 61 29.8 
Missing 2 1.0 
Total 207 100 
Firm Size   
0-100 3 1.4 
100-500 34 16.4 
500-1000 31 15.0 
1000-5000 52 25.1 
5000-10000 47 22.7 
>10000 38 18.4 
Missing 2 1.0 
Total 207 100 
 
3.8.4 Nonresponse Bias Test 
Although there is no generally accepted minimum percentage for response rates 
(Fowler, 2013), nonresponse bias is always a concern.  Non-respondents alter the sample 
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frame and can potentially create a sample that is not truly depictive of the actual population 
(Dillman et al., 2009). One method for testing non-response bias is to test for significant 
differences between the responses of early and late waves of returned surveys (Krause, 
Ragatz, & Hughley, 1999). This method is based on the assumption that the opinions of 
late responders are somewhat representative of the opinions of non-respondents 
(Armstrong & Overton, 1977). In this study, 129 usable observations were obtained from 
the first round, and subsequently 78 responses were obtained in the follow-up round. 
Comparing the firms’ responses across groups yields a non-significant t-test statistic 
(p>0.10), between the two groups. A non-significant t-test statistic indicates that non-
response bias may not be a significant problem in this study. 
3.8.5 Common Method Bias Test 
Another potential source of bias in survey research is common method bias 
(CMB). One of the procedures utilized to test for evidence suggesting the presence or 
absence of common method bias in a data set is the Harman’s one-factor test (Podsakoff 
et al., 2003). The Harman’s single factor test resulted in more than one factor being 
obtained which suggests that CMB is not a significant issue. However, another robust 
approach to examine for common method bias is by using a correlation-based marker 
variable technique (Malhotra, Kim, & Patil, 2006). Craighead, Ketchen, Dunn, and Hult 
(2011) suggest that this technique involves using one variable in the survey instrument 
that is theoretically unrelated to at least one factor in the study. The results of correlating 
the marker variable (i.e, to what extent do you enjoy Starbucks coffee) with other variables 
used in this study, are presented in Table 3-26. Only one variable (i.e., continuance 
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commitment) had a significant correlation with the marker variable. Statistically 
insignificant correlations between the variables of interest and the marker variable suggest 
that the threat of common method bias is minimal (see Table 3-26). 
3.8.6 Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) 
This section presents the results of the CFA measurement model for each construct 
followed by the results of the CFA for the overall measurement model.  I use CFA for 
each construct in order to examine the convergent validity of the constructs along with 
their significance level and to determine which items need to be deleted from subsequent 
analysis. The CFA of the overall measurement model is carried out to examine overall 
model fit, to test for the efficacy of a second-order factor  structure for Transformational 
Leadership, and to examine for convergent and discriminant validity among the constructs 
used in this study. Although some similarities do exist between CFA and EFA, each is 
used for different purposes. In EFA, the number of factors is not specified while in CFA 
the number of factors is already specified (Shah & Goldstein, 2006). The regression 
coefficients in a CFA are termed as the factor loadings and higher values suggest that they 
more precisely represent the latent construct. Convergent validity exists if all items for a 
construct are measuring one common factor (Koufteros et al., 1998). This validity is 
demonstrated by the statistical significance of factor loadings at a given level of 
significance. If items had loadings on their construct (i.e., ≤ 0.60) these are deleted from 
subsequent analysis, and that is if their deletion did not hamper content validity. If multiple 
items are being deleted from a single factor, an iterative process was undertaken to delete 
multiple items from a given construct. 
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Table 3-26: Marker Variable Correlations 
 
  
Charisma/ 
Inspirational 
Intellectual 
Stimulation 
Individualized  
Consideration 
Management 
by 
Exception 
Contingent 
Reward 
Trust 
Affective 
Commitment 
Continuance 
Commitment 
Integration 
Transformational 
Leadership 
Marker 
Variable  
Pearson 
Correlation 
.030 .013 .064 .123 .043 .084 -.017 .137* .094 .041 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.665 .849 .356 .077 .540 .229 .811 .049 .178 .560 
N 207 207 207 207 207 207 207 207 207 207 
Notes:            
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Several fit indices such as the CFI, TLI, and SRMR measure how well the model 
fits the data. Generally a CFI and TLI values greater than 0.90 are indicative of a good 
model (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1986). Similarly, SRMR values less than 0.05 are suggestive 
of a well-fitting model and models with SRMR values less than 0.09 are also considered 
to have acceptable model fit (Kline, 2011).  A summary of acceptable fit indices is 
presented in Table 3-27 below. 
Table 3-27: Fit Statistics for Measurement Model 
Fit Statistic Accepted Cut-Off Values 
SRMR <0.09 
CFI >0.90 
TLI >0.90 
2 /d.f.  <2.0 
3.9 CFA with Each Factor 
This section presents the CFA results for each construct. Model fit indices are 
examined first followed by examining the standardized factor loadings and their 
significance. Mplus does not compute the model fit indices for constructs with three or 
less items. Based on the factor loadings and its significance value, items are considered 
for deletion (i.e., factor loadings <0.60) in this phase. Items are deleted iteratively and the 
fit indices for the revised model and the factor loadings are also presented and discussed. 
Caution is taken to ensure that deleting an item does not affect the content validity of the 
construct.   
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3.9.1 Transformational Leadership-CFA 
Theory suggests that Transformational Leadership is a second-order factor 
characterized by three sub-dimensions (Avolio et al., 1999). Prior to establishing that 
Transformational Leadership is a second order construct it was necessary to establish the 
convergent validity for the three constructs of Transformational Leadership 
(Charismatic/Inspirational, Intellectual Stimulation, and Individualized Consideration). 
The CFA for Charismatic/Inspirational leadership is carried out using Mplus 6 with a 
maximum likelihood robust estimator (MLM) to estimate the factor loadings and their 
significance. A similar approach was carried out for intellectual stimulation, and 
individualized consideration.  
Table 3-28: Measurement Model- Charismatic/Inspirational Leadership 
Items Model-1 
Standardized Factor 
Loadings 
p-value 
 
II1 0.751 0.000 
II2 0.693 0.000 
II3 0.694 0.000 
II4 0.737 0.000 
II5 0.758 0.000 
II6 0.783 0.000 
Notes: Model-1: Fit indices (overall):2 (d.f)= 14.78(9), 2/d.f= 1.64, CFI= 0.99, TLI=0.98, SRMR= 
0.03 
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Table 3-29: Measurement Model- Intellectual Stimulation 
Items Model-1 
Standardized 
Factor 
Loadings 
p-value Model-2 
Standardized 
Factor 
Loadings 
p-value 
IS1 0.704 0.000 0.722 0.000 
IS2 0.750 0.000 0.700 0.000 
IS3 0.482 0.000 Deleted NA 
IS4 0.732 0.000 0.768 0.000 
Notes: Model-1: Fit indices (overall):2 (d.f)= 5.51(2), 2/d.f= 2.75, CFI= 0.97, TLI=0.91, 
SRMR= 0.03; Model-2: Just identified hence fit indices cannot be computed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3-30: Measurement Model- Individualized Consideration 
 Items Model-1 
Standardized 
Factor 
Loadings 
p-value 
 
  
IC1 0.588 0.000   
IC2 0.759 0.000   
IC3 0.804 0.000   
Notes: Model-1: Just identified and hence fit indices are not computed.   
 
The CFA model for Charismatic/Inspirational Leadership has the following fit 
indices: 2 (d.f.) = 14.78(9), 2 /d.f.= 1.64, CFI= 0.99, TLI=0.98, SRMR= 0.03 (see Table 
3-28) and were indicative of a good fitting model (Hu & Bentler, 1999).  The lowest 
standardized factor loading for the Charismatic/Inspirational construct is 0.69, was above 
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the threshold (i.e., 0.60), all the items of charismatic/inspirational leadership were 
retained. The CFA models for Intellectual stimulation and Individualized Consideration 
did not have their fit indices computed because they were just identified based on the 
number of items for each construct. From Table 3-29 it is evident that IS3 had the lowest 
standardized factor loading at 0.48 (i.e. 0.60). Since IS3 had a very low loading on the 
construct it was deleted from our subsequent analyses. Care was taken to ensure that the 
content validity of the construct is not affected by deleting the measure IS3. Likewise 
Table 3-30 depicts that IC1 had the lowest standardized factor loading of 0.58 for the 
construct individualized consideration. Even though IC1 had marginally lower factor 
loadings than the threshold (i.e., 0.60), it was retained to ensure the content domain of the 
factor individualized consideration. The factor loadings for all the three constructs were 
significant at the 0.01 level.  
3.9.2 Transactional Leadership-CFA  
Within the realm of transactional leadership, two distinct constructs, i.e., 
contingent rewards and management by exception, are frequently identified. Both 
constructs are measured by using three indicators each. CFA is used to establish the 
convergent validity of the items for contingent reward and management by exception by 
examining the factor loading so of their measures. The CFA results for contingent rewards 
and management by exception are provided in Tables 3-31 and 3-32 respectively. 
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Table 3-31: Measurement Model- Contingent Reward 
Items Model-1 
Standardized 
Factor Loadings 
p-value 
 
CR1 0.491 0.000 
CR2 0.827 0.000 
CR3 0.819 0.000 
Notes: Model-1: Just identified and hence fit indices are not computed. 
Table 3-32: Measurement Model- Management by Exception 
 Items Model-1 
Standardized 
Factor 
Loadings 
p-value 
 
ME1 0.747 0.000 
ME2 0.798 0.000 
ME3 0.917 0.000 
Notes: Model-1: Just identified and hence fit indices are not computed. 
Due to the number of items (i.e., 3) for each of the transactional leadership 
constructs, their CFA models were just-identified and fit indices were not generated by 
Mplus 6.0. Table 31 depicts the factor loadings of contingent reward and suggests that 
CR1 is poorly loading on the intended construct (0.49). This finding is consistent with my 
results which were based on the preliminary data analysis. Thus, CR1 is deleted for the 
purposes of subsequent analyses. Caution is taken to ensure that the content validity of the 
construct is not lost while deleting a particular item. Table 32 suggests that all the items 
measuring management by exception relate with the intended construct. This is manifested 
through the high factor loadings of the measures on the construct. ME1 had the lowest 
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factor loading of 0.747. The factor loadings for contingent reward and management by 
exception were all significant at the 0.01 level. 
3.9.3 Trust-CFA 
The construct of trust is operationalized by twelve items in this study. CFA was 
carried out to examine the model fit, and determine the convergent validity of the items 
measuring trust. The CFA model for trust has the following fit indices: 2 (d.f.) = 
79.12(27), 2 /d.f.= 2.93, CFI= 0.92, TLI=0.90, SRMR= 0.05 (see Table 3-33) which are 
suggestive of a good fitting model  (Hu & Bentler, 1999). Although 2 /d.f. >2, this model 
is considered acceptable as the other fit indices appear to surpass recommended 
thresholds.  
 
Table 3-33: Measurement Model- Trust 
Items Model-1 
Standardized Factor Loadings 
p-value Model-2 
Standardized Factor Loadings 
p-value 
T1 0.697 0.000 0.700 0.000 
T2 -0.156 0.029 Deleted NA 
T3 -0.135 0.062 Deleted NA 
T4 -0.275 0.000 Deleted NA 
T5 0.667 0.000 0.671 0.000 
T6 0.679 0.000 0.687 0.000 
T7 0.742 0.000 0.730 0.000 
T8 0.815 0.000 0.818 0.000 
T9 0.714 0.000 0.700 0.000 
T10 0.735 0.000 0.734 0.000 
T11 0.713 0.000 0.720 0.000 
T12 0.701 0.000 0.705 0.000 
Notes: Model-1: Fit indices (overall):2 (d.f)= 269.38(54), 2/d.f= 4.98, CFI= 0.75, TLI=0.71, 
SRMR= 0.11; Model-2: Fit indices (overall):2 (d.f)= 79.12(27), 2/d.f= 2.93, CFI= 0.92, TLI=0.90, 
SRMR= 0.05 
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The factor loadings for the measures of trust are presented in Table 3-33 and 
suggest that most of the items had fairly high loadings on the intended construct. However, 
indicators T2, T3, and T4 had fairly low and negative loadings on the intended construct, 
with the lowest being -0.13. Again, the results are consistent with the findings of our 
preliminary analysis. These items were dropped iteratively and the revised factor loadings 
are also shown in Table 3-33. Caution was taken when deleting the three items of trust so 
that the content validity of the construct was not compromised. All the factor loadings 
were significant at the 0.01 level. 
3.9.4 Commitment-CFA 
Affective commitment and continuance commitment are the two types of 
commitment examined here. Affective commitment is operationalized using five items 
and continuance commitment is captured using four items. The CFAs for these two 
constructs are used to establish the convergent validity of their items by examining their 
factor loadings and p-values. Table 3-34 and Table 3-35 depict the results of the CFA for 
affective and continuance commitment respectively. 
Table 3-34: Measurement Model-Affective Commitment 
Items Model-1 
Standardized 
Factor 
Loadings 
p-value Model-2 
Standardized 
Factor 
Loadings 
p-value 
AC1 0.799 0.000 0.801 0.000 
AC2 0.736 0.000 0.736 0.000 
AC3 0.704 0.000 0.703 0.000 
AC4 0.747 0.000 0.746 0.000 
AC5 0.046 0.548 Deleted NA 
Notes: Model-1: Fit indices (overall):2 (d.f)= 4.692(5), 2/d.f= 0.938, CFI= 1.00, TLI=1.00, SRMR= 
0.02; Model-2: Fit indices (overall):2 (d.f)= 0.508(2), 2/d.f= 0.254, CFI= 1.000, TLI=1.00, SRMR= 
0.01 
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The final CFA model for affective commitment had the following fit indices: 2 
(d.f.) = 0.508(2), 2 /d.f.= 0.254, CFI= 1.00, TLI=1.00, SRMR= 0.01 (see Table 3-34). 
These fit indices are suggestive of a good fitting model. The fit indices for continuance 
commitment were not generated by Mplus 6.0 as the final CFA model for continuance 
commitment was just identified.  
 
Table 3-35: Measurement Model-Continuance Commitment 
Items Model-1 
Standardized 
Factor 
Loadings 
p-value Model-2 
Standardized 
Factor 
Loadings 
p-value 
CC1 0.653 0.000 0.639 0.000 
CC2 0.452 0.000 Deleted NA 
CC3 0.896 0.000 0.872 0.000 
CC4 0.804 0.000 0.839 0.000 
Notes: Model-1: Fit indices (overall):2 (d.f)= 23.66(2), 2/d.f= 1.92, CFI= 0.93, TLI=0.78, SRMR= 
0.06; Model-2: Fit indices (overall):2 (d.f)= 1668.59(867), 2/d.f= 1.92, CFI= 0.91, TLI=0.90, 
SRMR= 0.08 
 
The factor loadings for the measures of affective commitment are presented in 
Table 3-34 and suggest that most of the items had fairly high loadings on their intended 
construct. However, item AC5 had a fairly low and negative loading on the intended 
construct (0.046). This result was consistent with the findings which relied on my 
preliminary analysis. This item was dropped and the revised factor loadings for affective 
commitment are also shown in Table 3-35. When continuance commitment is considered, 
most items, except of item CC2 with a factor loading of 0.45, loaded heavily on their 
intended construct. Indicator CC2 was dropped from subsequent analyses. The revised 
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factor loadings for continuance commitment are presented in Table 3-35. Care was taken 
to ensure that content validity was not affected by dropping items. All the remaining factor 
loadings are significant at the 0.01 level.  
3.9.5 Integration-CFA 
The primary dependent variable in this study is SCI. The construct of SCI is 
measured using 18 items. The CFA is used to assess model fit and convergent validity by 
examining the factor loadings with their significance level. The results of the CFA are 
presented in Table 3-36 below.  
Table 3-36: Measurement Model- Integration 
Items Model-1 
Standardized 
Factor 
Loadings 
p-value Model-2 
Standardized 
Factor 
Loadings 
p-value 
I1 0.528 0.000 0.441 0.000 
I2 0.569 0.000 Deleted NA 
I3 0.565 0.000 Deleted NA 
I4 0.461 0.000 Deleted NA 
I5 0.653 0.000 0.644 0.000 
I6 0.384 0.000 Deleted NA 
I7 0.683 0.000 0.706 0.000 
I8 0.748 0.000 0.614 0.000 
I9 0.621 0.000 0.622 0.000 
I10 -0.317 0.000 Deleted NA 
I11 -0.611 0.000 Deleted NA 
I12 -0.430 0.000 Deleted NA 
I13 0.630 0.000 0.714 0.000 
I14 0.686 0.000 0.739 0.000 
I15 0.720 0.000 0.701 0.000 
I16 0.664 0.000 0.722 0.000 
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Table 3-36: Continued 
Items Model-1 
Standardized 
Factor 
Loadings 
p-value Model-2 
Standardized 
Factor 
Loadings 
p-value 
I17 0.501 0.000 0.488 0.000 
I18 0.686 0.000 0.753 0.000 
Notes: Model-1: Fit indices (overall):2 (d.f)= 402.48(135), 2/d.f= 2.98, CFI= 0.77, TLI=0.74, 
SRMR= 0.09; Model-2: Fit indices (overall):2 (d.f)= 91.85(44), 2/d.f= 2.82, CFI= 0.93, TLI=0.91, 
SRMR= 0.05 
 
The CFA model has the following fit indices: 2 (d.f.) = 91.85(44), 2 /d.f.= 2.01, 
CFI= 0.93, TLI=0.91, SRMR= 0.05 (see Table 3-36). Although, 2 /d.f. >2, this model is 
considered acceptable as the other fit indices are fairly supportive of good model fit. 
The factor loadings for the measures of SCI appear in Table 3-36 and suggest that 
most of the items had fairly high loadings on their intended construct. However, several 
items (i.e., I10, I11, I12) had fairly low and negative loadings with I10 having the lowest 
loading of -0.31. Several of the items that had low factor loadings were the same as the 
items that were labeled suspicious in my preliminary analysis (see items I10, I11, I12). 
Items were dropped iteratively. However, at the end of the iterative approach, two items 
(i.e., I1 and I17) that had low factor loadings were retained as deleting them would have 
affected the content validity of the construct.  
3.10 Overall Measurement Model 
Once the variables were purified and the model fit and the convergent validity of 
individual constructs was established, an overall measurement model was examined using 
CFA. To address the overall measurement model using CFA, tab-delimited data was used 
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as the input and tested using Mplus 6.0. The overall measurement model was used to test 
for the efficacy of a second-order specification for Transformational Leadership factor, 
assess convergent and discriminant validity for all constructs, and to compute the 
composite reliability for each latent variable. To test the efficacy of the second-order 
factor, four competing models specified within the realm of the overall measurement 
model are examined using the guidelines proposed by Koufteros, Babbar, and Kaighobadi 
(2009). The extant literature supports a higher-order factor specification for 
Transformational Leadership. The steps for examining the second-order model 
specification is discussed below.  
Four different models are compared and the model that is conceptually plausible 
and fits the data well will be selected for subsequent analyses. The first model (Model 1) 
specified that all 10 items load onto a single first-order factor, whereas the second model 
(Model 2) specifies three uncorrelated first-order factors. The primary difference between 
Model 2 and Model 3 is that all the first-order factors are correlated in Model 3. The last 
model (Model 4) specifies three first-order factors and one second-order factor. After 
establishing an appropriate measurement model, it is deployed in the structural model to 
test the hypotheses in this study.  
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Table 3-37: Goodness of Fit Indices for Alternative Models of Factor Structure 
 Model 1: One 
first-order factor 
Model 2: Three 
first-order factors 
uncorrelated 
Model 3: three 
first-order factors 
correlated 
Model 4: Three 
first-order factors , 
one second-order 
factor 
2(df) 1437.93(1005) 1554.29(993) 1320.04(990) 1355.20(1002) 
2/df 1.43 1.57 1.33 1.35 
Comparative fit 
index (CFI) 
0.91 0.88 0.93 0.92 
Tucker-Lewis fit 
index (CFI) 
0.90 0.87 0.92 0.92 
Standardized root 
mean square 
residual (SRMR) 
0.08 0.17 0.07 0.07 
 
Table 3-38: Overall Measurement Model 
Items Standardized Factor 
Loadings 
p-value Construct 
II1 0.716 0.000 Charisma/ 
II2 0.683 0.000 Inspirational 
II3 0.713 0.000  
II4 0.712 0.000  
II5 0.755 0.000  
II6 0.774 0.000  
IS1 0.747 0.000 Intellectual  
IS2 0.724 0.000 Stimulation 
IS4 0.704 0.000  
IC1 0.621 0.000 Individualized 
IC2 0.758 0.000 Consideration 
IC3 0.768 0.000  
CR1 0.849 0.000 Contingent  
CR2 0.819 0.000 Reward 
ME1 0.783 0.000 Management 
ME2 0.792 0.000 By 
ME3 0.921 0.000 Exception 
T1 0.711 0.000 Trust 
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Table 3-38: Continued  
Items Standardized Factor 
Loadings 
p-value Construct 
T5 0.703 0.000  
T6 0.715 0.000  
T7 0.736 0.000 Trust 
T8 0.801 0.000  
T9 0.647 0.000  
T10 0.708 0.000  
T11 0.715 0.000  
T12 0.685 0.000  
AC1 0.745 0.000 Affective 
AC2 0.801 0.000 Commitment 
AC3 0.680 0.000  
AC4 0.747 0.000  
CC1 0.648 0.000 Continuance 
CC3 0.868 0.000 Commitment 
CC4 0.830 0.000  
I1 0.458 0.000  
I5 0.669 0.000  
I7 0.650 0.000  
I8 0.757 0.000 SCI 
I9 0.661 0.000  
I13 0.698 0.000  
I14 0.740 0.000  
I15 0.728 0.000  
I16 0.723 0.000  
I17 0.500 0.000  
I18 0.736 0.000  
Charisma/Inspirational 0.983 0.000 Transformational  
Intellectual Stimulation 0.595 0.000 Leadership 
Individualized 
Consideration 
0.989 0.000  
Notes: Fit indices (overall):2 (d.f)= 1355.20(1002), 2/d.f= 1.35, CFI= 0.92, TLI=0.92, 
SRMR= 0.07 
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To select the appropriate model, the competing models are compared examining, 
iteratively whether there is a statistically significant difference in 2 values, and where 
lower 2 values are favored (see Table 3-37). Model 1 produced a 2=1437.93 (1005 d.f.) 
while Model 2 had an 2=1554.29 (993 df). The 2diff is 116.36 and is statistically 
significant (p<.01) based on 12 d.f. This suggests that Model 1 is preferred to Model 2. 
Model 3 produced a significantly lower 2=1320.04 (990 d.f.) than Model 2 and the 2diff 
of 234.25 (3 d.f.) is statistically significant (p<.01) that indicates Model 3 is preferred to 
Model 2. Finally, Model 4 generated a χ2=1355.20 (1002 d.f.) and 2diff =35.2 (12 d.f.), 
which is statistically significant (p<0.01), suggesting model Models 3 has a better fit than 
Model 4. Thus Model 3 is the best fitting model followed by model 4. Model 3 will always 
have the best model fit, since a second-order model can never produce better fit indices 
than its corresponding first-order correlated model (Koufteros et al., 2009). However, a 
second-order model that is comparable in terms of its fit indices with the correlated first-
order model can serve as an attractive option if it can be conceptually supported. The fit 
of Model 4 proved to be similar to the fit generated by Model 3 in terms of CFI and TLI 
and can be conceptually supported. Thus model 4 appears to be a suitable alternative and 
was used as the model for evaluating the substantive hypotheses.  
The overall measurement model with a second order factor for Transformational 
Leadership has acceptable model fit based on the following fit indices: 2 (d.f.) = 
1355.20(1002), 2 /d.f.= 1.35, CFI= 0.92, TLI=0.91, SRMR= 0.07 that are suggestive of 
a good fitting model (Hu & Bentler, 1999). Furthermore, all the items loaded significantly 
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onto their respective factors based on their t-values (see Table 3-38). Most of the factor 
loadings were above 0.60 and a great majority of those loadings were above 0.70. 
3.11 Discriminant Validity Results 
Table 3-39 provides information about the AVE, CR and squared factor 
correlations. Evidence for discriminant validity can be obtained by comparing the AVEs 
of any two constructs against the respective squared factor correlation (Koufteros & 
Marcoulides, 2006).  Table 3-39 also includes the second-order factor. Correlations among 
the first-order Transformational Leadership factors and their second-order factor are 
expected to be rather high. Thus, the AVE and the squared factor correlations were not 
compared among the three first order factors and Transformational Leadership.  
The highest squared correlation among all the constructs compared was observed 
between affective commitment and Transformational Leadership at 0.62 which is greater 
than the AVE for affective commitment.  Similarly, for trust its AVEs were lower than its 
squared correlations with Transformational Leadership. Transformational leadership is a 
strong driver of trust and commitment and hence very high correlations among these 
constructs are expected.  The AVEs for all the other constructs are higher than their 
respective squared correlation, and thus rendering support for discriminant validity (Ho & 
Zhang, 2008). Reliability for the measurement items of each construct is established by 
probing the CR and AVE values. In our case, the CR value for every construct is above 
0.70, and the AVE values for most of the constructs are greater than 0.50 except for SCI 
for which the AVE is 0.45. The relatively low AVE value for SCI is potentially because 
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Table 3-39: Reliability and Correlation Matrix for the Constructs 
Constructs 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
10 
1. Charisma/Inspirat
ion 
0.87a 
0.53b 
         
2. Intellectual 
Stimulation  
0.51c** 
(0.26)d 
0.77a 
0.53b 
        
3. Individualized 
Consideration 
0.79** 
(0.62) 
0.44** 
(0.19) 
0.76a 
0.52b 
       
4. Transformational 
Leadership 
0.95** 
(0.90) 
0.70** 
(0.49) 
0.88 
(0.77) 
0.90a 
0.76b 
      
5. Contingent 
Reward  
0.66** 
(0.43) 
0.43** 
(0.18) 
0.65** 
(0.42) 
0.69** 
(0.47) 
0.82a 
0.70b 
     
6. Management by 
Exception 
-0.11 
(0.01) 
0.09 
(0.00) 
-0.01 
(0.00) 
-0.04 
(0.00) 
0.12 
(0.01) 
0.87a 
0.69b 
    
7. Trust 0.74** 
(0.54) 
0.31** 
(0.09) 
0.74** 
(0.54) 
0.74** 
(0.54) 
0.67** 
(0.44) 
0.09 
(0.00) 
0.90a 
0.51b 
   
8. Affective 
Commitment 
0.79** 
(0.62) 
0.44** 
(0.19) 
0.72** 
(0.52) 
0.79** 
(0.62) 
0.58** 
(0.33) 
-0.13 
(0.02) 
0.66** 
(0.44) 
0.83a 
0.54b 
  
9. Continuance 
Commitment 
-0.08 
(0.00) 
0.02 
(0.00) 
-0.01 
(0.00) 
-0.04 
(0.00) 
0.17* 
(0.02) 
0.73** 
(0.53) 
0.11 
(0.01) 
-0.05 
(0.00) 
0.84a 
0.64b 
 
10. Integration 0.54** 
(0.29) 
0.44** 
(0.19) 
0.53** 
(0.34) 
0.59** 
(0.34) 
0.54** 
(0.29) 
0.17* 
(0.03) 
0.58** 
(0.33) 
0.54** 
(0.29) 
0.123 
(0.02
) 
0.89a 
0.45b 
 
Notes: On the diagonal: aComposite reliability and baverage variance extracted. Off the diagonal: cCorrelation and 
dsquared correlation in parentheses.   
One-tailed sign. Level: *p-value<0.05, ** p-value<0.01 
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of the two poorly loading items that were retained to ensure content validity of the 
construct.  
3.12 Research Methods for Testing the Structural Model 
The Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) approach works particularly well for 
testing relationships among several constructs simultaneously with large data (Kline, 
2011). Shah and Goldstein (2006, p.149) state that “structural equation modeling is a 
technique to specify, estimate, and evaluate models of linear relationships among a set of 
observed variables in terms of a generally smaller number of unobserved variables.” SEM 
has become a widely used method among empirical scholars in Operations and Supply 
Chain Management (OSCM) to study linear relationships between unobserved variables 
(Shah & Goldstein, 2006). 
3.12.1 Structural Model Analysis and Results 
This section provides an overview of the procedures used for testing the structural 
model. The subsequent sections will provide a comprehensive treatment of the procedures 
used. The structural model provides insights about the hypothesized relationships among 
constructs in this study. According to the prescriptions provided by Anderson and Gerbing 
(1988), a two-step approach is utilized in testing the models. The first step involves testing 
the measurement model using CFA and the subsequent step involves the testing of the 
structural model. The structural model is assessed using Mplus 6.0 using the maximum 
likelihood robust estimator. 
Prior to examining the overall structural model, researchers need to examine 
whether there are any biases due to potential outliers and non-normality of data. The 
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maximum likelihood estimator used frequently in examining the structural model is 
sensitive to non-normality. If any non-normality is detected, necessary transformations 
need to be carried out to ensure normality of data or an adequate estimator that can handle 
non-normality should be used for the analysis. It is also necessary to examine the 
representativeness of the sample vis-à-vis the population so that we can generalize the 
findings to the entire population.  
After undertaking these tests, and comprehensively taking into account the 
findings from previous analyses, the structural model presented in Figure 3-1 is tested. 
Typically, the beta coefficients indicate the strength of the relationships between variables 
and the structural model is evaluated by examining the size of the standardized structural 
path coefficients.  These coefficients are scrutinized for their statistical and substantive 
significance. In general, standardized path coefficient values of 0.20 or higher, indicate a 
substantive relationship among constructs (Chin, 1998). The statistical significance of the 
beta coefficients is demonstrated using the p-values derived from t-tests. 
3.13 Data Quality Check 
3.13.1 Missing Data 
Some participants were eliminated from further analyses in this study. In the 
structural model analysis observations with missing data were deleted “listwise” based on 
the job profile and the functional role of the individuals. Although a carefully selected 
sample was targeted, 17 observations did not match the functional department and job title 
requirements for this study. For instance, one of the observations that was deleted had a 
job title listed as a foreman.  After carefully screening out 17 participants, 242 
 151 
 
observations remained of which 34 was used for the pilot study and 207 for the large data 
analyses.   
3.13.2 Normality Check 
The maximum likelihood estimation technique is sensitive to non-normality in the 
data. To examine the normality of data used for the structural model analysis a normality 
check of the individual constructs is conducted. Although, univariate normality does not 
ensure multivariate normality, the presence of a multivariate distribution is reflected by 
the univariate distributions (Johnson & Wichern, 2002). To examine normality the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) statistics for the constructs in this study were estimated. The 
results are presented in Table 3-40. As illustrated in Table 3-40 all the variables did not 
pass the normality test as the KS test statistic was significant at the 0.05 level. Hence I 
opted to use the MLM estimator that is capable of handling non-normal data in the 
structural model analysis. 
Table 3-40: Test for Normality- Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test 
 Statistic d.f. Sig. 
1. Charisma/Inspiration 0.119 207 0.000 
2. Intellectual 
Stimulation  
0.139 207 0.000 
3. Individualized 
Consideration 
0.130 207 0.000 
4. Transformational 
Leadership 
0.146 207 0.000 
5. Contingent Reward  0.137 207 0.000 
6. Management by 
Exception 
0.141 207 0.000 
7. Trust 0.124 207 0.000 
8. Affective Commitment 0.102 207 0.000 
9. Continuance 
Commitment 
0.083 207 0.000 
10. Integration 0.168 207 0.000 
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3.13.3 Representativeness of Sample 
The representativeness of the sample is assessed by comparing the number of firms 
observed in each manufacturing sector with the number of firms expected in each based 
on the distribution of the respondents across different manufacturing sectors.  The 
distribution of firms in different SIC codes is obtained using 
www.melissadata.com/lookups/sic.asp. Using the distribution of firms in each SIC code, 
the expected counts are computed by estimating the proportion of firms in each SIC code 
based upon the total number of observed firms. The chi-square test was used to compare 
the observed and the expected counts across different SIC codes. The Chi-square statistic 
was 107.17 with 17 degrees of freedom and p=0.000 (see Table 3-41). This indicates that 
our sample is not representative of the original population. One plausible reason for this 
finding can be attributed to the fact that several firms in this study did not report their 
company name and industry to which they belonged. This prevented them from being 
included in the representativeness check which could have altered our test statistic value 
and its significance. Although, the results from this analysis appear to restrict the 
generalizability of this study’s findings, having data from companies belonging to 18 
different SIC codes in the manufacturing industry suggests strong generalizability for our 
findings to US manufacturers. 
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Table 3-41: Representativeness Test 
SIC Classification Observed Expected Residual 
20 5 12 -7 
21 1 1 1 
22 1 2 -1 
23 2 5 -3 
24 1 9 -8 
25 5 2 3 
26 4 3 1 
28 4 6 -2 
29 5 2 3 
30 2 5 -3 
32 3 2 1 
33 6 3 3 
34 3 16 -13 
35 17 26 -9 
36 17 7 10 
37 20 5 15 
38 11 6 5 
39 25 20 5 
Notes:  
Chi-Square (d.f.) 107.17 (17) 
p-value 0.000 
 
3.14 Structural Model Analysis and Results 
 SEM is used to test the nomological network comprising of transformational 
leadership, transactional leadership, trust, two types of commitment, and SCI.  The 
nomological network relates transformational leadership to trust, and contingent reward 
and management by exception to trust.  Furthermore, there are hypothesized relationships 
from trust to affective and normative commitment, which subsequently affects SCI. The 
extant literature also suggests that several factors such as industry competition e.g., 
number of suppliers (Staber, 1998); product type in reference to whether it is a strategic 
or a commodity product (Oliver & Ebers, 1998), and the firm size (Koufteros et al., 2007) 
can influence SCI as they can influence the degree on inter-dependence between firms. 
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Table 3-42: Structural Model Coefficients 
 
 
 
 
Structural Path (from-to) Hypotheses Coefficient  
(t-Value) 
Transformational Leadership  Trust H1  0.88 a *** (9.60) 
Contingent Reward  Trust H2a  0.03          (0.76) 
Management by Exception Trust H2b  0.02          (0.50) 
Trust  Affective Commitment H3a  1.04***   (30.83) 
Trust  Continuance Commitment H3b  0.06           (0.75) 
Affective Commitment   Integration H4a  0.64***     (12.20) 
Continuance Commitment Integration H4b  0.17*         (2.31) 
Notes: Fit indices (overall):2 (d.f)= 1489.44(1043), 2/d.f= 1.42, CFI= 0.91, TLI=0.90, SRMR= 0.08, a =Completely Standardized 
Coefficient, One-tailed sign. level: *p-value<0.05,** p-value<0.01, *** p-value<0.001 
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Furthermore, relationship duration (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994) between customers can 
influence the relationship between commitment and SCI.  
The results for the structural model are presented in Table 3-42. The overall fit 
indices of the structural model are acceptable under the guidelines proposed by Hu and 
Bentler (1999): 2(d.f.)= 1448.87(1037), 2 /d.f.= 1.39, CFI= 0.91, TLI=0.91, SRMR= 
0.07. Hypothesis 1 suggests that Transformational Leadership impacts Trust positively. 
The standardized path coefficient is indicative of a significant relationship (=0.883, t-
value=11.452). The second set of hypotheses relates the two factors of transactional 
leadership to Trust. The hypothesized effect of Contingent Reward on Trust (=0.030, t-
value=0.709) and the effect of management by exception on Trust (=0.025, t-
value=0.422) are not statistically significant. The third set of hypotheses relates Trust to 
two types of commitment. There is evidence to suggest that Trust is positively related to 
Affective Commitment rendering support to Hypothesis 3a (=1.039, t-value=46.187). 
However, there is no sufficient evidence to suggest that there is a significant relationship 
between Trust and Continuance Commitment (=0.051, t-value=0.680). The final set of 
hypotheses relates Affective and Continuance Commitment to SCI. The standardized path 
coefficient for the relationship between Affective Commitment and SCI is indicative of a 
significant relationship between the two (=0.630, t-value=6.099). Furthermore, contrary 
to the hypothesized direction Continuance Commitment has a positive and significant 
relationship with SCI (=0.166, t-value=2.931). However, the relationship between  
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Figure 3-2: Hypothesized Structural Model Results1
 
 
                                                 
1
Note: One-tailed sign. level: *p-value<0.05,** p-value<0.01, *** p-value<0.001 
Controls: Product type, relationship duration, competition, and firm size. 
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Affective Commitment and SCI is more pronounced than the relationship between 
Continuance Commitment and SCI. 
3.15 Discussion and Conclusion 
The findings from this study provide insights regarding the mechanisms through 
which leadership styles will ultimately influence SCI. Figure 3-2 suggests that 
transformational leadership had a positive impact on trust indicating that customers who 
demonstrated more charisma/inspiration, intellectual stimulation, and individualized 
consideration were more likely to develop trust in their suppliers, supporting Hypothesis 
1. The relationship of transactional leadership and trust was insignificant, indicating that 
customers exhibiting contingent reward and customers that manage their relationship with 
suppliers by exception had no impact on suppliers’ trust of their customers, and thus 
Hypotheses 2a and 2b were not supported. Lack of evidence for Hypothesis 2a suggests 
that getting tasks accomplished from suppliers by rewarding them for their completing 
their work and punishing them for failing might not induce trust. Suppliers who perceive 
their customers not to be very helpful, and rather punitive when they fail to accomplish a 
task, tend to harbor low levels of trust towards their customers.  Likewise, customers who 
work with their suppliers with a contractual frame of mind, and actively manage and 
correct deviations from contracts, are also less likely to help develop trust in their 
suppliers. Furthermore, Figure 3-2 reveals that suppliers’ trust positively influences their 
affective commitment towards their customers. This supports Hypothesis 3a which 
suggests that as suppliers trust their customers they are more willing to be committed to 
their customers and develop a long term orientation towards them. On the other hand 
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Figure 3-2 implies that suppliers’ trust towards their customers had an insignificant impact 
on their continuance commitment, and thus Hypothesis 3a was not supported. These 
results suggest that only customers exhibiting transformational leadership effectively 
achieve high levels of affective commitment among suppliers by engendering trust. 
Empirical evidence from this study further demonstrates that transactional leadership has 
no significant impact on trust which plays a pivotal role in developing affective 
relationship commitment. This finding is in line with Hult et al. (2000) who also 
empirically demonstrate that transactional leadership has no significant impact on 
relationship commitment. 
This study also investigates the relationship between affective and continuance 
commitment on SCI. Figure 3-2 illustrates that the path coefficient from affective 
commitment to SCI is positive and highly significant, and thus Hypothesis 4a is supported. 
This suggests that suppliers that have an emotional attachment and emotional bonding 
through trust with their customers are more likely to invest substantively into their 
relationship with customers. They are more likely to internalize the values of their 
customers and work more closely together. Figure 3-2 also reveals that continuance 
commitment is also positively related to integration. This finding was contrary to 
Hypothesis 4b. One plausible explanation for this finding is that suppliers with 
continuance commitment might engage in some degree of SCI to salvage some benefit 
from their existing relationship with customers. However, suppliers with continuance 
commitment will be willing to change their customers if they find a viable alternative. The 
results of my study also demonstrate that continuance commitment has a relatively smaller 
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impact on SCI than affective commitment. This smaller impact suggests that a customer 
should try and foster affective commitment more than continuance commitment with their 
suppliers to enhance SCI.  Zhao et al. (2008) state “When suppliers have an intrinsic desire 
to continue their relationship…SCI can be readily achieved” (p.67).  
Understanding the mechanism of SCI development through leadership, trust and 
commitment is particularly helpful for practitioners in selecting the appropriate leadership 
style. Since transformational leadership style is the most effective leadership style in 
developing SCI, customers should engage in motivating, challenging and helping 
suppliers in order to achieve high levels of SCI by engendering trust and affective 
commitment.   
This work contributes substantially to the SCI literature by systematically 
examining the relationship among leadership styles, trust, commitment and SCI. The role 
of leadership has hardly been subject to empirical investigation in the realm of supply 
chain management (Defee, 2007). Through this research, I demonstrate the significance 
of transformational leadership in the context of SCI. 
 This study provides managerial insights on the effective leadership style that 
needs to be developed to foster SCI. This study demonstrates a strong relationship between 
affective commitment and SCI and illustrates the most effective way to lead suppliers to 
develop affective commitment. A clear link is established between leadership styles-trust-
commitment and SCI. My work also demonstrates that engaging in contingent rewarding 
behavior does not influence trust development, and should be used with caution by 
customers towards their suppliers. Furthermore, customers should actively engage with 
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suppliers by helping them achieve specific goals, training them to look at problems from 
different perspectives, and fostering creativity.  However, customers should refrain from 
binding suppliers to set rules and standards as they do not engender trust.   
Even though this study makes significant contributions to academia and practice, 
there are several limitations to this study that offer the potential for future research. First, 
the leadership style exhibited can be subject to several contextual constraints such as 
power, task knowledge, and environmental uncertainty. Future studies should consider the 
contextual variables while examining leadership. Second, the interaction effect between 
transformational and transactional leadership styles can be considered. Studies have 
suggested that leaders who exhibit both transformational and transactional leadership can 
be very successful. However this claim is yet to be examined in the realm of supply chain 
management.  Third, this study is focused on the supplier perspective, and although this 
perspective provides useful insights into the development of SCI, future studies should try 
to incorporate the perspective of both the customer and the supplier. Developing this line 
of thought, leadership style within a supplier can also impact its relationship with a 
customer and examining the role of leadership styles within suppliers in the context of this 
study can be a fruitful endeavor. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CALLING THE SHOTS 
4.1 Introduction 
Leading-edge companies have recognized that the real competition is not 
necessarily pitting company against company anymore but rather supply chain against 
supply chain (Cooper et al., 1997; Molm et al., 2000; Peng et al., 2013; Rice & Hoppe, 
2001). Drucker (1996), a renowned management theorist, emphasized that the biggest 
change in the way business is being conducted may be the increasing growth of 
relationships based on partnerships, and not in ownership. Accordingly, firms have 
utilized supply chain integration (SCI), which involves close strategic relationships with 
supply chain partners, to improve their performance (Paulraj & Chen, 2005; Wagner et 
al., 2011; Watson, 2001). Scholarly research attests that firms can use SCI as a strategic 
weapon to gain competitive advantage (Dyer & Singh, 1998). Porter (1985, p. 48) stated, 
“Competitive advantage frequently derives from linkages among activities just as it does 
from the individual activities themselves.” SCI involves linkages of several activities 
across firms (Das et al., 2006; Stevens, 1989). Many studies have demonstrated, for 
instance, that SCI is a critical factor in the success of new product development 
(Koufteros, Rawski, & Rupak, 2010; Rai & Bajwa, 1997; Saeed et al., 2005) and for 
competitive advantage at large (Droge et al., 2004; Kahn & Mentzer, 1998; Rosenzweig 
et al., 2003; Wong et al., 2011). Frohlich and Westbrook (2001) illustrate that firms with 
wider arcs of integration have higher performance improvement. That is, firms with 
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greater supplier and customer integration exhibit higher operational performance 
improvement when compared to firms that have lower integration levels with their supply 
chain partners. 
Although several studies have cited the benefits of SCI (Chen et al., 2004; 
Leuschner et al., 2013; Peng et al., 2013; Stuart, 2000; Wong et al., 2011), there is scarcity 
of research that examines executive decision making related to SCI at the individual level 
(Croson, Anand, & Agarwal, 2007; McKnight, Cummings, & Chervany, 1998; Stuart, 
1998; Villena et al., 2009). Much of the empirical literature on SCI has taken a macro (i.e., 
organizational level) perspective (Das et al., 2006; Flynn et al., 2010; Gulati, 1995; Van 
der Vaart & van Donk, 2008). As an example, Peng et al. (2013) examine SCI at the level 
of strategic business units (SBUs), and finds that SCI improves plant innovation and 
improvement capabilities. Although research on SCI has benefited from a macro 
perspective, the concomitant micro level perspective has not made significant inroads in 
SCI research. For instance, the personal interests of executive decision makers are ignored 
when examining SCI, but increasingly researchers question whether this is prudent given 
the level of power executives hold (Hitt & Tyler, 1991; Villena et al., 2009). 
Furthermore, most extant empirical studies have examined SCI assuming that only 
a single type of relationship describes SCI between firms (Flynn et al., 2010; Frohlich & 
Westbrook, 2001). However, several recent studies on SCI have shown that relationships 
among firms can exist at different levels, such as coordination, collaboration, and 
internalization (Leuschner et al., 2013; Vanpoucke et al., 2014). The most elemental form 
of relationship is “coordination.” Coordination refers to basic exchange of information 
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and linkage of information systems for facilitating the flow of goods (Leuschner et al., 
2013). The next level of relationship between firms is termed as “collaboration,” which 
goes beyond coordination efforts and includes joint idiosyncratic investments. Several 
studies have examined the added benefits of going beyond mere coordination (Jap, 1999), 
but have acknowledged the additional investments that are required for collaboration vis-
à-vis coordination (Dyer & Singh, 1998). The extant literature also has suggested that 
some firms take their relationship to a level beyond collaboration by building relational 
linkages (Lado et al., 2008; Villena et al., 2011). These firms internalize the values of their 
partners and are willing to withstand short-term losses to achieve long-term strategic 
relationships with their partnering firms (Lado et al., 2008). I coin this type of relationship 
“internalization.” Internalization reduces transaction costs and improves firm performance 
(Dyer & Singh, 1998). See Appendix-C for a more detailed definition for coordination, 
collaboration, and internalization. Vanpoucke et al. (2014) also ackonwledge that 
interfirm relaitonship evolves through three phases through which they gradually develop 
close strategic relationships. The failure to acknowledge that relationships can exist at 
different levels in limits our understanding in two primary ways. We cannot, first, examine 
the circumstances under which the highest level of SCI is opted, and, second, ascertain the 
benefits of having a specific level of SCI. 
SCI is typically ascribed with positive evaluations, but it is still considered to be a 
risky decision (Gulati, 1995; Villena et al., 2009; Villena et al., 2011). Engaging in SCI 
requires significant investments of time, and both financial and nonfinancial resources 
(Vanpoucke et al., 2014). Furthermore, the failure rate of strategic alliances is anywhere 
 164 
 
between 30% and 50% (Anderson & Jap, 2012). The risk of failure is largely undertaken 
by the executive who makes the decision to engage in a strategic alliance with a particular 
firm. The transfer of risk from the firm to the executive occurs by design through 
governance mechanisms (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). The perceived risk to the 
executive’s wealth occurs via a threat to compensation or any other form of threat that 
results in greater risk bearing by the executive. Agency theorists have argued that when 
an executive bears greater risk, he or she engages in risk-averse behaviors (Wiseman & 
Gomez-Mejia, 1998). In a similar vein, if supply chain executives (SCEs) who make 
decisions related to SCI bear greater risk, they might decide not to pursue SCI (Villena et 
al., 2009). Agency scholars argue for the use of monitoring or incentive mechanisms to 
align the interests of the executives and the firms. 
Economic factors, such as variability in pay, are known to affect executive decision 
making under risk (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). Empirical research on executive 
compensation dates back at least 85 years to when Taussig and Baker (1925) found 
empirical evidence that suggested a relationship between executive compensation and firm 
performance. Ever since, literally hundreds of studies have examined executive 
compensation. Compensation scholars have tried to explain the impact of different 
compensation schemes on executive behavior over the past several decades (Gómez-
Mejía, Haynes, Núñez-Nickel, Jacobson, & Moyano-Fuentes, 2007), and specifically the 
influence of fixed pay and variable pay (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998) on executive 
behavior.  
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Although variability in pay is an important factor to be considered when examining 
SCE decision making (Bloom & Milkovich, 1998), executive compensation scholars have 
also increasingly demanded the incorporation of factors examined in disciplines such as 
sociology and psychology, for instance socioemotional wealth, to better explain executive 
decision making within organizations (Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997). Studies have 
previously shown that cognitions, values, and perceptions held by executives do influence 
their decision making (Graham, Li, & Qiu, 2012; Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Hitt & Tyler, 
1991). “Strategic choices made in organizations are reflections of the cognitions, 
perceptions, and values of powerful actors” (Carpenter et al., 2004, p. 750). 
In this study, I examine the circumstances under which individuals will opt for 
varying levels of SCI resting on the theoretical tenets of the Behavioral Agency Model 
(BAM) (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998) and the Behavioral Approach and Inhibition 
Model (BAIM) (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006). The BAM theory predicts that individuals 
are in general loss averse and will engage in risky behaviors in loss situations to mitigate 
losses or to totally avoid them (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). BAM particularly 
examines the role of variability in base pay in decision making and suggests that higher 
levels of variability in base pay are associated with increased risk seeking behaviors 
(Villena et al. 2009). The base pay for an executive is the portion of income that is essential 
for maintaining or raising his or her standard of living. The base pay generally includes 
annual cash compensation along with annual cash bonus awards that tend to have 
considerable consistency from year to year (Larraza-Kintana, Wiseman, Gomez-Mejia, & 
Welbourne, 2007). Studies in the past have examined the role of incentives in the form of 
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variable base pay on strategic decision making (Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997), but not 
specifically in the context of SCI. BAM predicts increased risk taking behaviors with an 
increase in the variability in base pay. For instance, Larraza-Kintana et al. (2007), had 
used BAM and found that variability in base pay is positively associated with risky 
strategic decisions. I thus examine the role of variability in base pay (variability in pay 
henceforth) on SCE decision making in the context of SCI. 
On the other hand, BAIM theory posits that individuals with more power 
(socioemotional wealth in this context) are more risk seeking vis-à-vis individuals with 
low power (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003). The concept of socioemotional 
wealth captures the innate feeling of self-worth, the ability to exercise authority, and the 
sense of belonging within organizations, and it is a construct that is closely linked with 
power (Gomez-Mejia, Cruz, Berrone, & De Castro, 2011; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & 
Anderson, 2003). Individuals with high socioemotional wealth view situations more 
optimistically and focus more on gains rather than losses. BAIM predicts that individuals 
with high socioemotional wealth are more risk seeking than individuals who lack 
socioemotional wealth.  
Examining the interaction effect of socioemotional wealth and variability in pay 
can provide a more holistic view of how SCEs make decisions within organizations 
(Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997). To the best of my knowledge, there are no extant 
studies that have considered the interaction effect of variability in pay and socioemotional 
wealth on executive decision making. This study systematically investigates the role of 
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variability in pay and socioemotional wealth in executive decision making related to 
interfirm relationships through an experimental methodology.  
In this study, SCI examined at three different levels. Extant empirical studies have 
had positive attributions towards high levels of SCI (Frohlich & Westbrook, 2001; 
Leuschner et al., 2013). However, there is increasing evidence to suggest that as a firm 
moves toward internalization from mere coordination, performance can be impacted 
adversely due to increased opportunism (Locke, Noorderhaven, Cannon, Doney, & 
Mullen, 1999), reduced objectivity (Granovetter, 1985), and poor decision making 
(Grover, Lim, & Ayyagari, 2006). Therefore, I anticipate that when SCEs consider the 
potential benefits of internalization, they will also consider the downside risks associated 
with internalization.  
The predictions regarding the impact of variability in pay and socioemotional 
wealth on SCEs decision making rest on the theoretical perspective of BAM (Wiseman & 
Gomez-Mejia, 1998) and BAIM (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006). The experiments were 
carried out by manipulating the socioemotional wealth and the variability in pay of an 
executive using a hypothetical situation administered first to students, and then to supply 
chain practitioners using vignettes. Immediately after sensitizing the participants to a 
specific scenario which involved manipulation of variability in pay and socioemotional 
wealth, they were asked to respond on their decision to pursue a specific type of a 
relationship with their supply chain partner. I piloted the experiment with 400 students 
before I eventually administered the finalized experiment to another 150 business students 
and 166 practitioners using an online software, Qualtrics.  
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The results derived the practitioner sample suggest that only variability in pay is a 
significant predictor of SCE’s decision making. However, a post-hoc analysis suggested 
that ‘age’ affects decision making by influencing how individuals perceive variability in 
pay and socioemotional wealth. The results from young practitioners suggest that 
individuals who experience variability in pay are prone to more risk taking, and 
individuals who have high socioemotional wealth are also more risk seeking compared to 
those who experience no variability in pay and low socioemotional wealth respectively. 
This was reflected by greater propensity to internalize. Furthermore, young individuals 
with high socioemotional wealth who experience high variability in pay are relatively 
more risk averse, and so less likely to opt for internalization, when compared to individuals 
with low socioemotional wealth who experience high variability in pay, and individuals 
with high socioemotional wealth who experience low variability in pay. These results were 
consistent with the student sample results. However, results based on older practitioners 
suggest that they valued only socioemotional wealth when considering a specific level of 
SCI to pursue with their customer, and, furthermore, they were risk averse when 
possessing high socioemotional wealth and were less likely to choose internalization. 
Specifically, this study addresses the research question how do variability in pay 
and socioemotional wealth influence a SCEs decision to engage in a specific level of 
integration. In the process of addressing the research question, I contribute to the extant 
SCI literature by identifying two important factors that can influence executive decision 
making, and addressing a growing call to incorporate a micro (i.e., individual level) 
perspective in SCI research. Furthermore, I examine SCI at three different levels. 
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Although supply chain researchers have cited the importance of examining the role of 
individuals in SCI, (Villena et al., 2009) and suggest that there are different levels of SCI 
(Lee, 2000), to the best of my knowledge this is the first study that address both the issues.  
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In section 2, I discuss the primary 
dependent variable used in this study, and in section 3, I review some of the related 
literature on interfirm relationships, behavioral agency theory, and socioemotional wealth 
in the context of decision making. Subsequently in section 4, I develop the hypotheses to 
be tested in this study. The subsequent sections discuss the experimental design for this 
study, the methodology used, analyses, and present the results. The final part summarizes 
the results and recommend directions for future research. 
4.2 Primary Dependent Variable –Supply Chain Integration 
Supply chain scholars often measure interfirm relationships using the construct of 
supply chain integration (SCI). The term SCI is characterized by inconsistent definitions 
and dimensions (Tate et al., 2010). Some scholars treat SCI as a single construct (Cox, 
2001), while others focus on multiple dimensions of SCI (Leuschner et al., 2013; Nahapiet 
& Ghoshal, 1998; Peng et al., 2013; Rai & Bajwa, 1997), in particular internal-, customer-
, and supplier-integration. While these dimensions offer significant insights into research 
on SCI, the extant literature falls short in defining the term SCI. 
 Van der Vaart & van Donk (2010) suggest that the term SCI is captured by various 
practices, patterns, and attitudes. They suggest that supply chain practices are 
characterized by tangible activities, or technologies that play a critical role in the 
collaboration of a focal firm with its suppliers and/or customers. Examples include the 
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utilization of Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) and Vendor Managed Inventories (VMI). 
Moreover, they suggest that related to supply chain practices are supply chain patterns, or 
interaction patterns, between the focal firm and its suppliers and/or customers. Examples 
of interaction patterns include regular visits to the supplier's facility and frequent face-to-
face communication. Attitudes, they suggest, measure the feelings of buyers and/or 
suppliers towards each other or towards SCI in general. For instance, one such feeling is 
a customer’s view of their suppliers as an extension of their company. These categories 
help us group pre-existing measures of SCI in an effective fashion. The classification 
advanced by Van der Vaart & van Donk (2010) affords a useful classification to examine 
how existing empirical studies have captured SCI, yet it does not adequately resolve the 
ambiguity of the term SCI.  
SCI confounds the terms coordination and collaboration (Cao & Zhang, 2011; Lee, 
2000; Leuschner et al., 2013). Several studies suggest that there is a difference between 
coordination, collaboration, and integration (Cao & Zhang, 2011; Lee, 2000), but the 
differences between them are still very ambiguous. According to a report by Boston 
Consulting Group & Wharton (2006), supply chain coordination and collaboration are not 
sufficient to address the primary goal of supply chain management to have the right 
product at the right place at the right time at the right price. The report recommends that 
successful firms have now embraced SCI. It is important to note they suggest there is a 
difference between supply chain coordination, collaboration, and integration without, 
however, really delineating the differences between the three. In addition, Lee (2000) 
suggests that there is a difference between being coordinated and being integrated. 
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According to Lee (2000), coordination reflects information sharing, exchanging decision 
rights, work realignment, and resource sharing, while integration encompasses 
coordination and organizational linkages which facilitate sharing of risks, costs, and gains. 
The differentiation made by Lee (2000) is significant; however, the term collaboration is 
lost in the expression of coordination and integration. Also, a number of scholars have 
illustrated that collaboration is different from coordination (Bowersox et al., 2003; Zaheer 
et al., 1998b). Jap (1999) carried out a significant study towards this account. Jap (1999) 
suggests that collaboration is the combination of coordination efforts and joint investment 
in idiosyncratic resources. Although scholars acknowledge that there is a difference 
between the terms supply chain coordination, collaboration, and integration, these terms 
are frequently confused with each other (Cao & Zhang, 2011). A plausible reason for this 
confusion is the lack of an unambiguous definition for the constructs of supply chain 
coordination, supply chain collaboration, and SCI.  
I posit that SCI is an overarching term that encompasses different levels of 
interfirm relationships such as coordination, collaboration, and internalization shown in 
Figure 4-1. I draw upon the inter-personal relationship literature (e.g., Raven, 1992; Yukl, 
2010) to develop a rudimentary argument to support my claim. Kelman’s (1958) seminal 
paper suggests that changes in behavior produced by social influence may occur at 
different levels. He further suggests that the difference in the levels of change that occur 
correspond to differences in the processes by which an entity accepts influence. The 
different processes by which changes in behavior occur are compliance, identification, and 
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Figure 4-1: Levels of Interfirm Relationships (adapted from Lee, 2000) 
 
 
internalization (Kelman, 1958). Compliance is said to occur when an individual accepts 
influence because he/she hopes to achieve a favorable reaction from another person or 
group. Identification occurs when an individual adopts the induced behavior because 
he/she wants to be associated with the relationship. Finally, internalization occurs when 
an individual adopts the induced behavior because it is congruent with his/her value 
system and the behavior adopted via this way is integrated with an individual’s value 
system. The adoption of a certain behavior through internalization is permanent, and it 
changes the way an individual will react in the future to certain situations.  
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Although the influence occurs through three different processes, it is important to 
understand that the behavior obtained through compliance can be achieved through 
identification, and the behavior achieved through identification can be achieved through 
internalization, but the reverse is not possible. This is because the behavior through 
compliance is contingent upon extrinsic rewards and surveillance, while the behavior 
through identification is due to an individual’s personal interest to be associated with the 
influencing agents. Therefore, through identification, an individual might do more than 
what was necessary through surveillance due to his/her personal interests to maintain the 
relationship. Likewise, behaviors through internalization will be undertaken because the 
values of the individual and the values of the influencing agent are congruent (Burnes & 
New, 1997). Therefore, internalization can induce behaviors achieved through 
identification and more. Internalization of organizational values has been linked to 
elevated levels of commitment towards the organization (Burnes & New, 1997).  
Drawing upon the inter-personal influence literature to study organizations is not 
new. For example, scholars have utilized power, which was primarily considered to be an 
inter-personal influence mechanism, to study relationships between organizations (Benton 
& Maloni, 2005; Goo et al., 2008). Therefore, extrapolating this discussion to the context 
of a social network comprising of organizations sets the foundation for the explanation of 
the term SCI.  
I posit that the term coordination is associated with the most basic form of inter-
organizational relationships. Coordination is defined as the process of managing 
dependencies between firms (Malone & Crowston, 1994), and is primarily achieved 
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through contracts (Leuschner et al., 2013). If a firm is essentially coordinating and not 
collaborating, or internalizing, it implies that the firm is merely complying with the 
influencing firm based on contracts and will restrict its behaviors to what can be governed 
by contracts. Collaboration is the next level of interfirm relationships. Collaboration is a 
process by which two firms jointly work towards achieving common objectives (Stank, 
Keller, & Daugherty, 2001b). Collaboration includes coordination efforts and investments 
in idiosyncratic resources (Jap, 1999). Collaboration occurs when a firm is identifying 
itself with another firm, since it occurs under conditions of salience of a firm’s relationship 
with an influencing firm. A firm that is collaborating will also be coordinating based on 
the previously stated argument that behaviors through identification will encompass 
behaviors through compliance. 
Internalization is the highest level of interfirm relationship. It is achieved due to 
the internalization of values by the constituent firms. The behavior of firms that have 
internalized are in harmony with each other. Firms that have internalized their partner’s 
values perform desired actions regardless of surveillance or salience. Such firms can also 
exhibit leniency towards the other firm. These firms are purported to have the highest level 
of SCI. Internalization is the highest level of interfirm relationships followed by 
collaboration and then by coordination. A firm, however, cannot have internalization 
without collaboration and coordination. Similarly, a firm cannot have collaboration 
without coordination (see Figure 4-1). 
Importantly, internalization is riskier than collaboration, and collaboration is 
riskier than coordination. To augment this argument, a parallel is drawn between the three 
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levels of inter-firm relationship (i.e., internalization, coordination, and collaboration), and 
the evolution of relationship types amongst humans (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). Guerrero 
and Andersen (2003) illustrate the evolution of relationships through dating, engagement, 
and marriage. Although marriages are socially desirable in most cultures, marriages 
require the highest level of commitment in contrast to dating and engagement. Rapoport 
(1998 p.37) states that in marriages “an individual's social role changes, his image of 
himself is affected, the way in which others expect him to behave changes and his 
legitimate expectations for the behavior of others change.” 
 An individual’s investments are lower when dating (e.g., buying flowers) in 
contrast to when engaged (e.g., buying a ring), and similarly, the investments during 
married life (e.g., the effort put into coping with the responsibilities of marriage) are 
significantly higher than in the engagement phase. Likewise, the cost and ease of getting 
out of a date (e.g., cost of dinner and saying goodbye) might be lower in comparison with 
marriage (e.g., alimony to be paid after divorce, and complexity of a divorce).  
Now using the analogy between the levels of inter-firm relationships and the 
evolution of relationship types between individuals (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994), two 
aspects of internalization can be inferred. First, although internalization is desirable, 
internalization comes at a higher cost than collaboration or coordination. Second, it is 
more difficult for a firm to disentangle from an internalized relationship, as opposed to 
when it is coordinating. Thus, it is possible for SCEs to perceive internalization to be 
riskier than collaboration, and collaboration to be riskier than coordination.  
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4.3 Related Literature 
Within the context of the supply chain literature, SCI has been examined primarily 
at the firm level (e.g., Flynn et al. 2010), and at times at the SBU level (e.g., Peng et al., 
2013). Whereas these extant studies have contributed to our understanding of the factors 
that impact SCI (Autry & Golicic, 2010; Dollinger, Golden, & Saxton, 1997; Wong et al., 
2011; Zhao et al., 2008), a significant part of the puzzle has been left largely unexplored. 
There is scant empirical evidence in the extant literature that has examined the role of 
individual executives in the context of interfirm relationships. More recently supply chain 
scholars have recognized the need to consider executive decision making in the context of 
supply chain relationships (e.g., Ho & Zhang, 2008; Lim & Ho, 2007). As an example, 
Loch and Wu (2008) found that social preferences systematically influence managerial 
decision making in the context of supply chain transactions. Although, these studies have 
offered meaningful insights regarding managerial decision making, experimental studies 
to date have not made significant progress in corporate strategy related research (Croson 
et al., 2007). Furthermore, experimental studies related to supply chain management have 
particularly focused on loss aversion primarily due to economic incentives using game 
theoretic models, and have mostly ignored other intrinsic factors related to decision 
makers (Croson et al., 2007). In this study, I examine economic incentives in the form of 
variability in pay and an executive’s cognitive perceptions and values in the form of 
socioemotional wealth. 
I draw upon the BAM (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998) and BAIM (Keltner et 
al. 2003) to shed light regarding how managers opt for a specific level of SCI in the 
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presence of variability in base pay and socioemotional wealth. Wiseman and Gomez-
Mejia (1998) are credited with developing BAM. The BAM combines the elements of 
prospect and agency theory to explain executive risk taking. The BAM predicts that 
decision makers will be more risk averse to gains and risk seeking toward losses (Villena 
et al., 2009). BAM is widely used to study managerial risk taking under different 
compensation structures (Pathak, Hoskisson, & Johnson, 2013). 
Although economic factors to some extent determine the behavior of executives, 
they do not adequately predict managerial behavior. For instance, Jensen and Murphy 
(1990) found that executives do not effectively respond to changes in pay, i.e., their pay-
for-performance sensitivity was low, and suggested that non-economic factors need to be 
considered to fully explain an executive’s behavior. Executive compensation scholars 
have generally agreed upon the axiom that “executive compensation does not reside within 
a vacuum” (Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1998, p. 350). Several executive characteristics 
can impact the relationship between executive compensation and executive behavior 
(Carpenter et al., 2004; Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Tosi, Katz, & Gomez-Mejia, 1997). 
However, alarmingly, executive compensation research has yet to adequately capture the 
inherent factors describing executives that can perhaps meaningfully explain an 
executive’s behavior within organizations. The executive’s strategic decisions are 
influenced by his cognitions, perceptions and values (Carpenter et al., 2004). Along 
similar lines, this study captures variability in pay and socioemotional wealth of 
executives while examining their decision making with respect to interfirm relationships. 
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Historically, scholars believed that individuals with low socioemotional wealth 
tended to be more risk seeking (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006) than those who possess high 
levels of socioemotional wealth (Adler et al., 1994). However, a more recent and contrary 
view suggests that individuals with higher power, alike to high socioemotional wealth, are 
more optimistic, focus on positive outcomes more than negative outcomes, and feel less 
vulnerable to a negative outcome, and, therefore should be more risk seeking than 
individuals with low power (Keltner et al., 2003). Possessing high or low power should 
cause individuals to respond differently to a potential risky situation (Galinsky, Magee, 
Gruenfeld, Whitson, & Liljenquist, 2008). For example, individuals with high 
socioemotional wealth will focus more on the potential gains and less on potential losses 
in a given situation (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006). Therefore, high socioemotional wealth 
should increase optimism, which in turn leads to greater risk taking. Management scholars 
have argued that the decision maker’s tendency to maintain or elevate socioemotional 
wealth guides his or her decision making with respect to “organizational choices 
concerning management processes, firm strategies, corporate governance, stakeholder 
relations and business venturing”(Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011, p. 351)  
In the subsequent section I rely on the tenets of the BAM and the BAIM to develop 
my hypotheses for this study.  
4.4 Hypotheses Development 
4.4.1 Interfirm Relationships and Variability in Pay 
Internalization requires the greatest commitment in terms of time, resources, and 
effort as compared to coordination or collaboration (Leuschner et al., 2013). The high 
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investment cost for internalization makes the cost of failure the greatest. More often, the 
risk of internalizing with a customer is transferred from the firm to a supply chain 
executive who makes the decision through governance mechanisms (Villena et al., 2009). 
Although internalization is risky, empirical evidence regarding interfirm relationships has 
suggested that having close relationships in highly uncertain environments can improve a 
firm’s performance (Peng et al., 2013). For instance, Wong and Boon-itt (2012) suggested 
that close relationships among supply chain partners improve firm performance when 
uncertainty in the environment is high. Collectively, the extant literature has suggested 
that firms benefit from close interfirm relationships when uncertainty is high (Peng et al., 
2013). However, if the interests of the firm and the supply chain executives are not aligned, 
the supply chain executives might act in ways that detract from the firm’s performance 
(Tosi et al., 1997). Bloom and Milkovich (1998) concur, and suggest that executives do 
not necessarily make decisions that are in the best interest of their firm when they are 
faced with a high business risk (i.e., the uncertainty of future outcomes or events with 
respect to business decisions).  
Choosing high levels of SCI can be a risky decision for SCEs (Villena et al. 2009), 
but can enhance firm performance (Peng et al., 2013). However, if adequate incentive 
mechanisms are not present, SCEs might not act in the best interest of their firms. The 
BAM proposes the use of variable pay as an incentive mechanism to align the interest of 
an SCE with the firm (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998; Villena et al., 2009). BAM 
predicts that in a loss situation, SCEs will be more likely to engage in risk seeking 
behavior. For instance, Larraza-Kintana et al., (2007) demonstrate that when there is 
 180 
 
variability in pay, executives are more risk seeking. When executives experience 
variability in pay, they can perceive it to be a gain or a loss. However, elements of BAM 
suggest that individuals tend to weigh losses more heavily than gains, and thus executives 
are more likely to focus on the possible loss when they experience variability in pay. This 
induces higher risk seeking behavior, and, therefore prompts SCEs to engage in high levels 
of SCI. Thus I propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1. Supply chain executives experiencing high variability in pay are more 
likely to pursue internalization.  
4.4.2 Interfirm Relationships and Socioemotional Wealth 
Internalization is much riskier than coordination and collaboration but can have 
more lucrative better payoffs (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994, Villena et al. 2009). Traditional 
arguments regarding individuals ascribed with high socioemotional wealth have suggested 
that these individuals will be less likely to internalize because they value what they have 
and will try to preserve it by making risk-averse decisions (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006). 
Contrary to the traditional conception of socioemotional wealth, more recent studies 
(Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Keltner et al., 2003) have found that high socioemotional 
wealth increases risk seeking behavior. When individuals have high levels of 
socioemotional wealth they focus more on the positive outcomes and less on the negatives 
in a given situation and feel less susceptible to negative outcomes (Anderson & Berdahl, 
2002). Several other independent studies have attest that individuals with high 
socioemotional wealth are more likely to orient towards positive outcomes (Anderson & 
Galinsky, 2006). Individuals with high socioemotional wealth tend to perceive an 
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increased sense of personal control, which motivates them to view a given situation more 
optimistically than individuals with low socioemotional wealth (Galinsky et al., 2008). 
The increased optimism is reflected in the risky behaviors individuals with high 
socioemotional wealth undertake. Gomez-Mejia et al. (2007), for example, demonstrated 
that high socioemotional wealth can lead to more risk seeking behavior in the context of 
family-controlled firms.  
SCI can furnish valuable benefits if successful, but can lead to high costs in case 
of failure. Using the theoretical tenets of BAIM, SCEs with high socioemotional wealth 
are more likely to focus on the positive aspects of SCI while SCEs with low 
socioemotional wealth will more likely focus on the negative aspects of SCI. Thus, 
individuals with high socioemotional wealth are likely to seek high levels of SCI (Gómez-
Mejía et al., 2007). Therefore, I propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2. Supply chain executives with high socioemotional wealth are more likely 
to pursue internalization. 
4.4.3 Interfirm Relationships, Variability in Base Pay, and Socioemotional Wealth 
Much of the extant executive compensation literature has considered variability in 
pay without taking into consideration the socioemotional wealth of an executive (Gomez-
Mejia & Wiseman, 1997). There is a pressing need to consider the compensation 
mechanisms for executives along with their cognitions, perceptions, and values (Carpenter 
et al., 2004; Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997). Independently, BAM predicts that 
executives who experience variability in pay should be more inclined to seek high levels 
of SCI (i.e., internalize), and BAIM predicts that executives with high socioemotional 
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wealth are also likely to internalize. However, to examine the impact of variability in pay 
and socioemotional wealth on a SCE’s decision to engage in specific levels of SCI, I 
combine the BAM and the BAIM perspectives.  
BAIM suggests that individuals with high socioemotional wealth will emphasize 
the potential positives more heavily than the potential negatives in a given situation 
(Keltner et al., 2003). High socioemotional wealth increases the anticipated value of gains 
and reduces the anticipated value of losses (Inesi, 2010). Thus they are more likely to 
internalize (H2). However, if a SCE who possesses high levels of socioemotional wealth 
experiences high variability in pay, which can be perceived as gains or losses, he/she will 
tend to perceive it as a gain as opposed to as a loss (Larraza-Kintana et al., 2007). Since, 
they perceive variability in pay more optimistically than others who lack socioemotional 
wealth, they view variability in pay as a gain. According to BAM, SCEs in gain position 
are risk averse. So, although high socioemotional wealth executives tend to perceive SCI 
positively, the high variability in pay makes them slightly risk averse by inducing them to 
be in a gain situation. Thus they might opt for slightly lower levels of SCI than when they 
experienced only variability in pay or possessed only high socioemotional wealth. Thus, I 
hypothesize the following:  
Hypothesis 3. Supply chain executives with high variability in pay and high 
socioemotional wealth are less likely to internalize. 
4.5 Research Design 
To the best of my knowledge, there are no extant studies that have examined 
executive decision making in the context of interfirm relationships using experiments 
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despite there being calls to incorporate experimental methodology in corporate strategy 
research (Croson et al., 2007) and supply chain management research. Experiments enable 
researchers to infer the causal relation between related variables, thus providing a high 
degree of internal validity compared to other studies such as cross-sectional studies or 
even longitudinal studies.  
Several factors can influence the type of relationship among firms, such as their 
degree of interdependence, their financial stability, the type of product, and the industry 
(Heide & John, 1990). However, experiments help us isolate the effects of the variables 
of interest while controlling for the rest. One potential drawback of this method is the lack 
of generalizability (i.e., external validity). In order to overcome this problem, I conduct 
my experiment with practitioners from different industries.  
I undertook several rounds of pilot studies before administering the experiment to 
students in a behavioral lab and then to practitioners, using an online software, Qualtrics. 
I am primarily interested in examining the behavior of practitioners. However, I also report 
the analysis and results based on student data in Appendix-C. Corroborating evidence 
from the field and the lab renders credibility to my findings. 
4.6 Experimental Design 
 I employed a 2 x 2 full factorial between subjects design to test the hypotheses, 
which resulted in four design scenarios. I use a between-subjects design to ensure that 
there was no carryover effect among scenarios. Participants were randomly assigned to 
each condition. This resulted in a fairly even distribution of participants across the 
different conditions. The factors in the vignettes were orthogonal to each other (Carter & 
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Ellram, 2003), thus alleviating concerns about endogeneity. All the scenarios had a 
common script and a manipulation script. The common script prompted each participant 
to assume he/she is a supply chain executive in a large firm in the electronics industry that 
supplied parts which are critical to a large, financially stable customer. The sales to this 
customer contributed a significant proportion of their annual dollar sales volume. 
Participants were also informed that they had the authority to make decisions regarding 
their customer relationships assuming that there is some level of volatility in the market 
environment due to the nature of the industry (see Appendix-C). 
The experiment manipulated two variables: variability in pay and socioemotional 
wealth. Each of these was varied at two different levels: low and high. The manipulation 
script for high variability in pay stimulated participants to assume that their firm’s 
performance was highly inconsistent, resulting in their annual compensation being highly 
variable for the past few years. Similarly, the low variability scenario encouraged 
participants to assume that the firm’s performance had been relatively stable, and they had 
been receiving a stable annual income for the past few years. In order to manipulate an 
individual’s socioemotional wealth, I derived measures from Gomez-Mejia et al. (2011) 
and Keltner et al. (2003). I provided participants in the high socioemotional wealth 
condition with a statement that described them as individuals who had worked with the 
company for ten years, whose colleagues looked up to them when a crisis emerges, and 
whose top management viewed them favorably in comparison to their colleagues. On the 
contrary, participants with low socioemotional wealth read a statement that portrayed them 
as individuals who had been with the firm for only two years, who constantly sought the 
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help of their peers to perform their job, and who were not considered by top management 
to be those who always made the right decision.  
Following these manipulations, the participants were asked a series of questions 
regarding the type of a relationship that they desired to pursue with the customer given the 
scenario. In order to determine whether participants paid adequate attention to the 
questions, I placed an attention filter at the end the survey. The attention filter required the 
respondents to read five lines of text and follow specific instructions in the text to answer 
that particular question.  
4.7 Pilot Testing 
Prior to pilot testing my study, I discussed the relevancy of the study with 11 high 
level executives across industries. They included VPs and Directors of Supply Chain. I 
then completed two pilot rounds of my experiment with undergraduate business students 
before I administered the experiment to a new group of students and then practitioners. 
Collectively, I piloted the study with 400 undergraduate business students to ensure that 
the manipulations created the desired state of mind for the respondents, and also to ensure 
that the sequence of manipulation did not have an effect on how each individual perceived 
a scenario in the experiment.  
4.8 Sample 
I conducted the study using practitioners as my primary respondents. To obtain the 
consent of practitioners I corresponded with sponsors within several firms and briefed 
them about the study. The sponsors undertook the responsibility to carefully select the 
participants for this study. Sponsors screened participants by examining the functional role 
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within their organization and the knowledge domain of each individual. The sponsors then 
provided me with the contact information of the prospective participants for the study. 
Subsequently, I sent an email to the identified participants and solicited their participation. 
As an incentive for participation I provided each individual participants a $5 Starbucks 
gift card as a small token of appreciation. After screening out 41 observations through an 
attention filter, I obtained 125 usable observations for this experiment. The attention filter 
required participants to read a five line instruction, and select an option as suggested in 
the instruction and then type in “effort” as shown in Appendix-C.  
Table 4-1: Experiment Demographics 
 N Percentage 
Gender   
Female 43 34.4 
Male 82 65.6 
Total 125 100 
Age   
18-24 20 16..0 
25-34 59 47.2 
35-44 35 28.0 
45-54 7 5.6 
55-64 4 3.2 
Total 125 100 
Race   
Black or African American 1 0.8 
Hispanic or Latino 20 20.0 
Asian  6 4.8 
White 90 72.0 
Other 8 6.4 
Total   125 100 
Education   
Some College 8 6.4 
Associate’s Degree 4 3.2 
Bachelor’s Degree 84 67.2 
Master’s Degree 26 20.8 
Doctorate Degree 3 2.4 
Total 125 100 
 187 
 
Table 4-1: Continued 
 N Percentage 
Experience   
1 Year 11 8.8 
2 Years 23 18.4 
3 Years 16 12.8 
4 Years 13 10.4 
5 Years 4 3.2 
>5 Years 58 46.4 
Total 125 100 
Job Title   
Buyer/Procurement/Operations 
Specialist  
24 19.2 
Manager 57 45.6 
Business Analyst 9 7.2 
Director 4 3.2 
Other 31 24.8 
Total 125 100 
Table 4-1 provides demographic information regarding the participants. A large 
proportion of the practitioner sample was fairly young, (around 61.2% of my sample was 
between the age group of 18-34). The sample included more male than female individuals 
with males representing 65.6% and females representing 34.4% of the sample. Moreover, 
a large proportion of the sample, i.e., 46.4% had over 5 years of work experience.  
4.9 Manipulation Check 
A manipulation check informs the researcher whether the desired state of mind 
was created for each respondent. To examine whether the desired state of mind was created 
two manipulation check questions were asked at the end of the study (see Appendix-C). 
One manipulation check asked respondents to identify the type of individual (i.e., as one 
who possesses low or high socioemotional wealth respectively) described in the study, and 
the other manipulation check asked the participants to identify the variability in pay (i.e., 
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low or high) described in the scenario. A chi-square test comparing the observed and 
expected values for socioemotional wealth and variability in pay respectively was 
insignificant with p>0.10 indicating that the manipulations created the desired state of 
mind with the individuals.  
4.10 Risk Profile 
I posited based on the extant literature, that internalization is the riskiest while 
coordination is the least risky type of interfirm relationship. Collaboration, I argue lies in-
between coordination and internalization in terms risk associated with it for a SCE.  
The perception of risk is context specific (Dowling, 1986), and I determined 
whether the risk profile of the different levels of interfirm relationships, given a scenario, 
matched my theoretical conceptualization about the risk involved different levels of SCI. 
I developed a risk profile for the outcome variable based on the sample of 125 observations 
from practitioners. From Figure 4-2 it is evident that my conceptualization of the risk 
profile for different levels of SCI matched the perceptions of individuals participating in 
my study. 
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Figure 4-2: Risk Profile 
 
 
 
It is evident that a large majority of the population (67.2%) interpreted 
internalization as the most risky choice among the three levels of SCI. Similarly, a large 
proportion of the sample population selected coordination (57.6%) as the least risky option 
among collaboration and internalization while 67.2% chose collaboration in between 
coordination and internalization in terms of risk. 
4.11 Control Variables 
For this study, I identified several variables that potentially can confound my 
results, and controlled for them. For example factors such as product type (i.e., strategic 
or commodity) (Vanpoucke et al., 2014), relationship duration (Ring & Van de Ven, 
1994), and firm size (Koufteros et al., 2007) can influence the relationships developed by 
firms. These variables were implicitly controlled for in this study by describing them in 
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the common script presented to each participant, within their respective scenario. Certain 
individual level factors such as gender, financial and social risk attitudes of participants 
(Bearden & Netemeyer, 1999) were explicitly measured and controlled for in this study.  
4.12 Analysis and Results 
4.12.1 Ordered Logistic Regression 
Logit models have been widely used to examine managerial decision making under 
different circumstances. The ordinal nature of the dependent variable (i.e., coordination, 
collaboration, and internalization) in my study guided me to use ordered logistic 
regression (Ologit) for the analysis. Although I tried to balance the distribution of 
scenarios, and since the distribution was randomly carried using the software, Qualtrics, I 
ended up with slightly unbalanced cell counts. Logit models come under the class of 
generalized linear models (GLM) and are acceptable for analyzing unbalanced data 
(Jaeger, 2008). The Ologit model used here examines the impact of variability-in-pay, 
socioemotional wealth, and their interaction after controlling for gender, financial 
performance of the firm in the scenario, and social and financial risk taking attitudes of 
the participants. I control for the inherent risk taking attitudes of individuals by controlling 
for their social and financial risk taking attitudes. The model is specified as follows:  
Logit(p(Y))=α+β1(socioemotional wealth)+β2(variability in pay) + β3(socioemotional 
wealth*variability in pay)+ gender + firm performance+ social risk taking attitude+ 
financial risk taking attitude+ e  ----- (1) 
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The dependent variable (Y) captures the specific level of SCI that a participant 
decides to pursue with the customer in a respective scenario. It assumed values of ‘1’, ‘2’, 
or ‘3’ depending upon whether the participant is willing to coordinate, collaborate or 
internalize. The variable socioemotional wealth is a binary measure that represents the 
level of socioemotional wealth. The socioemotional wealth variable received a value of 
‘0’ for low socioemotional wealth, and ‘1’ for high socioemotional wealth scenarios. 
Variability in pay is also a binary measure that captures whether the participant in a 
scenario experienced low (0) or high variability (1) in pay. The firm performance of the 
organization was embedded in the scenario and was captured using a binary measure while 
the respondent social and financial risk taking attitudes were captured on a seven point 
Likert scale.  
I used the ordered logistic regression method via SPSS 21 to analyze the 
practitioners’ data. Since Ologit bases its calculations on the ordinal nature of the data, the 
results are the same for any monotonic transformation of the original dependent variable. 
In order to evaluate the model, I first examined for model fitting information using a Log 
likelihood ratio test. A significant Log Likelihood ratio test indicates that the full model is 
significantly better than the base intercept only model. Furthermore, it is necessary to 
check for the proportional odds assumption in the model. The proportional odds 
assumption implies that the odds of moving from one level to another in the dependent 
variable does not vary. This assumption is tested using the test for parallel lines. In the test 
of parallel lines, I do not wish to reject the null hypotheses which suggests that the odds 
of moving from one level to another in the dependent variable is not different.  
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4.12.2 Ordinal Logistic Regression Results 
Based on the analysis I find that the model is well fitting (𝜒2=15.748, p<0.05, see 
Table 4-2). I find evidence to suggest that the model is significantly better than the base 
intercept only model. I obtain a Nagelkerke R-Square value of 0.140. This suggest that the 
variables in the model explain 14% of the variance of the dependent variable, SCI. Table 
4-3 provides the results for the test of proportional odds assumption in the model. I find 
that the Log Likelihood Ratio test is insignificant (𝜒2=5.029, p>.10). This suggests that 
the odds do not change across groups and thus it is appropriate to use the Ologit model. 
The results for the Ologit model are provided on Table 4-4.  
Table 4-2: Model Fitting Information 
Study Model  -2Log Likelihood Chi-
Square  
Sig. Nagelkerke  
R-Square 
Overall Sample Null Hypotheses 
 
General 
225.055 
 
209.307 
 
15.748 
 
0.025 
 
0.140 
Post-Hoc: Low 
Age 
Null Hypotheses 
 
General 
148.982 
 
129.627 
 
19.355 
 
 
0.007 
 
0.255 
Post-Hoc: High 
Age 
Null Hypotheses 
 
General 
79.813 
 
66.474 
 
13.340 
 
0.064 
 
0.304 
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Table 4-3: Test of Parallel Lines 
Study Model  -2Log Likelihood Chi-Square  Sig. 
Overall Sample Null Hypotheses 
 
General 
209.307 
 
204.278 
 
5.029 
 
0.656 
Post-Hoc: Low 
Age 
Null Hypotheses 
 
General 
129.627 
 
125.107 
 
4.520 
 
0.718 
Post-Hoc: High 
Age 
Null Hypotheses 
 
General 
66.474 
 
56.750 
 
9.724 
 
0.205 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4-4: Ordinal Regression Results 
 Study: 
Overall Sample 
Post-Hoc: 
 Low Age 
Post-Hoc: 
High Age 
 Thresholds 1.382 2.032 0.532 
 
Main Effects 
 
 4.541 5.324 4.495 
Socioemotional Wealth   Low vs. High -0.548 -1.704* 2.255* 
Variability in Pay 
 
Interaction Effect 
 
Socioemotional Wealth 
x Variability in Pay  
 
Low vs. High 
 
 
 
Low vs. High 
-1.228* 
 
 
 
0.619 
-2.098* 
 
 
 
1.874† 
-0.117 
 
 
 
-1.821 
Controls 
 
     
Gender Female vs. 
Male 
0.430 0.962† -0.983 
Financial Performance   0.443** 0.538** 0.458 
Financial Risk Attitude   0 .192† 0.071 0.593** 
Social Risk Attitude  0.119 0.137 0.145 
Notes: † p<0.1. *p<0.05. **p<0.01            
 
The first hypothesis predicts that individuals who experience variability in pay are 
more risk seeking than individuals who do not experience variability-in-pay, and therefore 
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they are more likely to seek internalization. A negative beta implies that there is a higher 
chance for moving to a higher value of the dependent variable for a unit increase in the 
independent variable. From Table 4-4, I observe that an increase in variability-in-pay will 
result in a higher probability of internalization (β= -1.228, p<.05). However I do not find 
support for hypothesis 2 (β= -0.548, p>.10) and Hypothesis 3 (β= 0.649, p>0.10). This 
seems to suggest that socioemotional wealth does not have any effect on executive 
decision making in the context of interfirm relationships. 
4.12.3 Robustness Check- ANCOVA 
An ANCOVA analysis was conducted by using the sample of 125 observations. 
Table 4-5 provides the ANCOVA analysis results for the effect of socioemotional wealth, 
variability in pay and their interaction effects on SCI after taking the covariates into 
consideration. In the analysis I find that consistent with the Ologit analysis, only the main 
effect of variability in pay had a significant impact on executive decision making. 
In order to better interpret the ANCOVA results, I plotted variability in pay and 
socioemotional wealth against the outcome variable of SCI. From Figure 4-3, I find that 
at low variability in pay individuals with high socioemotional wealth have marginally 
higher values of integration than individuals who have low levels of socioemotional 
wealth. However, there is clearly no difference in the values of SCI for individuals who 
experience high variability in pay and high socioemotional wealth with individuals who 
experience high variability in pay and have low socioemotional wealth. Furthermore, the 
slopes for variability in pay and SCI are not markedly different among individuals with 
low and high socioemotional wealth. Figure 4-3 also suggests that there is a significant 
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increase in the values of SCI for individuals who experience high variability in pay from 
individuals who experience low variability in pay among individuals who experience 
either high or low socioemotional wealth. 
Figure 4-3: Overall Sample ANCOVA Plot 
 
 
These results suggest that as the variability in pay increases, there is an increase in 
the value of the outcome variable, SCI. This is indicative of the shift towards risk taking 
behavior among SCEs as the variability in pay increases. Collectively interpreting the 
ANCOVA results from Table 4-5 and Figure 4-3, there seems to be an insignificant effect 
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of socioemotional wealth on SCI and the interaction effect does not appear to be 
significant. However, the variability in pay appears to have a significant effect on the SCI. 
Table 4-5: ANCOVA Results 
DV=SCI Study: 
 Overall Sample 
Post-Hoc:  
Low Age 
Post-Hoc:  
High Age 
 F-statistic Sig. F-statistic Sig. F-statistic Sig. 
Corrected Model 2.168 0.042 2.795 0.013 1.771 0.122 
Intercept 9.664 0.002 4.173 0.045 5.140 0.029 
Socioemotional Wealth .464 0.497 1.836 0.180 3.149 0.084 
Variability in Pay 3.740 0.056 3.919 0.052 0.768 0.386 
Socioemotional Wealth x 
Variability in Pay 
0.373 0.542 3.115 0.082 1.353 0.252 
 
Gender 1.198 0.276 3.842 0.054 1.500 0.228 
Financial Performance 7.264 0.008 7.240 0.009 1.314 0.259 
Financial Risk Attitude 3.348 0.070 0.339 0.562 8.236 0.007 
Social Risk Attitude 0.604 0.439 0.495 0.484 0.341 0.563 
R-Square 0.115 0.216 0.246 
4.13 Post-Hoc Analysis  
The results of this study were not as predicted or suggested in the study with 
students (see Table C-4 in Appendix-C). Further, studies have demonstrated that age 
should attenuate the effect of incentives by reducing the negativity bias associated with 
incentive framing (Mather & Carstensen, 2005; Vroom & Pahl, 1971). In order to further 
examine the cause of the discrepancy in results I conducted post-hoc analysis by splitting 
the sample with practitioners into two groups, low age group (i.e., age ≤ 34) and high age 
group (age>34), and subsequently performed Ologit and ANCOVA analysis. The low age 
group had 79 observations while the high age group had 46 observations. 
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4.13.1 Ordinal Logistic Regression  
Based on the analysis for the low age group, I find that the model fit is acceptable 
(𝜒2=19.355, p<0.05, see Table 4-2), and I also find evidence to suggest that the model is 
significantly better than the base intercept only model. I obtained a Nagelkerke R-Square 
value of 0.255. This suggest that the variables in the model explain 25.5% of the variance 
of the dependent variable, SCI. Table 4-3 provides the results for the test of proportional 
odds assumption in the model. I find that the Log Likelihood Ratio test is insignificant 
(𝜒2=4.520, p>.10). This indicates that the odds do not change across groups and thus it is 
appropriate to use the Ologit model. The results of the Ologit model with the low age 
group and high age group are presented in Table 4-4. Hypotheses 1 (β= -1.704, p<.05), 2 
(β= -2.098, p<.05), and 3 (β= 1.874, p<.05) were supported in the context of the low age 
group sample. Similarly, I conducted the analysis for the high age group and found that 
the model fit is also acceptable (𝜒2=13.340, p<0.10, see Table 4-2). Here, I obtained a 
Nagelkerke R-Square value of 0.304. This suggest that the variables in the model explain 
30.4% of the variance of the dependent variable, SCI. Table 4-3 provides the results for 
the test of proportional odds assumption in the model. I find that the Log Likelihood Ratio 
test is insignificant (𝜒2=9.724, p>.10). This indicates that the odds do not change across 
groups and thus it is appropriate to use the Ologit model. The results of the Ologit with 
the high age group are presented in Table 4-4. For this sample, I find that only 
socioemotional wealth was a significant predictor of executive decision making with 
respect to inter-firm relationships (β= 2.255, p<.05). The sign of the coefficient for 
socioemotional wealth in the high age group sample was the opposite of what was obtained 
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in the low age group sample and the a priori prediction. This indicates that older 
individuals react differently to socioemotional wealth. In this case, older individuals were 
willing to take less risk even if they had high socioemotional wealth. 
4.13.2 Robustness Check- ANCOVA 
ANCOVA analysis was performed for the low age and the high age groups as a 
part of the post-hoc analysis. Table 4-5 provides the ANCOVA analysis results for the 
effect of socioemotional wealth, variability in pay, and their interaction effect on SCI for 
both the groups. For the low age group, I find that the main effect of variability in pay (F 
= 3.919, p<.05) and the interaction of variability in pay and socioemotional wealth (F = 
3.115, p<.10) are significant. However, I do not find evidence to support the main effect 
of socioemotional wealth. On the other hand when I examine the results of the high age 
group, I find that the main effect of socioemotional wealth is significant (F= 3.149, p<.10) 
while the main effect of variability in pay and the interaction term are not significant. The 
ANCOVA analysis results are consistent with the Ologit analysis with the exception of 
socioemotional wealth, which was insignificant in the low age group while using 
ANCOVA but significant when examined using Ologit.  
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Figure 4-4: Low Age Group ANCOVA Plot 
 
Figure 4-5: High Age Group ANCOVA Plot 
 
In order to better interpret the ANCOVA results, I plotted variability in pay and 
socioemotional wealth against the outcome variable SCI. From Figure 4-4, for the low age 
 200 
 
group sample, for individuals with low variability in pay there seems to be a marked 
increase in the value of integration for the high socioemotional wealth individuals 
compared to the low socioemotional wealth individuals. In addition, for both the high and 
low socioemotional group of individuals, variability in pay seems to have a positive effect. 
However, the slope relating variability in pay and SCI seems to be steeper for low 
socioemotional wealth than for high socioemotional wealth group individuals. Figure 4-4 
also reveals that individuals with high socioemotional wealth and high variability in pay 
seem to opt higher levels of SCI than individuals possessing high socioemotional wealth 
and do not experience variability in pay. Furthermore, I find from Figure 4-4 that 
individuals possessing high socioemotional wealth and experiencing high variability in 
pay are likely to opt lower levels of SCI than individuals with low socioemotional wealth 
and experiencing high variability in pay. Collectively interpreting the ANCOVA results 
from the Table 4-5 and the Figure 4-4, I find that high variability in pay significantly 
increases the possibility of executives opting for SCI. However with regards to 
socioemotional wealth it appears that high socioemotional wealth increases the probability 
of executives opting for high SCI from Figure 4-4, but the ANCOVA results from Table 
4-5 suggests that this increase is not significant. Figure 4- 4 and Table 4-5 also suggest 
that interaction effect between socioemotional wealth and variability in pay is significant.  
 Examining the plot for the high age group sample in Figure 4-5, among 
individuals who experience low variability in pay, I clearly see a marked decrease in the 
value of SCI for individuals with high socioemotional wealth compared those with low 
socioemotional wealth. Furthermore, individuals with low socioemotional wealth 
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experiencing high variability in pay do not seem to differ in their choice SCI level pursued 
from those individuals with low socioemotional wealth experiencing low variability in 
pay. The level of SCI pursued by individuals who experience high variability in pay and 
have high socioemotional wealth is higher than what is pursued by individuals who do not 
experience variability in pay but possess high socioemotional wealth. This is reflected by 
the positive slope relating variability in pay and SCI for high socioemotional wealth 
individuals. Furthermore, the level of SCI opted for by individuals with low 
socioemotional wealth and experiencing high variability in pay is higher than what is 
pursued by individuals with high socioemotional wealth experiencing high variability in 
pay. Collectively interpreting the ANCOVA results from Table 4-5 and Figure 4-5 suggest 
that high variability in pay does not significantly influence the possibility of executives 
opting for high levels of SCI, and socioemotional wealth seems to decrease the probability 
of executives opting for SCI. Figure 4-5 and Table 4-5 further suggest that interaction 
effect between socioemotional wealth and variability in pay is not significant.  
4.14 General Discussion 
I use two theoretical models, BAM and BAIM, to examine how managers make 
decisions with respect to inter-firm relationships. BAM predicts that, ceteris paribus, 
individuals who experience high variability-in-pay will be more risk seeking than 
individuals who experience low variability-in-pay. Thus, individuals with high variability-
in-pay are more likely to seek internalization as a form of their relationship with their 
customers. Similarly, BAIM suggests that individuals with higher socioemotional wealth 
will exhibit more risk seeking behavior, as opposed to individuals with lower 
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socioemotional wealth, and thus they are more likely to internalize. However, I argue that 
considering these factors independently does not provide a holistic perspective on strategic 
decision making. Thus, I combined the perspectives of BAM and BAIM and examined 
the interaction effect of variability in pay and socioemotional wealth on executive decision 
making in the context of interfirm relationships.  
To test the hypotheses, I conducted an experiment with supply chain practitioners 
to investigate executive decision making. However, I had also administered the 
experiment to business students prior to administering it to practitioners. The experiment 
offers us the potential to isolate the effects of interest, in this case the impact of variability 
in pay and socioemotional wealth on executive decision making. The experiment was set 
up as a fully crossed 2x2 traditional design. The results from the practitioner based sample 
supported only the hypothesis related to variability in pay. This result was only partially 
predicted by the theory, and partially supported by the results from student based data (see 
Table C-4 in Appendix-C). An in-depth examination of the results based on splitting the 
practitioner sample by age yielded interesting results. The results from the low age group 
sample were consistent with the results obtained based on student sample (compare Table-
4 with Table C-4 in Appendix-C) and supported all the hypotheses in the study. The results 
from the high age group sample indicated that socioemotional wealth was the only 
significant predictor of executive decision making in the context of interfirm relationships. 
These results suggest that age attenuates the negativity bias associated with variability in 
pay. The results are also consistent with the recent findings that age diminishes negativity 
bias (Goldsmith & Dhar, 2013) .Furthermore, I find that socioemotional wealth, among 
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the high age group, had the opposite effect to what was anticipated. Older individuals with 
socioemotional wealth were risk averse while younger individuals with the same 
socioemotional wealth were risk seeking by opting for lower levels of SCI and high levels 
of SCI respectively.  
4.15 Conclusion 
In today’s competitive environment firms are increasingly relying on other firms 
in their supply chain to develop distinctive competitive advantage (Dyer & Singh, 1998). 
Firms try to engage in relationships with their supply chain partners, where these 
progressively become strategic. Yet, there has been limited research regarding how SCEs 
make strategic decisions in the context of interfirm relationships. Agency theorists have 
long argued that the interests of individual decision makers within organizations should 
be aligned with those of the firm (Eisenhardt, 1989). Several incentive mechanisms have 
been developed to align the interests of the firm and the individual (Wiseman & Gomez-
Mejia, 1998). Variability in pay contingent on firm performance is one such prominent 
incentive alignment mechanism (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). Jensen and Murphy 
(1999) suggest that it is not how much you pay, but how. They find that incentive 
mechanisms through variability in pay did not have the desired effects on individual 
decision makers. Compensation contracts often fail to consider the personal attributes of 
individuals while trying to align the interest of the decision maker with that of the firm 
(Tosi et al., 1997). I extend Jensen and Murphy’s (1990) argument in this article to suggest 
that is not sufficient to consider how much you pay, and how you pay, but it is necessary 
to consider to whom you are paying. This study addresses the recent call in the 
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compensation literature that suggests “executive compensation does not reside in a 
vacuum” (Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1998, p.350). Further, the strategic decisions of 
executives within organizations are influenced by executives’ cognitions, perceptions and 
values. Towards this end, this study is one of the first to consider the socioemotional 
wealth of an individual while simultaneously examining the compensation mechanism in 
strategic decision making within the context of SCI.  
This research contributes to the SCI literature and practice. A recent study by 
Villena et al. (2011), using a survey of managers, suggests that as the variability in pay 
increases managers are more likely to seek supply chain integration. The Ologit results 
based on the overall practitioner sample suggests that increasing variability in pay 
increases an executive’s inclination to achieve high levels of SCI. With the overall sample 
I did not find that socioemotional wealth or the interaction between socioemotional wealth 
and variability in pay to be significant predictor of executive decision making in terms of 
SCI. The results were not as predicted by BAM and BAIM, or consistent with the results 
obtained from the student sample which matched the predictions. Moreover, theory also 
suggests that age can diminish the effect of incentives by reducing negativity bias 
associate with incentive framing. This prompted us to conduct a post-hoc analysis. The 
post-hoc analysis of the practitioner sample suggested that variability in pay increases an 
executive’s inclination to integrate but only among young individuals. I found that 
variability in pay was not an effective means to align the interest of older individuals with 
the firm. In addition to the difference in the impact of variability in pay between the young 
and old individuals on SCI, I find that young individuals possessing higher socioemotional 
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wealth are more likely to seek internalization, which is riskier than coordination and 
collaboration. However, with older individuals, socioemotional wealth seems to enhance 
the risk averse behavior of individuals and thereby prompting them to opt low levels of 
SCI. The findings with respect to the young practitioners were comparable to the results 
obtained from the student sample (compare results from Table 4-4 and Table C-4 in 
Appendix-C). This similarity renders greater credibility to the findings through 
triangulation. While organizations seek to employ SCI as a means to achieve competitive 
advantage, organizations need to realize that the incentives for SCEs need to be structured 
by considering taking the cognitive biases, perceptions and values of an SCE into 
consideration.  
Furthermore, studies have shown that the effect of incentives on risk seeking 
behavior can diminish with age (Goldsmith & Dhar, 2013). For instance, among young 
adults extreme negative images produced greater brain activation compared to equally 
positive images whereas among older adults this effect was not observed (Ito, Larsen, 
Smith, & Cacioppo, 1998). This suggests that younger were more sensitive to negatives 
while older adults were not. Along similar lines, studies have shown that attention to 
negative events reduces with age, (Isaacowitz, Wadlinger, Goren, & Wilson, 2006), but 
not so for positive events (Kennedy, Mather, & Carstensen, 2004). In my study, I find that 
age can impact how executives perceive variability in pay, and the emphasis that they give 
to negative outcomes associated variability in pay, which influences their overall decision 
to engage in SCI.  
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Another contribution of this study is examining inter-firm relationships by 
considering them at different levels of a larger construct, SCI. Much of the extant literature 
on inter-firm relationships has primarily sought to describe SCI using a single level 
construct. However, a better understanding of the different nuances in inter-firm 
relationships provides greater insights into understanding the phenomenon. Particularly in 
this study, coordination, collaboration, and internalization are all perceived at different 
levels of risk and benefits associated with them. Understanding the role of variability in 
pay and socioemotional wealth under this conceptualization of SCI provides useful 
insights to devise appropriate incentive mechanisms for executives to engage in SCI.  
This study has some limitations, but they present opportunities for future research. 
Generalizability is still a major concern in experimental studies, and mine is no exception. 
Survey studies that capture the socioemotional wealth and variability-in-pay of supply 
chain executives and their decision making will render more credibility into my findings. 
Furthermore, in light of the recent findings, compensation scholars can examine the impact 
of different incentive mechanisms to align the interest of executives with their firms. Also, 
supply chain scholars can incorporate the cognitive factors such as socioemotional wealth 
of executives while examining game theoretical models. Another potential direction for 
future research is to examine the role of socioemotional wealth and variability-in-pay in 
other contexts such as inventory management.  
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5                      CHAPTER V 
OVERALL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
5.1 Introduction 
Supply chain integration (SCI) is perceived to be a panacea that can be deployed 
to resolve several supply chain challenges. A plethora of studies have examined SCI over 
the last two decades, and yet I demonstrate through this dissertation that there is a lot to 
be accomplished in terms of understanding the phenomenon. I contribute to the SCI 
literature via three related and yet distinct studies. All the three studies were guided by 
one broad question:  how to effectively manage and achieve supply chain integration. In 
the process of answering this broad research question, I identified three potential gaps in 
the extant SCI literature that were addressed with this dissertation. I used an array of 
different methods ranging from qualitative, survey and experimental research to 
adequately respond to the research questions. However, I conclude on the note that I have 
taken a small step towards understanding SCI while a considerable amount of future 
research is still desired in the area of SCI. I provide a brief summary for my studies and 
reiterate some conclusions and directions for future research presented earlier in the 
respective chapters, and subsequently provide a more holistic perspective based on all 
three studies.  
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5.2 Study-1 
5.2.1 Summary 
My first research question pertains to the examination of the distinct behaviors 
exhibited by firms engaging in SCI. In order to address this research question, I employ a 
grounded theory (GT) methodology to analyze data obtained from several interviews 
across multiple firms. Based on this work, I provide a stipulative definition of SCI and 
identify the idiosyncratic characteristics associated with SCI. This work suggests that 
firms engaging in SCI widely exhibit a set of six behavioral patterns, which vary in degree. 
The six behavioral patterns are identified as monitoring, relational investments, 
knowledge sharing, joint activities, vision sharing, and adaptability in relationships.  
Based on the degree of specific behavioral combinations, I conjecture that SCI exists at 
three different levels which include coordination, collaboration, and internalization. 
Among the three levels of SCI, coordination is the most rudimentary form while 
internalization is coined as the most evolved form of SCI. Collaboration is invariably 
perceived as standing in between the other two forms. I also found that companies progress 
from coordination to internalization through collaboration. This research endeavor 
specifically sheds light on the different attributes or behaviors exhibited by firms at each 
level of SCI. I conjecture that if firms would like to achieve high levels of SCI, they would 
have to achieve high levels of internalization, which implies that firms have to exhibit 
characteristics that go above and beyond of what they do at their coordination or 
collaboration levels.  
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5.2.2 Conclusion and Directions for Future Research 
The theoretical framework I posit can be used to drive measurement instruments 
for subsequent studies on SCI. Proposing a framework for SCI enables additive empirical 
research by theoretically delineating its levels and their respective idiosyncratic nuances 
while drawing the differences between the concepts of SCI, coordination, and 
collaboration. This research also contributes to practice. Several organizations from 
different industries were purposefully selected to be representative units in my study in 
order to make the findings as generalizable as possible. My research presents a broad set 
of characteristics that are exhibited by firms at different levels of SCI. This provides 
managerial insights by specifying the diverse practices that firms engage in while pursuing 
coordination, collaboration, and internalization. Furthermore, this research also suggests 
engaging in activities that develop trust and commitment in followers can have a 
significant impact in the evolution of SCI from coordination to internalization. Managers 
need to focus on trust and commitment building initiatives among supply chain partners.  
This study only captures ongoing relationships at the time of my research. It does 
not seek to examine the factors that contribute to the demise of an ongoing relationship, 
neither does it track the process of termination. For instance, internalized relationships can 
decline through collaboration, and coordination before being terminated, or can directly 
decline from internalization to coordination, or seize to exist all together. Understanding 
the effective ‘relationship reversal process’ can provide meaningful insights to 
practitioners to reduce their loss in the event of SCI failure.        
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Through this research I came to the conclusion that relationships do not necessarily 
evolve from one level to the next in a set time interval that is common across firms or 
industries. Similarly, a firm might transition from coordination to collaboration much 
faster, as compared to the time it takes for firms to progress from collaboration to 
internalization. Also, I noticed that certain firms achieve internalization (moving from 
collaboration) faster than others.  How and what causes such differences in transition is 
not adequately captured in this study and should be addressed in future research. This is a 
critical issue for academic research as several studies employ “relationship duration” as a 
proxy for the strength of relationship (Bolton, 1998) and this might not be apposite given 
that I found that duration of the relationship does not always explain SCI levels. Some 
companies evolve from coordination all the way to internalization in a year while others 
may take 12-15 years.  
Based on my interviews I acknowledge the critical role that trust plays in the 
evolution of SCI. Future research should attempt to address the exact nature of trust (i.e., 
contractual, competence, and goodwill) that is salient at different levels of SCI. Also 
scholars should examine the role of different types of organizational cultures (e.g., the 
competing values framework proposed by Cameron and Quinn (2011) in the evolution of 
SCI. For instance, Cameron and Quinn (2011) propose four types of organizational 
cultures (i.e., clan, adhocracy, market, and hierarchy) that “differentiate an orientation 
toward flexibility, discretion, and dynamism from an orientation toward stability, order, 
and control” (Kessler, 2013, p. 123).  Ascertaining the most effective type of 
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organizational culture for successfully engaging in SCI can prove to be useful to 
practitioners.   
Future research on SCI should seek to conduct longitudinal and in-depth case-
studies by tracking specific relationships over time in order to ascertain the evolution of 
SCI more systematically. 
5.3 Study-2 
5.3.1 Summary 
In the second study I develop a theoretical framework that examines the 
relationship between leadership behavior styles and SCI and test it via survey-based 
approach that included the collection of data from several industries. I draw upon the 
Transformational Leadership Theory (TLT) and the Social Exchange Theory (SET) to 
propose that the level of SCI a supplier is willing to pursue with its customer rests on the 
type of commitment (affective or continuance) the supplier has for its customer, which is 
dependent on the level of trust the supplier holds for its customer. In turn, I posit that the 
level of trust is subject to the type of customer leadership behavior (transformational or 
transactional). In other words, I postulate a mediational model. I employ structural 
equations modeling (SEM) to analyze data obtained from 207 firms via survey 
methodology. My results suggest that the customer’s transformational leadership behavior 
appears to positively influence trust which impacts affective commitment. Affective 
commitment is found to engender high levels of SCI. Furthermore, no statistical evidence 
was found to suggest that transactional leadership behaviors positively influence trust. I 
also find that continuance commitment is positively related to SCI, which is opposite to 
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the hypothesized relationship. A plausible explanation for this finding is that suppliers 
with continuance commitment might engage in some degree of SCI to salvage some 
benefit from their existing relationship with customers.  
5.3.2 Conclusion and Directions for Future Research 
Stock, Boyer, and Harmon (2010) note that “researchers examined channel 
captains in traditional and vertically integrated distribution systems, but supply chain 
management (SCM) researchers have yet to apply that knowledge to managing the supply 
chain” (p.39). They call for research on supply chain leadership. Harland, Caldwell, 
Powell, and Zheng (2007) find that customer leadership can have a significant positive 
impact on supply chain information integration. They also call for further research to 
examine the leadership styles that specifically enhance SCI. My study empirically 
demonstrates the role that leadership behavior style plays in achieving high levels of SCI, 
and finds that transformational leadership is an effective way undertaken by customers to 
develop high levels SCI. My findings are partially corroborated by Hult et al. (2000) who 
find that transformational leadership can positively influence relationship commitment of 
exchange partners.  
Customers exhibiting transformational leadership are sensitive to suppliers’ needs 
and contributions, and engage with suppliers in ways that develop self-worth and self-
belief, which are crucial as they engender trust and affective commitment. Most customers 
continuously strive to gain the commitment of their suppliers. My research clearly 
demonstrates the leadership path by which customers can achieve high levels of 
commitment from their suppliers and thereby elicit high levels of SCI.  
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Using contingent rewards is a widely advocated practice within organizations and 
in supply chains but my study demonstrates that contingent reward behavior did not have 
a significant impact in the development of trust in suppliers. However, this result should 
be interpreted with caution.  The relationship between customers’ contingent reward 
behaviors and trust can be fully mediated by suppliers’ perception of customers’ intrinsic 
motives (Dirks & Ferrin, 2002). Additional studies are required to understand the exact 
nature of relationship between customers’ contingent reward behaviors on inducing 
suppliers’ trust. 
MacKenzie, Podsakoff, and Rich (2001) suggest that effective leaders tend to 
exhibit both transformational and transactional leadership behaviors. For example, it is 
possible for a customer to provide individualized consideration to its suppliers, and at the 
same time reward them for specific tasks accomplished. In my study, both leadership 
behaviors were examined in isolation of each other. It is however possible that customers 
can exhibit both transactional and transformational leadership behaviors simultaneously 
and therefore the interaction effect between them needs to be accounted in future research.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
While this research makes significant contributions, caution should be taken in 
interpreting the results. The influence of customer leadership behavior on suppliers can be 
contingent on several external factors such as the environmental uncertainty, supplier 
concentration, and power disposition (Yukl, 2010). Future studies should examine the role 
of customer leadership behaviors in the realm of other constraining or enabling factors of 
leadership (Bass & Bass, 2009).  Antonakis, Avolio, and Sivasubramaniam (2003) suggest 
that transformational leadership can be context specific. Certain transformational 
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leadership behaviors might be more effective than others contingent upon the context in 
which they are being operated (Schriesheim, Wu, & Scandura, 2009). Future research can 
focus on identifying the effectiveness of specific transformational leadership behaviors 
(e.g., individualized consideration) under different contexts e.g., at high and low 
environmental uncertainty.  
 Although this study did not consider the role of leadership within supplier firms, 
it can have a significant impact in the development of SCI (Defee et al., 2010).  Carpenter 
et al. (2004) suggest that organizational behaviors are a mirror of its leadership, and to 
gain a better understanding of customer leadership behaviors’ effectiveness in achieving 
SCI, supplier firms’ leadership behaviors should also be closely examined. 
5.4 Study-3 
5.4.1 Summary 
In the third study I argue that SCI exists at three different levels (i.e., coordination, 
collaboration, and internalization) and suggest that internalization appears to evoke or 
reflect the highest level of risk for decision makers, while it is also credited with the 
greatest returns. On the other hand, I posit that coordination entails the lowest level of risk 
while yielding however the lowest levels of returns. I employ two behavioral theories, i.e., 
Behavioral Agency Model (BAM) and Behavioral Approach and Inhibition Model 
(BAIM), in order to frame the research question regarding SCEs decision making 
behavior. I synthesize the two theories, and specify two variables (i.e., Variability in Pay 
and Socioemotional Wealth) as potential explanatory variables of SCE decision making. 
Using the theoretical tenets of BAM and BAIM, I postulate that variability in pay and 
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socioemotional wealth impact behavior in specific directions respectively and collectively 
when decision making involves risk. I test my theoretical model using a 2x2 between-
subjects experimental design where socioemotional wealth and variability-in-pay are each 
varied at two levels (i.e., low & high). I examine the theoretical model in light of multiple 
studies (i.e., with business students and practitioners) while accounting for several control 
variables. The study was piloted for calibration purposes with roughly 400 undergraduate 
students in two different spells. The main findings reported in this study are based on 125 
usable responses obtained from practitioners via Qualtrics. Based on the responses from 
supply chain management practitioners, I find evidence to suggest that only the main effect 
of variability in pay is positive and statistically significant. This suggests that individuals 
experiencing high levels of variability in pay are more likely to seek internalization. A 
post-hoc analysis, which involved splitting the sample by age (i.e., low & high) groups, 
yielded interesting findings as the results varied significantly between the two age groups. 
Among younger individuals, I find evidence to suggest that those with low socioemotional 
wealth and high variability in pay are more likely to seek high levels of SCI. Similarly, 
those with high socioemotional wealth and low variability in pay are also likely to opt for 
high levels of SCI. However, among the younger individuals, I find evidence to suggest 
that those possessing high socioemotional wealth and experiencing high variability in pay 
are less likely to pursue high levels of SCI. In older individuals, I find evidence to suggest 
that socioemotional wealth is the only salient variable but it exhibits a statistically 
significant negative impact on SCI. The results of the younger individuals matched with 
the results obtained earlier from the student sample. 
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5.4.2 Conclusion and Directions for Future Research 
Clearly this study demonstrates that adequate incentives should be designed to 
achieve high levels of SCI. Adequate incentive mechanisms should also take into account 
the cognitions, perceptions and values of executives as they can also influence executive 
decisions (Carpenter et al., 2004). Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that older 
adults do not respond effectively to variability in pay. My findings attest that older 
executives are willing to sacrifice performance to preserve their socioemotional wealth, 
as they do not engage in high levels of SCI.  
My study’s findings are consistent with some recent work on negativity bias. In 
this study I find that older adults are less responsive to variability in pay. This is consistent 
with the findings by Goldsmith and Dhar (2013) on negativity bias. Studies have 
articulated that young adults are more sensitive to extreme events (e.g., high variability in 
pay) whereas among older adults this effect was not observed (Ito et al., 1998). Along 
similar lines, studies have shown that attention to negative events diminishes with age 
(Isaacowitz et al., 2006), but not so for positive events (Kennedy et al., 2004). Several 
organizations use variability in pay as a mechanism to align the incentives of executives, 
without considering the personal interests of executives into consideration. Future 
research should determine ways to incorporate the cognitions and values of executives 
while devising alignment mechanisms. Further research is necessary to comprehend how 
the negative impact of socioemotional wealth on risky decision making (e.g., opting for 
high levels of SCI) can be mitigated. 
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This study also operationalized SCI at three different levels coordination, 
collaboration, and internalization, which proved to be effective in analyzing executive 
decision making. Koufteros et al. (2007)  warn that “not all relationships with suppliers 
have to be close or collaborative” (p. 867). Future research can attempt to examine SCI at 
different levels to better understand their implications on performance by considering the 
circumstances under which one is preferred over the other.  For instance, in the context of 
commodity products it might be more effective to merely engage in SCI at the 
coordination level, but not at the collaboration and internalization levels. Furthermore, 
some scholars argue that SCI improves performance under high environmental uncertainty 
(Peng et al., 2013), while others argue that it can deter performance (Villena et al., 2011). 
Under high environmental uncertainty it is possible that very high and very low levels of 
SCI can adversely impact performance, however pursuing SCI at the collaborating level 
might positively enhance firm performance. Future research should examine such 
possibilities. 
5.5 Holistic Perspective 
This section provides some insights into the implications of the three different, and 
yet interrelated studies on each other. Figure 5-1 indicates the areas of overlap among the 
three studies which are subsequently discussed. 
5.5.1 Theoretical Framework for SCI and Supply Chain Leadership (A) 
Study 2 demonstrates that transformational leadership behavior style has a 
significant far reaching impact on achieving high levels of SCI. However, based on my 
qualitative research (study 1), the influence of leadership on the behavior of supply chain 
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members was not immediately evident. SCI research can benefit from having a better 
understanding of how leadership behavior impacts the evolution from coordination to 
internalization. It is possible that during coordination, transactional leadership is more 
effective (i.e., as rules and norms of relationships are being shaped), and once firms go 
beyond coordination to collaboration and internalization transformational leadership is 
more effective (i.e., as firms at this level engage in shaping and developing their exchange 
partners). Understanding whether leadership behaviors suit specific levels of SCI can 
enhance the possibility of successfully achieving high levels of SCI. Lockstrom, Schadel, 
Moser, and Harrison (2011) also suggest that customer leadership behavior plays a vital 
role in attaining high levels of  SCI. 
 
Figure 5-1: Intersection across Studies 
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Both Studies 1 and 2 were conducted simultaneously. The survey instrument for 
SCI in Study 2 was primarily developed based on a comprehensive review of the extant 
literature while addressing some challenges that plagued SCI operationalization in the 
extant literature.  However, reflecting upon the findings from the theoretical framework 
some calibration might be necessary in order to enhance the effectiveness of the 
measurement scales.  For instance, the theoretical framework, suggests that monitoring 
behavior of supply chain partners differ along the different levels of SCI, however my 
refined instrument in Study 2 lacks a valid measure to capture monitoring behaviors. 
Future studies should undertake the endeavor to build on the existing scale for SCI from 
Study 2 and recalibrate it based on my theoretical framework in Study 1.  
Furthermore, Study 1 identified several contextual variables (e.g., management 
acumen and culture) that were not considered in Study 2 as factors that can influence the 
evolution of SCI. Future research should consider such contextual variables while 
examining leadership behavior (Schriesheim et al., 2009).   
5.5.2 Theoretical Framework for SCI and Executive Decision Making (B) 
Study 3 establishes that executives’ biases influence decisions regarding preferred 
levels of SCI. Specifically I find that variability in pay and socioemotional wealth had a 
differing impact on executives. However, Study 1 is restrictive in its understanding of the 
role of individuals within organizations. Executives within organizations can influence 
strategic decisions, and organizations can be seen as reflections of their top executives 
(Carpenter et al., 2004; Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Examining the role of individuals 
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within organizations in the context of SCI evolution may therefore be a fruitful research 
direction. 
Ring and Van de Ven (1994) offered a cyclical perspective on the evolution of  
interfirm relationships on the basis of individual learning. They suggested that 
relationships evolve through an iterative process of negotiation, commitment, and 
execution of responsibilities agreed upon in the commitment phase. After each cycle, 
individuals assess the performance of the relationship and compare it with their 
expectations. After assessment, a new cycle is initiated for the same or new task or the 
relationship is terminated. The theoretical framework examines the organizational 
behaviors exhibited. However, it will be worthwhile to assess the role of individuals within 
organizations as proposed by Ring and Van de Ven (1994) in the development of SCI 
through coordination, collaboration, and internalization. Jap and Anderson (2007) also 
suggest that the three steps proposed by Ring and Van de Ven (1994) can be executed 
within different phases on interfirm relationship evolution.  
5.5.3 Supply Chain Leadership and Executive Decision Making (C) 
In the third study, I demonstrate that an executive’s personal characteristics, such 
as variability in pay and socioemotional wealth, can influence firm-level decisions such as 
SCI. However, Study 3 does not take into consideration the leadership behaviors of their 
supply chain partners. A study by Korsgaard, Schweiger, and Sapienza (1995) suggests 
that the leadership behavior of customers can influence the decisions of exchange partners. 
Vroom and Yetton (1973) indicate that executive decision making can be perceived as a 
social process in which several interpersonal influence mechanisms such as leadership 
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style and power of other members involved in a relationship can impact executive 
decisions. My study on executive decision making was restrictive in scope and did not 
consider interpersonal influence factors (e.g., leadership style).  
In the experimental study, which pertained to executive decision making, I find 
that among older adults socioemotional wealth had a negative impact on the willingness 
to engage in SCI. I recommend that future research should examine means to alleviate the 
negative impact of socioemotional wealth on SCI. As a direction to remedy this challenge, 
future research should examine the role of interpersonal influence mechanisms (e.g., 
leadership), within and between organizations, as a means to alleviate the adverse impact 
of socioemotional wealth on decision making with respect to SCI.  
5.5.4 Theoretical Framework for SCI, Supply Chain Leadership, and Executive 
Decision Making (D) 
SCI is a complex phenomenon. Several firms have attempted to attain high levels 
of SCI but have failed in the process. This dissertation is aimed at understanding how to 
effectively manage and achieve high levels of SCI.  In the three studies that have examined 
SCI, it is evident that several factors such as customer leadership behavior style and 
executive personal interests within organizations can simultaneously impact SCI. To gain 
an in-depth understanding of SCI, future research should strive to consider all factors 
simultaneously in order to provide a comprehensive treatment. A systems dynamics 
approach to examining SCI may provide meaningful insights. 
Through this dissertation I took a step towards a better understanding on how to 
effectively manage and achieve high levels of SCI. For this purpose, I employed different 
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methodologies, including qualitative, survey, and an experimental approaches.  Although 
these studies provide meaningful insights, subsequent research should try to triangulate 
the findings by employing other suitable methods. For instance, I examined the impact of 
variability in pay and socioemotional wealth on executive decision making employing an 
experimental approach. However, survey studies can also be employed to capture the 
actual perception of socioemotional wealth and variability of pay of executives and to 
examine their decision making with respect to SCI.    
This dissertation specifically focused on comprehending how to effectively 
manage and achieve SCI.  However, future research should seek to understand the 
implications of achieving high levels of SCI in contexts such as supply chain risk 
management and sustainability, which are yet to be adequately explored. 
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APPENDIX A 
Table A-1: Semi-Structured Interview Protocol 
                        Questions Description 
Questions regarding the 
obstacles and benefits of  
interfirm relationships 
 
 
Questions pertaining to 
different levels of  interfirm 
relationship 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. What are some of the most challenging 
aspects of managing interfirm relationships? 
2. Do you perceive that relationships with 
certain firms change over time? 
 
1. What are the different levels of an interfirm 
relationship? 
2. What are the differentiating aspects among 
the different levels of an interfirm 
relationship? 
3. How you relate the common aspects across 
different levels of an interfirm relationship? 
4. Do firms transition from one level to 
another? How do firms transition among the 
different levels of an interfirm relationship? 
5. What factors help in the transition from one 
level to another? 
6. Why do firms transition among different 
levels/clusters in an interfirm relationship? 
7. Can you please describe the progression of 
your relationship, since its inception, with a 
customer that is intertwined with your 
organization? 
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APPENDIX B 
Definitions for Transformational and Transactional Leadership Behaviors  
Leadership Behaviors Definitions (Bass, 1985) 
Charismatic/Inspirational 
Motivation 
Communicates an appealing vision, instills pride, 
gains respect, and communicates expectations 
Intellectual Stimulation Behavior that increases follower awareness of 
problems and influences followers to view 
problems from a new perspective 
Individualized Consideration Providing support, encouragement, and coaching 
followers 
Contingent Reward Providing rewards for specific tasks accomplished 
Management by Exception Watches and searches for deviations in rules and 
standards, and takes corrective action 
 
Definition for Relationship Commitment 
Types of Relationship 
Commitment 
Definition (Allen and Meyer, 1990) 
Affective Commitment Affective Commitment is associated with a sense of 
emotional attachment and involvement in the 
relationship 
Continuance Commitment Continuance Commitment is associated with the costs 
of leaving a particular relationship  
 
Screeners Employed for the Supply Chain Leadership Study 
1. In what sector do you work? 
 Manufacturing (deals with making tangible or physical products. For example, 
making a dashboard is manufacturing) (1) 
 Service (deals with providing an intangible or abstract experience. For example, 
consulting is a service) (3) 
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2.  Do you work primarily in a Business-to-Business (B2B) or Business-to-Customer 
environment (B2C)? 
 
 B2B 
 B2C  
 
3.  How many people are employed in your organization? 
 0-100 (1) 
 100-500 (2) 
 500-1,000 (3) 
 1,000-5,000 (4) 
 5,000-10,000 (5) 
 10,000-20,000 (7) 
 Greater than 20,000 (8) 
 
4.  What is your functional department? 
 Supply Chain or Supply Chain Management (1) 
 Marketing or Marketing and Sales (2) 
 Sales or Sales Operations (3) 
 Operations (4) 
 Other (Please Specify) (5) ____________________ 
 
5. Do you have close interaction with customers or manage customer relationships? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 
6.  How long have you been working in your company? 
 0-3 Years (1) 
 3-5 (3) 
 Greater than 5 Years (4) 
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Correspondence Email 
 
Dear XXXX 
 
My name is XXXX and I am a PhD candidate at the Mays Business School, Texas A&M 
University. I am currently working on my doctoral dissertation in the domain of Supply 
Chain Management. I am reaching out to my fellow Aggies to help me complete my 
work which focuses on the relationship between leadership types and levels of 
integration with supply chain partners. I have prepared a survey to seek your input, and I 
am requesting for your participation. This study should take you no longer than 20-25 
minutes to complete. I acknowledge that this is a relatively long survey and I apologize 
in advance for it. However, this is necessary in order to gain an in-depth understanding 
of inter-firm relationships within the supply chain context. 
 
I understand that your time is very valuable, and I cannot adequately compensate for it. 
However, I will be providing you with a Starbucks gift card as a small token of 
appreciation for your valuable time and effort. Also, you are entitled to receive a free 
benchmark report upon the completion of my study. I am sure you will find the results of 
the benchmark report interesting and insightful. Please let me know if you can help me 
in this regard. 
 
If you consent to participate in this study, please contact me at XXXX indicating your 
willingness to participate in this study. Once I receive your acceptance, I will send you a 
link to the survey along with the Starbucks gift card.  
 
If you believe that others whom you know will be interested in participating in this study 
please feel free to circulate this email to them as well.  You will receive an additional 
Starbucks gift card for each additional individual who references you as their referral in 
their survey.   
 
Again, I thank you for your time and effort.  
 
Best Regards! 
 
XXXX 
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APPENDIX C 
Definitions for Coordination, Collaboration, and Internalization Used in the 
Experiment. 
Coordination: 
It refers to interfirm relationships where firms involved exchange only basic operational 
and transactional information to achieve synchronization in the flow of goods, and have a 
rigid relationship primarily governed through contractual agreements. These relationships 
require minimal investment in time, money, and effort while the returns may be limited. 
Collaboration: 
It refers to interfirm relationships that go beyond mere coordination and it is primarily 
characterized by collective activities such as joint investments and a cooperative 
relationship which may be necessary to achieve respective objectives. These relationships 
require more investments into the relationship as compared to coordination but can have 
higher returns than coordination.    
Internalization: 
It refers to interfirm relationships that go beyond collaboration and involves the adoption 
of a strategic connection between the firms which are involved. This relationship is 
intimate and is characterized by trust, commitment, and long-term orientation, and a 
relational association is maintained among the involved parties. These relationships 
require the maximum investment in terms of time, money, and effort, but can have higher 
returns than collaboration 
 
Vignette 
Common Script 
Bill Smith is a 40 year old supply chain management executive at a large electronics 
component supplier. Bill is responsible for managing the firm’s relationships with its 
customers. The financial performance of his firm has been highly inconsistent over the 
past few years. For the past two years, Bill has been coordinating activities with a customer 
regarding a product which is critical to the customer, and may account for a significant 
proportion of annual dollar sales volume and profit at the company where Bill works. The 
customer is a large firm and has been a major player in the industry with a healthy financial 
performance for several years. Bill reckons that this customer is capable of meeting 
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contractual obligations and beyond. However, Bill acknowledges that the electronics 
industry is rather volatile (i.e., uncertain). 
Manipulation Script 
High Socioemotional Wealth 
Bill, who has worked with the company for ten years, is seen an individual who takes pride 
in his work, and is highly regarded by the top management as one who makes the right 
decisions. Many of Bill’s colleagues and subordinates even look up to Bill at times of 
trouble with their customers or when facing challenges at work.  
Low Socioemotional Wealth 
Bill, who has worked with the company for two years, is yet to make a name for himself 
within the organization. Bill constantly seeks the help of his colleagues for his work related 
problems.  
High Variability in Pay 
Bill’s annual income depends on raises to base salary, annual cash bonuses, and long-term 
cash compensation which all depend on the financial performance of his firm. The 
inconsistent performance of Bill’s firm has resulted in a high fluctuation to his annual 
income.  
Low Variability in Pay 
Bill’s annual income depends on raises to base salary, annual cash bonuses, and long-term 
cash compensation which all depend on the financial performance of his firm. The healthy 
financial performance of Bill’s firm has ensured Bill with a stable annual income.   
 
Attention Filter 
Research in decision making shows that people, when making decisions and answering 
questions, prefer not pay attention and minimize their effort as much as possible. Some 
studies show that over 50% of people don't carefully read questions. If you are reading 
this question and have read all the other questions, please select the box marked 'Other' 
and type 'effort' in the box below. Do not select decision making. Thank you for 
participating and taking the time to read through the questions carefully!  
 
What was this study about? 
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Manipulation Checks 
Questions Responses 
How will you characterize XXX in 
this Study? 
a. An individual who is well 
respected, somebody people 
look up to 
b. An individual without much 
status in the organization 
XXX’s Annual income is presently is? a. Highly stable or certain 
b. Highly unstable or uncertain 
 
 
Table C-1: Student: Demographics 
 N Percentage 
Gender   
Female 45 36.3 
Male 79 63.7 
Total 124 100 
Age   
18-24 120 96.8 
25-34 4 3.2 
Total 124 100 
Race   
Black or African American 1 0.8 
Hispanic or Latino 21 16.9 
Asian  8 6.5 
White 85 68.5 
Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander  1 0.8 
Other 8 6.4 
Total 124 100 
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Table C-2: Student Study-Model Fitting Information  
Study Model  -2Log 
Likelihood 
Chi-Square  Sig. Nagelkerke  
R-Square 
Study-1 Null Hypotheses 
 
General 
224.977 
 
212.526 
 
12.452 
 
0.087 
 
0.113 
 
 
  
 
Table C-3: Student Study-Test of Parallel Lines  
Study Model  -2Log 
Likelihood 
Chi-Square  Sig. 
Study-1 Null Hypotheses 
 
General 
212.526 
 
204.957 
 
7.568 
 
0.372 
  
 
Table C-4: Student Study-Ordinal regression Results 
 Estimate 
 Thresholds   -1.105 
 
Main Effects 
 
  1.873 
 
Socioemotional Wealth   Low vs. High -1.369* 
-1.264* 
 
 
 
  1.896* 
Variability in Pay 
 
Interaction Effect 
 
Socioemotional Wealth x Variability in 
Pay  
 
Low vs. High 
 
 
 
Low vs. High 
Controls 
 
     
Gender Female vs. Male -0.344 
Financial Performance  -0.149 
Financial Risk Attitude  0.183† 
Social Risk Attitude  -0.219† 
Notes: † p<0.1. *p<0.05. **p<0.01            
 
 
